Cases › DCA25MA108 › The analyst
BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2C10PSA Airlines
What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.
69
timed facts
8
precedents
588
passages to ask
Ask the docket
passages, not paraphrasesTry
Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.
One timeline
69 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report- 18:30:21FDRground/pre-flightp.13The reviewed portion of the recording started. The APU and APU GEN parameters were recorded as on.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 18:31:18FDRground/pre-flightp.13Engine 1 was started.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 18:32:07FDRground/pre-flightp.13Engine 2 was started.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 18:34:59FDRground/pre-flightp.13APU GEN switched off.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 18:35:50FDRground/pre-flightp.13The APU was shut down.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 18:43:53FDRdeparture - leg 1p.13The aircraft departed for its first leg of the flight. Departure was defined as the time the WOW parameters switched to and remained in air.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 18:46:52.0CVR STARTp.13“OF RECORDING”read in context ↗
- 19:22:13FDRlanding - leg 1p.13The aircraft landed after its first leg. Landing was defined as the time the WOW parameters switched to and remained in ground.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 19:22:17.5CVR INT-2p.24“no slope to speak of. pressure's out. and handle. * * *”read in context ↗
- 19:22:22.0CVR INT-1p.24“alright cool.”read in context ↗
- 19:29:17.9CVR INT-2calloutp.31“okay before takeoff power control levers are in fly we're gonna leave ourselves in auto we've got twenty two in the mains. transponder's still transponding we've got... approach and uh... Culpeper.”read in context ↗
- 19:29:41.4CVR INT-2p.32“alright. clear to come up.”read in context ↗
- 19:29:42.2CVR INT-3p.32“clear left.”read in context ↗
- 19:29:43FDRdeparture - leg 2p.13The aircraft departed for its second leg. Departure was defined as the time the WOW parameters switched to and remained in air.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 19:32:04.2CVR INT-1warningp.34“I did not start my clock looks like you did. * * your side. master caution.”read in context ↗
- 19:32:50.9CVR INT-1warningp.35“master caution. aux fuel.”read in context ↗
- 19:46:10.1CVR FPSwarningp.46“[sound of rapid beeping similar to stabilator auto mode fail master caution]”read in context ↗
- 19:46:11.8CVR INT-1warningp.46“master caution. COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER (HELICOPTER) DCA25MA108”read in context ↗
- 19:56:23.8CVR INT-1warningp.56“master caution aux fuel. resetting. COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER (HELICOPTER) DCA25MA108”read in context ↗
- 19:57:39.2CVR INT-2warningp.57“master caution aux fuel. COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER (HELICOPTER) DCA25MA108”read in context ↗
- 20:18:08.0CVR INT-1calloutp.78“go around go around go around.”read in context ↗
- 20:18:09.1CVR INT-2calloutp.78“go around. COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER (HELICOPTER) DCA25MA108”read in context ↗
- 20:24:22.3CVR INT-2p.87“okay. pressure * brake *.”read in context ↗
- 20:24:23FDRlanding - leg 2p.13The aircraft landed after its second leg. Landing was defined as the time the WOW parameters switched to and remained in ground.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 20:24:25.1CVR INT-1p.87“oh just hold 'em? COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER (HELICOPTER) DCA25MA108”read in context ↗
- 20:27:20.0CVR INT-2calloutp.90“okay. uh go ahead and take off north if you like and then turn south towards the point.”read in context ↗
- 20:27:30.2CVR INT-1calloutp.90“before takeoff.”read in context ↗
- 20:27:43.6CVR INT-2calloutp.90“okay. got it. alright before takeoff engine power control levers are at fly we've got twenty one hundred eighty in the mains four hundred each side tank...in our tanks we are * avionics right now. passengers mission equipment secure.”read in context ↗
- 20:28:08.9CVR INT-3p.91“clear left.”read in context ↗
- 20:28:10.0CVR INT-1p.91“roger right.”read in context ↗
- 20:28:12FDRdeparture - leg 3 (event flight)p.13The aircraft departed for its third leg. Departure was defined as the time the WOW parameters switched to and remained in air.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 20:34:24.3CVR INT-2warningp.99“we got a master caution for the aux fuel.”read in context ↗
- 20:34:39.2CVR INT-2warningp.100“master caution for the aux fuel.”read in context ↗
- 20:40:00FDRen route - leg 3p.13Approximately 8 minutes before end of recording: IAS 81 kts, Radar Altitude 665 ft and descending, Magnetic heading 52 degrees.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 20:40:06.2CVR INT-2p.106“okay.”read in context ↗
- 20:40:09.0CVR INT-1p.106“alright down to thirteen hundred feet we're already a little low.”read in context ↗
- 20:40:46FDRApproach - localizer interceptp.9The aircraft rolled out of a left turn, on a heading consistent with being established on the ILS localizer for runway 1 at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA), at approximately 4,000 feet (ft) pressure altitude, 170 knots (kts) airspeed, with the gear up, and flaps set to 20 degrees (deg).see the traces at this moment ↗
- 20:44:27.7CVR INT-1p.110“alright there's three hundred for two hundred. COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER (HELICOPTER) DCA25MA108”read in context ↗
- 20:44:27.7CVR GROUPp.110“CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT PG 109 OF 116 Time and Intra-Aircraft Communication Time and Over-the-Air Communication Source Source”read in context ↗
- 20:44:41 through 20:44:45FDRApproachp.9Flaps setting of 30 deg, then 45 deg were selected. The aircraft was descending through a radio altitude of approximately 2,200 ft and the aircraft was traveling at an airspeed of 150 kts.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 20:44:49FDRApproachp.9All three gear down and locked parameters switched to down and locked. The aircraft was fully configured for landing, approximately 6.2 nautical miles (NM) from DCA.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 20:44:55.1CVR INT-2p.111“two hundred.”read in context ↗
- 20:45:27.6CVR INT-3p.112“clear left.”read in context ↗
- 20:45:28FDRApproach - off localizerp.9The autopilot showed as disconnected and a shallow right turn began, breaking off the runway 1 extended centerline at a radio altitude of approximately 1,700 ft and an airspeed of 134 kts. This occurred approximately 5.4 NM from DCA.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 20:45:28.8CVR INT-2p.112“clear left. crane. no factor.”read in context ↗
- 20:46:51.8CVR INT-2p.115“better not to fight the wind.”read in context ↗
- 20:46:56.6CVR INT-2p.115“right pedal.”read in context ↗
- 20:47:00FDRapproachp.141 minute before end of recording: IAS 78 kts, Radar Altitude 224 ft and generally level, Magnetic heading 198 degrees.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 20:47:15.0CVR GROUPp.115“CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT PG 114 OF 116 Time and Intra-Aircraft Communication Time and Over-the-Air Communication Source Source”read in context ↗
- 20:47:28FDRApproach - circling to runway 33p.9A left roll began to turn the aircraft to final on runway 33. The aircraft was at a radio altitude of 516 ft and an airspeed of 133 kts. The aircraft recorded winds from 307 deg at 37 kts.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 20:47:39FDRApproach - final turnp.9The traffic advisory (TA) parameter switched to on and remained on for the remainder of the recording. The aircraft was at a radio altitude of 448 ft, airspeed of 141 kts, 9 deg of left roll with an increasing bank of 17 deg at 20:47:43. Pitch was variable between 0 and 1 deg nose up throughout the roll.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 20:47:44FDRapproachp.1415 seconds before end of recording: IAS 70 kts, Radar Altitude 281 ft and generally level, Magnetic heading 218 degrees.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 20:47:44.1CVR RDO-1p.116“PAT two five has uh- aircraft in sight request visual separation.”read in context ↗
- 20:47:47.8CVR INT-2p.116“(woah/below).”read in context ↗
- 20:47:52FDRFinal approachp.9The aircraft rolled out approximately on final. The aircraft was at a radio altitude of 344 ft, 143 kts airspeed, and 123 kts groundspeed. Recorded winds were from 307 deg at 35 kts.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 20:47:52.5CVR INT-1p.116“alright kinda come left for me ma'am I think that's why he's asking.”read in context ↗
- 20:47:54FDRapproachp.145 seconds before end of recording: IAS 72 kts, Radar Altitude 276 ft and generally level, Magnetic heading 214 degrees.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 20:47:54.3CVR INT-2final secondsp.116“sure.”read in context ↗
- 20:47:55.3CVR INT-1final secondsp.116“we're kinda... COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER (HELICOPTER) DCA25MA108”read in context ↗
- 20:47:55.3CVR GROUPfinal secondsp.116“CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT PG 115 OF 116 Time and Intra-Aircraft Communication Time and Over-the-Air Communication Source Source”read in context ↗
- 20:47:55.4CVR INT-2final secondsp.117“oh-kay. fine.”read in context ↗
- 20:47:56.4CVR INT-1final secondsp.117“...out towards the middle.”read in context ↗
- 20:47:57.7CVR INT-2final secondsp.117“[sound similar to mumbling]”read in context ↗
- 20:47:58.0FDRFinal approachp.9The control column moved from 3 deg to 11 deg nose up over a period of approximately 0.8 seconds. The elevators moved from a deflection of 1 deg to a maximum of 24 deg nose up over a period of approximately 0.7 seconds. At this time, the aircraft pitch was 1 deg nose up, and roll was 3 deg left, at a radio altitude of 313 ft.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 20:47:59.2CVR RDOfinal secondsp.117“[sound similar to ELT signal]”read in context ↗
- 20:47:59.5FDRCollisionp.10A longitudinal acceleration excursion was noted and was defined by the group as the first data point indicative of collision. The aircraft attitude at this time was approximately 9 deg nose up, and 11 deg left roll. The CRJ was descending at 448 feet per minute. The last radio altitude recorded for the CRJ before this point was 313 ft and was recorded two seconds prior to impact. Certain data parameters after this point may not be reliable.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 20:47:59.5FDRimpactp.11Last recorded sample of rotor RPM and longitudinal acceleration had values consistent with impact.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 20:48:00.1CVR FPSfinal secondsp.117“[sound of rapid beeping similar to stabilator auto mode fail master caution, continues to end of recording]”read in context ↗
- 20:48:04.3FDREnd of recordingp.10The recording ended.see the traces at this moment ↗
Recorder events without a clock time
- Overnight between March 26 and March 27, 2025Observation flight conducted using a sister ship to the accident UH-60L, flying near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, Arlington, Virginia, in support of a cockpit visibility study for the human performance and operations groups
- Elapsed time, approximately 1 hour, 55 minutes, 53 seconds durationFlight recorded on the aircraft's Integrated Vehicle Health Management System (IVHMS) for further analysis
- January 29, 2025, 2048 EST (0148 UTC January 30, 2025)Midair collision between US Army PAT25 Sikorsky UH-60L and PSA Airlines flight 5342 CL-600-2C10 (CRJ700) in Washington, DC
- May 15, 2025Test flight of three sister-ship UH-60L helicopters flown in routine formation flight; displayed altitudes recorded on chest-mounted cameras and compared to IVHMS-recorded altitudes for the aircraft performance study
- N/AThree helicopters underwent pitot-static operational checks between June 30 – July 2, 2025, recorded on each helicopter's IVHMS
- N/ANTSB Vehicle Recorder Division received electronic files containing flight recorder data from ships 06-27093, 90-26259, and 99-26829
- N/ARecorded data were exported from the HUMS card in engineering units
- N/ATabular data for pitot-static system operational checks for ships 06-27093, 90-26259, and 99-26829 provided in electronic CSV format as attachments 1, 2, and 3
10-AIR-A FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - AIRPLANE - GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT · 10 events extracted by claude-sonnet-510-AIR-C FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - AIRPLANE - GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT ADDENDUM - OBSERVATION FLIGHT · 5 events extracted by claude-sonnet-510-HELO-A FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - HELICOPTER - GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT · 15 events extracted by claude-sonnet-510-HELO-C FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - HELICOPTER - GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT ADDENDUM 1 - OBSERVATION FLIGHT · 2 events extracted by claude-sonnet-510-HELO-E FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - HELICOPTER - GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT ADDENDUM 2 - ALTIMETER TEST FLIGHTS · 2 events extracted by claude-sonnet-510-HELO-I FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - HELICOPTER - GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT ADDENDUM 3 - PITOT-STATIC SYSTEM OPERATIONAL CHECK · 4 events extracted by claude-sonnet-512-HELO-A COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER - HELICOPTER - GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT · 44 of 1,089 lines shown
How the Board coded the sequence
- Approach: Midair collision→
- Enroute: Midair collision
Precedents
8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded- BOEING B17 · Commemorative Air ForceDallas, TX
- ●Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure
- ●Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Oversight
- ●Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Safety programs
Midair collision - De Havilland DHC-2 · High Adventure Air CharterSoldotna, AK
- ●Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure
- ●Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring
Midair collision - PIPER PA-32R-300 · STEVEN M ALTMANHoboken, NJ
- ●Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure
- ●Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring
Midair collision - CESSNA 208 · Martinaire Aviation LLCFulshear, TX
- ●Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure
- ●Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring
Midair collision - CESSNA 150MMoncks Corner, SCMidair collision
- CESSNA U206 · Alaska Skyways, Inc.Port Alsworth, AK
- ●Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure
- ●Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Oversight
- ●Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring
- CESSNA 208B · Hageland AviationSaint Marys, AK
- ●Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure
- ●Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Oversight
- BOMBARDIER INC DHC-8-402 · COLGAN AIR INCClarence Center, NY
- ●Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure
- ●Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring
- ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Workload management
What the record says
a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable causeFindings the Board cited in those cases
- 7 of 8Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedurecited here too
- 5 of 8Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoringcited here too
- 4 of 8Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
- 3 of 8Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Oversightcited here too
- 3 of 8Personnel issues › Physical › Sensory ability/limitation
- 3 of 8Personnel issues › Psychological › Perception/orientation/illusion
- 2 of 8Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Ceiling/visibility/precip
Occurrences it coded
- 5 of 8Midair collision
- 2 of 8Controlled flight into terr/obj (CFIT)
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
- Management › Policy/procedure
- Support/oversight/monitoring › Oversight
- Psychological › Attention/monitoring
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
- Aircraft systems › (general)
- Operating environment › Air traffic/operating proc
- Development › Design
- Management › Communication (organizational)
- Support/oversight/monitoring › Enforcement
Common in the precedents, not cited here
- Conditions/weather/phenomena › Ceiling/visibility/precip
- Action/decision › Info processing/decision
- Physical › Sensory ability/limitation
- Psychological › Perception/orientation/illusion
A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.
In the Board’s words — the closest cases
- CEN23MA0342022-11-12 · BOEING B17 · Commemorative Air Force
the air boss’s and air show event organizer’s lack of an adequate, prebriefed aircraft separation plan for the air show performance, relying instead on the air boss’s real-time deconfliction directives and the see-and-avoid strategy for collision avoidance, which allowed for the loss of separation between the Boeing B-17G and the Bell P-63F airplanes. Also causal was the diminished ability of the accident pilots to see and avoid the other aircraft due to flight path geometry, out-the-window view obscuration by airc…
- ANC20LA0742020-07-31 · De Havilland DHC-2 · High Adventure Air Charter
The failure of both pilots to see and avoid the other airplane. Contributing to the accident were (1) the PA-12 pilot’s decision to fly with a known severe vision deficiency that had resulted in denial of his most recent application for medical certification and (2) the Federal Aviation Administration’s absence of a requirement for airborne traffic advisory systems with aural alerting among operators who carry passengers for hire.
- ERA09MA4472009-08-08 · PIPER PA-32R-300 · STEVEN M ALTMAN
(1) the inherent limitations of the see-and-avoid concept, which made it difficult for the airplane pilot to see the helicopter until the final seconds before the collision, and (2) the Teterboro Airport local controller’s nonpertinent telephone conversation, which distracted him from his air traffic control (ATC) duties, including correcting the airplane pilot’s read back of the Newark Liberty International Airport (EWR) tower frequency and the timely transfer of communications for the accident airplane to the EWR…
- CEN22FA0812021-12-21 · CESSNA 208 · Martinaire Aviation LLC
The limitations of the see-and-avoid concept as a method for self-separation of aircraft, which resulted in an inflight collision. Contributing to the accident was the absence of collision avoidance technology on both aircraft.
- ERA15MA2592015-07-07 · CESSNA 150M
The approach controller's failure to provide an appropriate resolution to the conflict between the F-16 and the Cessna. Contributing to the accident were the inherent limitations of the see-and-avoid concept, resulting in both pilots' inability to take evasive action in time to avert the collision.
What it recommended after them
- A-24-031TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Work with the International Council of Air Shows Inc. (ICAS) and the warbird community to establish standard operating procedures for air show event organizers and air bosses that include: 1) applying… · CEN23MA034Open - Acceptable Response
- A-24-032TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require recurrent air boss evaluations as part of the letter of authorization renewal process. · CEN23MA034Open - Acceptable Response
- A-24-033TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Work with the International Council of Air Shows Inc. and other air show industry stakeholders to develop standardized, unambiguous terms to help ensure that the directives that air bosses provide per… · CEN23MA034Open - Acceptable Response
- A-24-034TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Revise Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Order 8900.1 to provide guidance and a job aid for FAA inspectors who evaluate an air boss’s performance and require the FAA inspector-in-charge of an air… · CEN23MA034Open - Acceptable Response
- A-24-035TO THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF AIR SHOWS, INC.: In collaboration with the Federal Aviation Administration and other air show industry stakeholders develop standardized, unambiguous terms to help ensure that the directives that air bosses p… · CEN23MA034Open - Acceptable Response
- A-24-036TO THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF AIR SHOWS, INC.: In collaboration with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the warbird community establish standard operating procedures for air show event organizers and air bosses that include: 1)… · CEN23MA034Open - Acceptable Response
- A-24-037TO COMMEMORATIVE AIR FORCE: Using the guidance provided in Advisory Circular 120-92D, “Safety Management Systems for Aviation Service Providers,” revise your safety risk assessment process for identifying and mitigating risks, tracking safe… · CEN23MA034Open - Acceptable Response
- A-10-010TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K operators to review their standard operating procedures to verify that they are consistent with the flight crew monitoring techniques desc… · DCA09MA027Closed - Unacceptable Action
This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).