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Cases › DCA25MA108 · Major investigation · Class 1

BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2C10PSA Airlines

Washington, DC, USA · 2025-01-30·N709PS

67
fatal
0
serious
Fatal
highest injury
Destroyed
damage

What happened

NTSB summary, verbatim

On January 29, 2025, about 2048 eastern standard time, a Sikorsky UH 60L, operated by the US Army under the callsign PAT25 (Priority Air Transport Flight 25), and an MHI (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries) RJ Aviation (formerly Bombardier) CL-600-2C10 (CRJ700), N709PS, operated by PSA Airlines as American Airlines flight 5342, collided in flight about 0.5 miles southeast of Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA), Arlington, Virginia, and impacted the Potomac River in southwest Washington, DC. The 2 pilots, 2 flight attendants, and 60 passengers on board the airplane and all 3 crewmembers on board the helicopter died. Both aircraft were destroyed as a result of the accident. Flight 5342 was operating under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 as a scheduled domestic passenger flight from Wichita Dwight D. Eisenhower National Airport, Wichita, Kansas, to DCA. PAT25 originated from Davison Army Airfield, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, for the purpose of the pilot’s annual standardization evaluation flight with the use of night vision goggles. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed in the area of DCA at the time of the accident.

Photographs

1the aircraft, and what the investigators found
The aircraft before the accident
American Eagle CRJ-700 N709PS at Charlotte, 2022
Colin Brown · CC BY 2.0 · Wikimedia Commons

Probable cause

the Board's determination
The Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) placement of a helicopter route in close proximity to a runway approach path; their failure to regularly review and evaluate helicopter routes and available data, and their failure to act on recommendations to mitigate the risk of a midair collision near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA); as well as the air traffic system’s overreliance on visual separation in order to promote efficient traffic flow without consideration for the limitations of the see-and-avoid concept. Also causal was the lack of effective pilot-applied visual separation by the helicopter crew, which resulted in a midair collision. Additional causal factors were the tower team’s loss of situation awareness and degraded performance due to the high workload of the combined helicopter and local control positions and the absence of a risk assessment process to identify and mitigate real-time operational risk factors, which resulted in misprioritization of duties, inadequate traffic advisories, and the lack of safety alerts to both flight crews. Also causal was the Army’s failure to ensure pilots were aware of the effects of error tolerances on barometric altimeters in their helicopters, which resulted in the crew flying above the maximum published helicopter route altitude. Contributing factors include: · the limitations of the traffic awareness and collision alerting systems on both aircraft, which precluded effective alerting of the impending collision to the flight crews; · an unsustainable airport arrival rate, increasing traffic volume with a changing fleet mix, and airline scheduling practices at DCA, which regularly strained the DCA air traffic control tower workforce and degraded safety over time; · the Army’s lack of a fully implemented safety management system, which should have identified and addressed hazards associated with altitude exceedances on the Washington, DC, helicopter routes; · the FAA’s failure across multiple organizations to implement previous NTSB recommendations, including Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast In, and to follow and fully integrate its established safety management system, which should have led to several organizational and operational changes based on previously identified risks that were known to management; and · the absence of effective data sharing and analysis among the FAA, aircraft operators, and other relevant organizations.

Occurrence sequence

2 stepsNTSB coding · CICTT taxonomy
  1. 1 · Approach
    Midair collision
    defining event
  2. 1 · Enroute
    Midair collision
    defining event

Findings

34 causal · 2 contributing
  • CAUSE
    Organizational issues › Development › Design › Policy/procedure development — FAA/Regulator
  • CAUSE
    Organizational issues › Development › Design › Policy/procedure development — FAA/Regulator
  • CAUSE
    Environmental issues › Operating environment › Air traffic/operating proc › Airway/route system procedure — Contributed to outcome
  • CAUSE
    Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Enforcement › Regulatory requirements — FAA/Regulator
  • CAUSE
    Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Enforcement › Regulatory requirements — FAA/Regulator
  • CAUSE
    Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Oversight › Oversight of operation — FAA/Regulator
  • CAUSE
    Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure › Adequacy of policy/proc — ATC
  • CAUSE
    Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Oversight › Oversight of operation — FAA/Regulator
  • CAUSE
    Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Task monitoring/vigilance — Pilot of other aircraft
  • CAUSE
    Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure › Adequacy of policy/proc — ATC
  • CAUSE
    Environmental issues › Operating environment › Air traffic/operating proc › Airway/route system procedure — Contributed to outcome
  • CAUSE
    Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring environment — ATC personnel
  • CAUSE
    Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure › Availability of policy/proc — ATC
  • CAUSE
    Personnel issues › Task performance › Workload management › Task overload — ATC personnel
  • CAUSE
    Aircraft › Aircraft systems › (general) — Capability exceeded
  • CAUSE
    Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure › Availability of policy/proc — ATC
  • CAUSE
    Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Oversight › Oversight of personnel — Other institution/organization
  • CAUSE
    Environmental issues › Operating environment › Air traffic/operating proc › Terminal arrival procedure — Contributed to outcome
  • CAUSE
    Environmental issues › Operating environment › Air traffic/operating proc › Traffic congestion — Contributed to outcome
  • CAUSE
    Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Oversight › Equipment monitoring — Other institution/organization
  • CAUSE
    Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Safety programs › Adequacy of safety program — Other institution/organization
  • CAUSE
    Aircraft › Aircraft systems › (general) — Capability exceeded
  • CAUSE
    Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Safety programs › Adequacy of safety program — FAA/Regulator
  • CAUSE
    Environmental issues › Operating environment › Air traffic/operating proc › Terminal arrival procedure — Contributed to outcome
  • CAUSE
    Organizational issues › Management › Communication (organizational) › Between groups/organizations — FAA/Regulator
  • CAUSE
    Environmental issues › Operating environment › Air traffic/operating proc › Traffic congestion — Contributed to outcome
  • CAUSE
    Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Safety programs › Adequacy of safety program — Other institution/organization
  • CAUSE
    Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Oversight › Oversight of personnel — Other institution/organization
  • CAUSE
    Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Oversight › Equipment monitoring — Other institution/organization
  • CAUSE
    Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Safety programs › Adequacy of safety program — FAA/Regulator
  • CAUSE
    Organizational issues › Management › Communication (organizational) › Between groups/organizations — FAA/Regulator
  • CAUSE
    Personnel issues › Task performance › Workload management › Task overload — ATC personnel
  • CAUSE
    Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring environment — ATC personnel
  • CAUSE
    Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Task monitoring/vigilance — Flight crew
  • FACTOR
    Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Light condition › Dark — Contributed to outcome
  • FACTOR
    Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Light condition › Dark — Contributed to outcome

Safety recommendations

52 issuedwhat changed because of this accident
  • A-25-001Closed - Exceeds Recommended ActionCLASS Iletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Prohibit operations on Helicopter Route 4 between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge when runways 15 and 33 are being used for departures and arrivals, respectively, at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA). (Urgent)

  • A-25-002Open - Acceptable ResponseCLASS Iletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Designate an alternative helicopter route that can be used to facilitate travel between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge when that segment of Route 4 is closed. (Urgent)

  • A-26-008Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Develop and implement time-on-position limitations for supervisory air traffic control personnel, including guidance for district and facility level management to adapt these limitations to account for their own staffing and local standard operating procedures.

  • A-26-009Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Develop instructor-led, scenario-based training on threat and error management that trains controllers to continuously monitor their environment to more quickly and accurately identify threats; promote team communication to ensure that communications are clear, timely, and assertive; emphasize effective scanning habits; recognize patterns in the development of adverse events; and enhance decision-making under stress by developing habits that balance procedural compliance with problem solving to mitigate the risks of threats and errors, and provide this training to all air traffic controllers annually.

  • A-26-010Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Develop and implement a risk assessment tool for supervisors that incorporates the principles of threat and error management to assist in risk identification, mitigation, and operational decision making.

  • A-26-011Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Initiate rulemaking in 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 93 Subpart K, High Density Traffic Airports, that prescribes air carrier operation limitations at DCA in 30-minute periods, similar to those imposed at LaGuardia Airport, to ensure that the airport does not exceed capacity and to mitigate inconsistent air carrier scheduling practices.

  • A-26-012Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Fully implement operational use of the time-based flow management system at Potomac Consolidated Terminal Radar Approach Control and its associated air traffic control towers.

  • A-26-013Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Reassess the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport’s airport arrival rate with special consideration to its airspace complexity, airfield limitations, mixed fleet operations, and traffic volume.

  • A-26-014Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require each Class B or Class C air traffic control tower facility to evaluate its existing miles-in-trail procedures or agreements to ensure that the spacing provided is appropriate for operational safety, and make the results publicly available.

  • A-26-015Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Define objective criteria for the determination of air traffic facility levels considering traffic and airspace volume, operational factors unique to each facility, and cost of living.

  • A-26-016Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Using the criteria established by Safety Recommendation A-26-15, determine whether the classification of the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport’s air traffic control tower as a level 9 facility appropriately reflects the complexity of its operations.

  • A-26-017Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Develop a new and comprehensive instructor-led, scenario-based training on the proper use of visual separation, both tower- and pilot-applied. This training should include information on the inherent limitations of see and avoid, responsibilities when applying visual separation, and guidance for controllers on factors, such as current traffic volume, workload, weather or environmental factors, experience, and staffing, that should be considered when applying visual separation. Require this training for all controllers and include on a recurrent basis thereafter in annual simulator refresher training.

  • A-26-018Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Conduct a comprehensive evaluation, in conjunction with local operators, to determine the overall safety benefits and risks to requiring all aircraft to use the same frequency when the helicopter and local positions are combined in the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport air traffic control tower.

  • A-26-019Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Implement anti-blocking technology that will alert controllers and/or flight crews to potentially blocked transmissions when simultaneous broadcasting occurs.

  • A-26-020Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Develop and implement improvements to the conflict alert system to provide more salient and meaningful alerts to controllers based on the severity of the conflict triggering the alert.

  • A-26-021Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Once the improvements to the conflict alert system discussed in Safety Recommendation A-26-20 are implemented, provide training to controllers on its use.

  • A-26-022Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Revise the Air Traffic Organization’s initial event response procedures so that an appropriate on-site supervisor makes each postaccident and postincident drug and alcohol testing determination, based on their assessment of whether the event meets testing criteria and which controllers had duties pertaining to the involved aircraft, without needing to wait for investigation or approval.

  • A-26-023Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: At least annually, provide training on the revised postaccident and postincident drug and alcohol testing determination procedure discussed in Safety Recommendation A-26-22 to all staff who have responsibilities under that procedure; this training should include a post-learning knowledge assessment.

  • A-26-024Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Ensure that annual reviews of helicopter route charts are being conducted throughout the National Airspace System as required by Federal Aviation Administration Order.

  • A-26-025Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Conduct a safety risk management process to evaluate whether modifications to the remaining helicopter route structure in the vicinity of Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport are necessary to safely deconflict helicopter and fixed-wing traffic and provide the results to the National Transportation Safety Board.

  • A-26-026Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Amend your helicopter route design criteria and approval process to ensure that current and future route designs or design changes provide vertical separation from airport approach and departure paths.

  • A-26-027Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Based on the criteria and approval process established by Safety Recommendation A-26-26, review all existing helicopter routes to ensure alignment with these updated criteria.

  • A-26-028Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Incorporate the lateral location and published altitudes of helicopter routes onto all instrument and visual approach and departure procedures to provide necessary situation awareness to fixed-wing operators of the risk of helicopter traffic operating in their vicinity.

  • A-26-029Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Modify airborne collision avoidance system traffic advisory aural alerts to include clock position, relative altitude, range, and vertical tendency.

  • A-26-030Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require existing and new traffic alerting and collision avoidance system (TCAS) I, TCAS II, and airborne collision avoidance system X installations to integrate directional traffic symbols.

  • A-26-031Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all aircraft operating in airspace where Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast (ADS-B) Out is required to also be equipped with ADS B In with a cockpit display of traffic information that is configured to provide alerting audible to the pilot and/or flight crew.

  • A-26-032Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require the use of the appropriate variant of airborne collision avoidance system X on new production aircraft that are subject to traffic alert and collision avoidance system equipage regulations.

  • A-26-033Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require existing aircraft that are subject to traffic alert and collision avoidance system equipage regulations be retrofitted with the appropriate variant of airborne collision avoidance system X.

  • A-26-034Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Evaluate the feasibility of decreasing the traffic advisory and resolution advisory inhibit altitudes in airborne collision avoidance system Xa to enable improved alerting throughout more of the flight envelope.

  • A-26-035Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: If the evaluation resulting from Safety Recommendation A-26-34 finds that the inhibit altitudes can be safely decreased, require retrofitting of the applicable airborne collision avoidance system X variant incorporating the reduced traffic advisory and resolution advisory inhibit altitudes on all aircraft that are subject to traffic alert and collision avoidance system and equipage regulations.

  • A-26-036Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require that all rotorcraft operating in Class B airspace be equipped with airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS) Xr technology once the ACAS Xr standard has been published.

  • A-26-037Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Create an objective definition of close proximity encounter and a public database of those encounters and their locations that can be used to monitor their prevalence and identify areas of potential traffic conflict for safety assurance and safety risk management.

  • A-26-038Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Develop and implement a process that will, in a timely manner, notify involved parties after events such as near midair collisions or traffic alert and collision avoidance system resolution advisory activations, such that notification occurs while relevant data remain available and before meaningful safety analysis, reporting, or corrective action is no longer practicable.

  • A-26-039Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Based on the results of the audit completed in accordance with Safety Recommendation A-26-56, ensure that all safety management system functions and data sharing activities at all air traffic control facilities are conducted in collaboration with all relevant external stakeholders.

  • A-26-040Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Establish a requirement across all air traffic control tower standard operating procedures that the operations supervisor (OS) or controller-in-charge (CIC) document in the daily facility log when any control position is combined with the local control position, or when the OS/CIC position is combined with a control position, along with a rationale for doing so.

  • A-26-041Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE UNITED STATES ARMY: Revise training procedures for flight crews assigned to operate in the Washington, DC, area to ensure that they receive initial and recurrent training on fixed-wing operations at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, including approach and departure paths, runway configurations, and the interaction of those traffic flows with published helicopter routes.

  • A-26-042Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE UNITED STATES ARMY: Develop and implement a recurring procedure, at an interval not to exceed 18 months, to verify the continued accuracy of recorded flight data.

  • A-26-043Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE UNITED STATES ARMY: Incorporate information within the appropriate operator’s manual for all applicable aircraft on the potential total error allowed by design that could occur in flight on an otherwise airworthy barometric altimeter, including the increased position error associated with the external stores support system configuration.

  • A-26-044Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE UNITED STATES ARMY: Develop and implement a transponder inspection procedure on all aircraft with transponders capable of transmitting Mode S and automatic dependent surveillance—broadcast (ADS-B) and operated in the National Airspace System (NAS), at least annually and upon each aircraft’s entry into service in the NAS, that ensures 1) the transponder ADS-B settings are correct, 2) the transponder is transmitting ADS-B, and 3) the transponder is transmitting the correctly assigned address.

  • A-26-045Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE UNITED STATES ARMY: Establish a flight data monitoring program for rotary-wing aircraft the US Army operates in the National Airspace System.

  • A-26-046Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE UNITED STATES ARMY: Survey US Army helicopter pilots to identify barriers to the utilization of flight safety reporting systems, develop a plan to address the identified barriers, and implement that plan across Army aviation units.

  • A-26-047Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE UNITED STATES ARMY: Revise the method for allocating resources to ensure the development of a robust safety management system that will, at a minimum, identify and monitor the potential for midair collisions between Army aircraft and civil air traffic operating in the National Airspace System.

  • A-26-048Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE UNITED STATES ARMY: Develop and maintain a flight safety management capability that is independently resourced and functionally separate from its occupational and environmental health management system, and ensure that this capability is both culturally and functionally integrated with units conducting sustained flight operations in the National Airspace System.

  • A-26-049Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF WAR, POLICY BOARD ON FEDERAL AVIATION: Conduct a study to evaluate the quality of radio transmissions and reception for those aircraft operated within the National Airspace System to identify factors that degrade communications equipment performance and adversely affect the safety of civilian and military flight operations.

  • A-26-050Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF WAR, POLICY BOARD ON FEDERAL AVIATION: Implement appropriate enhancements, based on the findings of the study recommended in Safety Recommendation A-26-49, to remediate identified deficiencies in air–ground radio communications performance.

  • A-26-051Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF WAR, POLICY BOARD ON FEDERAL AVIATION: Require the Department of War to verify on all aircraft with transponders capable of transmitting Mode S and automatic dependent surveillance—broadcast (ADS-B) and operated in the National Airspace System (NAS), at least annually and upon each aircraft’s entry into service in the NAS, that 1) the transponder ADS-B settings are correct, 2) the transponder is transmitting ADS B, and 3) the transponder is transmitting the correctly assigned address.

  • A-26-052Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF WAR, POLICY BOARD ON FEDERAL AVIATION: Require armed services to amend their operational procedures to allow flight crews to enable Automatic Dependent Surveillance—Broadcast Out while in flight.

  • A-26-053Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF WAR, POLICY BOARD ON FEDERAL AVIATION: Require all military aircraft operating in the National Airspace System (NAS) be equipped with Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) In with a cockpit display of traffic information that is configured to provide alerting audible to the pilot and/or flight crew, and that such requirement apply wherever in the NAS the Federal Aviation Administration requires any aircraft to operate with ADS-B Out.

  • A-26-054Open - Acceptable ResponseCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION: Require the Federal Aviation Administration to demonstrate at least annually that each air traffic control facility it operates has the routine capability to accomplish required postaccident and postincident drug and alcohol testing within the US Department of Transportation’s specified timeframes of 2 hours for alcohol and 4 hours for drugs, and implement a process to ensure that any facility without such capability will demonstrate timely remediation.

  • A-26-055Open - Acceptable ResponseCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION: Work with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Administrator to convene an independent panel to conduct a comprehensive review of the safety culture within the FAA’s Air Traffic Organization (ATO), and use the findings to enhance the ATO’s existing safety management system and integrate it into all levels of the organization.

  • A-26-056Open - Acceptable ResponseCLASS IIletter ↗

    UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL: Complete an audit of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Air Traffic Organization safety management system functions and data sharing activities at all air traffic control facilities and determine whether these activities are conducted in collaboration with all relevant external stakeholders, ensuring that the audit’s results are documented, reported to the Secretary of Transportation and the FAA Administrator, and made available to the public.

  • A-26-057Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE RTCA PROGRAM MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE: Finalize and publish the minimum operational performance standards for airborne collision avoidance system Xr for rotorcraft.

Sequence of events

2 timed eventsfrom the FDR factual report · claude-sonnet-5
  1. Overnight between March 26 and March 27, 2025Observation Flightp.4
    Observation flight conducted using a sister ship to the accident UH-60L, flying near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, Arlington, Virginia, in support of a cockpit visibility study for the human performance and operations groups
  2. Elapsed time, approximately 1 hour, 55 minutes, 53 seconds durationObservation Flight - Recordingp.4
    Flight recorded on the aircraft's Integrated Vehicle Health Management System (IVHMS) for further analysis

NTSB analysis

from the final report

On January 29, 2025, about 2048 eastern standard time, a Sikorsky UH 60L, operated by the US Army under the callsign PAT25 (Priority Air Transport Flight 25), and an MHI (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries) RJ Aviation (formerly Bombardier) CL-600-2C10 (CRJ700), N709PS, operated by PSA Airlines as American Airlines flight 5342, collided in flight about 0.5 miles southeast of Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA), Arlington, Virginia, and impacted the Potomac River in southwest Washington, DC. The 2 pilots, 2 flight attendants, and 60 passengers on board the airplane and all 3 crewmembers on board the helicopter died. Both aircraft were destroyed as a result of the accident. Flight 5342 was operating under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 as a scheduled domestic passenger flight from Wichita Dwight D. Eisenhower National Airport, Wichita, Kansas, to DCA. PAT25 originated from Davison Army Airfield, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, for the purpose of the pilot’s annual standardization evaluation flight with the use of night vision goggles. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed in the area of DCA at the time of the accident.