AIRBUS A320-232JETBLUE AIRWAYS CORP
Sacramento, CA, USA · 2010-08-26·N590JB
What happened
NTSB summary, verbatimUpon touchdown and with the first officer as the pilot flying, the airplane rapidly decelerated. After touchdown, air traffic control tower personnel notified the flight crew that smoke and sparks were coming from the airplane's main landing gear. The captain took control of the airplane and maintained directional control as it abruptly came to stop about 2,000 feet from the touchdown point. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that all four main landing gear tires were deflated and showed evidence of being locked on touchdown and that the main wheel rims were ground down. According to recorded digital flight data, the parking brake engaged about 5,116 mean sea level and remained engaged throughout the remainder of the flight and landing roll. The data also indicated that the speed brake was activated about 4 seconds before the parking brake. The speed brake lever is on the left side of the center console near the parking brake switch, which is at the bottom center of the console. The first officer stated that he activated the speed brake. It is likely that the first officer inadvertently activated the parking brake at the same time. The flight crew stated that they were unaware of any indications or warnings related to the parking brake system during flight. The airplane's Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM) system should alert the flight crew when the parking brake is engaged in flight. However, after the accident, the first officer stated that he selected and held down the ECAM emergency cancel pushbutton for several seconds and that this was his typical procedure to preempt the autopilot disconnect audio. This action also terminated, in part, most of the visual alert indications associated with the in-flight parking brake activation. (The alerts would appear in the cancelled caution field on the status page and could be recalled, if necessary.) The operator's procedures state to only use the ECAM emergency cancel pushbutton to suppress spurious master cautions. A review of the airplane's cockpit voice recorder transcript revealed no audible autopilot disconnect or parking brake activation warnings. Examination of the airplane's parking brake and ECAM revealed no mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. If the first officer had not cancelled out most of the visual alert indications associated with the in-flight parking brake activation, it is likely that a visual warning would have alerted the flight crew to the in-flight parking brake activation.
Photographs
1the aircraft, and what the investigators foundProbable cause
the Board's determinationThe first officer’s inadvertent activation of the parking brake in flight, which led to the airplane abruptly stopping and all four of its main landing gear tires deflating, and his use of a nonstandard procedure to cancel the airplane's monitoring alert system.
Occurrence sequence
2 stepsNTSB coding · CICTT taxonomy- 1 · ApproachMiscellaneous/otherdefining event
- 2 · Landing-landing rollMiscellaneous/other
Findings
2 causal · 0 contributing- CAUSEPersonnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of policy/procedure — Copilot
- CAUSEPersonnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action selection — Copilot
Sequence of events
20 timed eventsfrom the FDR factual report · claude-sonnet-5- 11:55takeoffp.3Aircraft took off
- 12:46:52descentp.3As the aircraft was passing through 5,164 feet, at an airspeed of 224 knots, the speed brake lever began to move.
- 12:46:56descentp.3Parking brake off parameter changed from a state of off to not off; left and right yellow brake pressure indications increased from a nominal value to about 2,300 psi and stayed around this value for the remainder of the flight; autopilot 2 parameter changed state from engaged to not engaged; a microphone key indicated at this time.
- 12:46:58descentp.3The master warning (FWC 2) parameter came on for 3 seconds.
- 12:47:00descentp.3The master caution (FWC 2) came on for 4 seconds, and the flight directors transitioned from engaged to not engaged.
- 12:47:21approachp.3At an airspeed of 225 knots, the gear was selected down.
- 12:47:39approachp.3The speed brakes were retracted (18 seconds after gear down selection).
- 12:47:55approachp.3The speed brakes were commanded again and remained extended for 13 seconds.
- 12:48:17approachp.3The slat-flap lever parameter registered a change from notch 0 to notch 1.
- 12:49:00approachp.3As the aircraft was passing through 2,000 feet, with an airspeed of 180 knots, the slat-flap lever moved to notch 2 and the flaps began to transition from 0 degrees.
- 12:49:19approachp.3The slat-flap lever moved to position 3 (nineteen seconds after notch 2).
- 12:49:31approachp.3The slat-flap lever transitioned to full.
- 12:51:36landingp.3The weight on wheels parameter for the left gear indicated compressed. The airspeed registered 114 knots and spoilers began to deploy.
- 12:51:37landingp.3The right gear indicated compressed, followed by the nose gear, but the wheel speed values remained around 0 knots, with intermittent wheel speeds recorded as 14, 20 and up to 60 knots.
- 12:51:38landingp.3There was a pronounced decrease in longitudinal deceleration during the touchdown with a maximum value of -.50 g's recorded.
- 12:51:40landing rollp.3The thrust reversers deployed.
- 12:51:55landing rollp.3There was a deflection in the brake pedal positions and the autobrake parameter indicated off for 5 seconds. The yellow brake pressure values decreased but there was minimal change in the normal brake pressure values.
- 12:51:59landing rollp.3The groundspeed recorded 0 knots.
- 12:52:00post-landingp.3The parking brake parameter recorded off for 2 seconds and then returned to the previous state of not off.
- 12:54:07end of recordingp.3The FDR stopped recording data for this flight.
NTSB analysis
from the final reportUpon touchdown and with the first officer as the pilot flying, the airplane rapidly decelerated. After touchdown, air traffic control tower personnel notified the flight crew that smoke and sparks were coming from the airplane's main landing gear. The captain took control of the airplane and maintained directional control as it abruptly came to stop about 2,000 feet from the touchdown point. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that all four main landing gear tires were deflated and showed evidence of being locked on touchdown and that the main wheel rims were ground down. According to recorded digital flight data, the parking brake engaged about 5,116 mean sea level and remained engaged throughout the remainder of the flight and landing roll. The data also indicated that the speed brake was activated about 4 seconds before the parking brake. The speed brake lever is on the left side of the center console near the parking brake switch, which is at the bottom center of the console. The first officer stated that he activated the speed brake. It is likely that the first officer inadvertently activated the parking brake at the same time. The flight crew stated that they were unaware of any indications or warnings related to the parking brake system during flight. The airplane's Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM) system should alert the flight crew when the parking brake is engaged in flight. However, after the accident, the first officer stated that he selected and held down the ECAM emergency cancel pushbutton for several seconds and that this was his typical procedure to preempt the autopilot disconnect audio. This action also terminated, in part, most of the visual alert indications associated with the in-flight parking brake activation. (The alerts would appear in the cancelled caution field on the status page and could be recalled, if necessary.) The operator's procedures state to only use the ECAM emergency cancel pushbutton to suppress spurious master cautions. A review of the airplane's cockpit voice recorder transcript revealed no audible autopilot disconnect or parking brake activation warnings. Examination of the airplane's parking brake and ECAM revealed no mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. If the first officer had not cancelled out most of the visual alert indications associated with the in-flight parking brake activation, it is likely that a visual warning would have alerted the flight crew to the in-flight parking brake activation.