BOEING 717-200Airtran Airways
Inverness, FL, USA · 2009-08-27·N994AT
What happened
NTSB summary, verbatimThe scheduled passenger flight was climbing through 25,000 feet when it encountered convective turbulence in daytime instrument meteorological conditions. A flight attendant, who was servicing the aft cabin, sustained leg and ankle fractures when her service cart became airborne and struck her in the leg. Both the flight and cabin crew members stated that the turbulence was unexpected. The National Weather Service (NWS) had issued multiple, sequential warnings of significant meteorological activity (SIGMETs) regarding the potential for thunderstorms and turbulence along the flight's planned route. The operator's dispatch department provided the flightcrew with a SIGMET that was valid until about one hour before the scheduled departure time. Contrary to operator and regulatory requirements, the dispatch department did not provide the flight crew with updated, current information, which included two new SIGMETs, one of which was issued an hour before the scheduled departure time, and all of which were similar in content and coverage area. The flight crew did not check with dispatch to determine whether any SIGMETS were current for the planned departure time. None of the air traffic controllers who handled the flight prior to the event relayed any hazardous weather information to the flight, despite their requirement to do so. Correlation of meteorological and flight path data indicated that the turbulence encounter occurred when the airplane penetrated a continuous line of thunderstorms that was present in the SIGMET coverage area. Strong radar echoes, indicative of potential turbulence, were detected below the airplane's altitude by ground-based weather radar. Review of the operator's flight and cabin crew guidance revealed that the procedures incorporated some of the latest industry strategies for mitigating turbulence hazards, but did not provide the flight attendants with the recommended level of autonomy when it came to decisions about when to provide service, or how to prioritize tasks, in the event of turbulence. Although hindered by the failure of the dispatch department to provide them with current SIGMETs, given the previous SIGMET and forecast for significant thunderstorms along the route, and atmospheric activity that was likely readily detectable by the airplane's onboard weather radar, the flightcrew could have anticipated the turbulence, and the flight attendants could have either been instructed to remain seated, or been provided with sufficient information to decide on their own, until the airplane was clear of the hazard area.
Photographs
1the aircraft, and what the investigators foundProbable cause
the Board's determinationThe flight crew's encounter with convective turbulence. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the operator's dispatch department to provide the flightcrew with current adverse weather information along the planned route of flight. Also contributing was the failure of the flightcrew to provide relevant forecast information to the cabin crew, and their failure to detect and avoid the existing convective conditions.
Occurrence sequence
2 stepsNTSB coding · CICTT taxonomy- 1 · Enroute-climb to cruiseTurbulence encounterdefining event
- 2 · Enroute-climb to cruiseCabin safety event
Findings
6 causal · 1 contributing- CAUSEEnvironmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Turbulence › Convective turbulence — Effect on operation
- CAUSEEnvironmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Turbulence › Convective turbulence — Awareness of condition
- CAUSEPersonnel issues › Task performance › Planning/preparation › Weather planning — Flt operations/dispatcher
- CAUSEPersonnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Lack of communication — Flt operations/dispatcher
- CAUSEPersonnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of available resources — Flight crew
- CAUSEPersonnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Lack of communication — Flight crew
- FACTORPersonnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Lack of communication — ATC personnel
Sequence of events
3 timed eventsfrom the FDR factual report · claude-sonnet-5- 1549 EDTTakeoffp.2Aircraft took off
- 1603 EDTClimbp.2Aircraft encountered turbulence while in a climb near Inverness, Florida; perturbations in lateral and vertical acceleration parameters for about 15 seconds while climbing through 25,000 feet
- 1706 EDTLandingp.2Aircraft landed
NTSB analysis
from the final reportThe scheduled passenger flight was climbing through 25,000 feet when it encountered convective turbulence in daytime instrument meteorological conditions. A flight attendant, who was servicing the aft cabin, sustained leg and ankle fractures when her service cart became airborne and struck her in the leg. Both the flight and cabin crew members stated that the turbulence was unexpected. The National Weather Service (NWS) had issued multiple, sequential warnings of significant meteorological activity (SIGMETs) regarding the potential for thunderstorms and turbulence along the flight's planned route. The operator's dispatch department provided the flightcrew with a SIGMET that was valid until about one hour before the scheduled departure time. Contrary to operator and regulatory requirements, the dispatch department did not provide the flight crew with updated, current information, which included two new SIGMETs, one of which was issued an hour before the scheduled departure time, and all of which were similar in content and coverage area. The flight crew did not check with dispatch to determine whether any SIGMETS were current for the planned departure time. None of the air traffic controllers who handled the flight prior to the event relayed any hazardous weather information to the flight, despite their requirement to do so. Correlation of meteorological and flight path data indicated that the turbulence encounter occurred when the airplane penetrated a continuous line of thunderstorms that was present in the SIGMET coverage area. Strong radar echoes, indicative of potential turbulence, were detected below the airplane's altitude by ground-based weather radar. Review of the operator's flight and cabin crew guidance revealed that the procedures incorporated some of the latest industry strategies for mitigating turbulence hazards, but did not provide the flight attendants with the recommended level of autonomy when it came to decisions about when to provide service, or how to prioritize tasks, in the event of turbulence. Although hindered by the failure of the dispatch department to provide them with current SIGMETs, given the previous SIGMET and forecast for significant thunderstorms along the route, and atmospheric activity that was likely readily detectable by the airplane's onboard weather radar, the flightcrew could have anticipated the turbulence, and the flight attendants could have either been instructed to remain seated, or been provided with sufficient information to decide on their own, until the airplane was clear of the hazard area.