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Cases › DCA25LA015 › The analyst

AIRBUS A300 F4-622RUnited Parcel Service Co

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

28
timed facts
8
precedents
25
passages to ask

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passages, not paraphrases
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Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.

One timeline

28 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report
  1. 08:45:00 EDTFDRDeparture/Climb/Cruise/Descentp.5
    The aircraft departed runway 26L at Ontario International Airport (KONT), Ontario, California. The data is consistent with an uneventful departure, climb, cruise, and descent into Louisville Muhammad Ali International Airport (KSDF), Louisville, Kentucky.
  2. 08:59:25 EDTFDRDescentp.5
    The crew tuned the ILS frequency to 110.3 MHz, the frequency for runway 17R at KSDF.
  3. 11:51:43 EDTFDRApproachp.5
    The slat began to increase from 0 deg.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  4. 11:51:53 EDTFDRApproachp.5
    The slat position was 17 deg. Radio altitude was 2,239 ft and airspeed was 233 kts.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  5. 11:52:36 EDTFDRApproachp.5
    The flap position began to increase from 0 deg.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  6. 11:52:48 EDTFDRApproachp.5
    The aircraft captured the localizer.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  7. 11:52:56 EDTFDRApproachp.5
    The flap position was 8.25 deg. Radio altitude was 2,660 ft and airspeed was 198 kts.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  8. 11:53:13 EDTFDRApproachp.5
    The aircraft lateral autopilot mode was localizer track.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  9. 11:53:16 EDTFDRApproachp.5
    The flap position was 17.5 deg. Radio altitude was 2,670 ft and airspeed was 187 kts.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  10. 11:53:18 EDTFDRApproachp.6
    The aircraft captured the glideslope.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  11. 11:53:41 EDTFDRApproachp.6
    The aircraft longitudinal autopilot mode was glideslope track.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  12. 11:53:51 EDTFDRApproachp.6
    The landing gear handle changed from not down to down.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  13. 11:53:55 EDTFDRApproachp.6
    The ground spoilers were armed for landing.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  14. 11:54:06 EDTFDRApproachp.6
    The nose and main gears were down and locked.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  15. 11:54:28 EDTFDRApproachp.6
    The slat position was 25 deg. Radio altitude was 1,824 ft and airspeed was 142 kts.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  16. 11:54:30 EDTFDRApproachp.6
    The flap position was 33.5 deg. Radio altitude was 1,781 ft and airspeed was 143 kts.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  17. 11:56:22 EDTFDRApproachp.6
    The left (captain) autopilot was disengaged. The first officer master warning was active for 4 seconds.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  18. 11:56:23 EDTFDRApproachp.6
    The captain master warning was active for 3 seconds.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  19. 11:57:02 EDTFDRLandingp.6
    The right weight on wheels changed from air to ground. Airspeed and ground speed were 131 kts and 126 kts, respectively.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  20. 11:57:03 EDTFDRLandingp.6
    The autothrust was disengaged and manual throttle was armed. The right weight on wheels changed from ground to air. Both right- and left-wing spoilers 5 through 7 began to extend.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  21. 11:57:04 EDTFDRLandingp.6
    Left and right control column position was 13.02 deg and 13.65 deg, respectively. Control column then began to reduce.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  22. 11:57:05 EDTFDRLandingp.6
    Both right and left weight on wheels were ground. Both right- and left-wing spoilers 1 through 4 began to extend. Both right- and left-wing spoilers 5 through 7 were at full extension. The engine thrust reversers were unlocked and in transition.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  23. 11:57:06 EDTFDRLandingp.6
    The right weight on wheels changed from ground to air and back from air to ground, consistent with a bounce. The aircraft reached a maximum pitch angle of 11.95 deg.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  24. 11:57:07 EDTFDRLandingp.6
    The right weight on wheels changed from ground to air and back from air to ground, consistent with a bounce. Left and right control column was 13.70 deg and 14.32 deg, respectively. Control column then began to reduce.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  25. 11:57:08 EDTFDRLanding rolloutp.6
    Thrust reverse was active on both engines for 3 seconds.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  26. 11:57:10 EDTFDRLanding rolloutp.6
    Left and right control column was 10.10 deg and 10.84 deg, respectively. Control column then began to reduce.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  27. 11:57:15 EDTFDRLanding rolloutp.6
    The nose gear weight on wheels was ground.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  28. 11:57:35 EDTFDRTaxip.7
    The aircraft began to turn off for taxiway B4. The aircraft taxied to the gate without further incident.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - SPECIALIST'S FACTUAL REPORT · 28 events extracted by claude-sonnet-5
How the Board coded the sequence
  1. Landing-flare/touchdown: Tailstrike

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • DCA23LA2212023-03-22substantialmatch 102
    AIRBUS A320-232 · UNITED AIRLINES INC
    Houston, TX
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters
    • ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info
    Tailstrike
  • DCA23LA2782023-05-05substantialmatch 102
    AIRBUS A321-231 · AMERICAN AIRLINES INC
    Charlotte, NC
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters
    • ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info
    Tailstrike
  • DCA25LA2512025-07-02substantialmatch 93
    BOEING 737-924ER · UNITED AIRLINES INC
    Las Vegas, NV
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters
    • ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info
    Tailstrike
  • DCA09FA0472009-05-04substantialmatch 90
    AIRBUS A320 · NORTHWEST AIRLINES INC
    Denver, CO
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters
    • ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info
    Tailstrike
  • DCA22LA1782022-08-07substantialmatch 82
    BOEING 757-251 · DELTA AIR LINES INC
    Atlanta, GA
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters
    • ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info
    Tailstrike
  • DCA20CA0952020-03-21substantialmatch 77
    Boeing 757 · American Airlines
    Las Vegas, NV
    • ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info
    Tailstrike
  • CEN19MA3122019-09-112 fatalmatch 69
    Convair 440 · Ferreteria E Implementos San Francisco
    Monclova, OH
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters
    • ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info
  • CEN22FA0312021-11-134 fatalmatch 69
    BRITTEN-NORMAN BN-2A · MCPHILLIPS FLYING SERVICE INC
    Beaver Island, MI
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters
    • ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Occurrences it coded
  • 6 of 8Tailstrike
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
  • Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters
  • Task performance › Use of equip/info
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
  • —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
  • —

A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.

In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • DCA23LA2212023-03-22 · AIRBUS A320-232 · UNITED AIRLINES INC
    The first officer's failure to maintain the correct airspeed and pitch attitude during landing which resulted in a tailstrike.
  • DCA23LA2782023-05-05 · AIRBUS A321-231 · AMERICAN AIRLINES INC
    The captain’s failure to maintain the appropriate airspeed and pitch attitude during landing which resulted in a tailstrike.
  • DCA25LA2512025-07-02 · BOEING 737-924ER · UNITED AIRLINES INC
    The first officer’s failure to maintain proper pitch attitude during flare which resulted in a bounced landing and a tailstrike.
  • DCA09FA0472009-05-04 · AIRBUS A320 · NORTHWEST AIRLINES INC
    The first officer’s excessive pitch-up of the airplane while landing with a tailwind, which resulted in a tailstrike following a bounced landing. Contributing to the bounced landing were a high descent rate and excessive thrust resulting from the first officer’s delay in retarding the thrust levers to idle, thereby providing residual thrust and preventing spoiler deployment.
  • DCA22LA1782022-08-07 · BOEING 757-251 · DELTA AIR LINES INC
    The overpitch control of the airplane during landing resulting in a tail strike.

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).