Cases › DCA22MA009 › The analyst
MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DC-9-87 (MD-87)987 Investments, LLC
What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.
34
timed facts
8
precedents
88
passages to ask
Ask the docket
passages, not paraphrasesTry
Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.
One timeline
34 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report- 09:28:50.3CVR STARTp.7“OF RECORDING”read in context ↗
- 09:29:09.0CVR CAM-2calloutp.7“flap takeoff selector?”read in context ↗
- 09:29:45.2CVR CAM-1calloutp.9“anything below eighty we'll abort. throttles idle max brakes spoilers and reversers.”read in context ↗
- 09:38:59.9CVR CAM-2warningp.22“with uhh- I saw him pull up the umm railing”read in context ↗
- 09:46:07.9CVR CAM-2warningp.32“anti-collision light.”read in context ↗
- 09:54:04.1CVR CAM-2calloutp.44“flaps slats are eleven eleven takeoff.”read in context ↗
- 09:54:08.4CVR CAM-1calloutp.45“eleven eleven takeoff.”read in context ↗
- 09:54:12.9CVR CAM-2calloutp.45“takeoff data uhhh let's see autobrakes spoilers do you em uhhh armed?”read in context ↗
- 09:54:20.1CVR CAM-1calloutp.45“takeoff- armed- armed.”read in context ↗
- 09:54:29.0CVR CAM-2calloutp.45“okay uhhh let's see- takeoff data T-R-I airspeed bugs.”read in context ↗
- 09:54:55.4CVR CAM-2calloutp.47“takeoff briefing.”read in context ↗
- 09:54:56.8CVR CAM-2calloutp.47“no questions taxi checklist complete do you want before takeoff to the line?”read in context ↗
- 09:55:07.1CVR CAM-2calloutp.47“F-M-A is alt takeoff takeoff two thousand feet set.”read in context ↗
- 09:55:11.4CVR CAM-1calloutp.47“alt takeoff takeoff two thousand.”read in context ↗
- 09:55:26.8CVR CAM-2calloutp.48“at eleven eleven takeoff.”read in context ↗
- 09:55:28.5CVR CAM-1calloutp.48“eleven eleven takeoff.”read in context ↗
- 09:58:28.9CVR TWRcalloutp.50“uh november niner eight seven alpha kilo departure runway heading winds zero nine zero at six runway three six cleared for takeoff.”read in context ↗
- 09:58:35.5CVR RDO-2calloutp.50“runway heading cleared for takeoff runway three six nine eight seven alpha kilo.”read in context ↗
- 09:58:40.7CVR CAM-1calloutp.50“cleared for takeoff.”read in context ↗
- 09:59:21.7CVR CAM-1p.51“auto-throttle's armed set takeoff thrust.”read in context ↗
- 09:59:24 CDTFDRTakeoff rollp.6Aircraft began the takeoff rollsee the traces at this moment ↗
- 09:59:25.3CVR CAM-2p.51“'kay auto-throttle's on.”read in context ↗
- 09:59:31.5CVR CAM-2calloutp.51“takeoff thrust is set. engines- instruments- normal.”read in context ↗
- 09:59:53.3CVR CAM-2p.51“# # # abort.”read in context ↗
- 09:59:55.5CVR CAMfinal secondsp.52“[sound of low thud.]”read in context ↗
- 09:59:56 CDTFDRTakeoff/Rejected takeoffp.7Aircraft reached a maximum recorded airspeed of 158 knotssee the traces at this moment ↗
- 09:59:56.3CVR CAMfinal secondsp.52“[sound of metallic slap.]”read in context ↗
- 09:59:56.8CVR CAMfinal secondsp.52“[sound of mechanical squeal.]”read in context ↗
- 09:59:57.8CVR CAMfinal secondsp.52“[start of gradual decrease in ambient noise.]”read in context ↗
- 09:59:59.8CVR CAMfinal secondsp.52“[sound similar to beginning of aircraft departing runway and impacting terrain.]”read in context ↗
- 10:00:02.5CVR CAMfinal secondsp.52“[sound of deep bang.]”read in context ↗
- 10:00:03 CDT (approximately)FDREnd of recordingp.7Valid recorded data endedsee the traces at this moment ↗
- 10:00:03.0CVR CAMfinal secondsp.52“[sound of second deep bang.]”read in context ↗
- 10:00:03.4CVR CAMfinal secondsp.52“[sound of rapid rumbling impacts.]”read in context ↗
Recorder events without a clock time
- During taxi outControl surface deflections consistent with a controls check were noted
- During taxi/takeoff rollBoth elevator surfaces were recorded consistently around 20 degrees nose down, beyond the documented valid parameter range of 15 degrees nose down to 25 degrees nose up
- As aircraft reached rotation speedMovements of the control wheel were noted, and the elevators appeared to move to a maximum deflection of 5 degrees nose down
- After rotation speed reachedAs the aircraft failed to rotate significantly, thrust was reduced, and brakes, spoilers, and thrust reversers were applied, consistent with a rejected takeoff
FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - SPECIALISTA��S FACTUAL REPORT · 7 events extracted by claude-sonnet-5COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER (CVR) - GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT · 31 of 536 lines shown
How the Board coded the sequence
- Takeoff: Flight control sys malf/fail→
- Takeoff-rejected takeoff: Runway excursion
Precedents
8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded- MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD80 · Ameristar Air Cargo, Inc.Ypsilanti, MI
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system
- ●Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Wind
Flight control sys malf/fail - BOEING 757-223 · AMERICAN AIRLINES INCJackson Hole, WY
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system
Flight control sys malf/failRunway excursion - Fairchild SA227-ACDutch Harbor, AK
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system
- ●Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Wind
- Embraer EMB145 · Envoy Air Inc.Chicago, ILRunway excursion
- BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2C10 · GOJET AIRLINES LLCKansas City, MO
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system
Flight control sys malf/fail - BOEING 737-524 · CONTINENTAL AIRLINES INCDenver, CO
- ●Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Wind
- ●Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Training
Runway excursion - EMBRAER EMB-145LR · EXPRESSJET AIRLINES INCChicago, IL
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system
Flight control sys malf/fail - BOEING 737 7L9 · Eastern Airlines Group, Inc.,New York, NY
- ●Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Training
Runway excursion
What the record says
a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable causeFindings the Board cited in those cases
- 5 of 8Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control systemcited here too
- 4 of 8Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
- 3 of 8Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Windcited here too
- 3 of 8Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info
- 2 of 8Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
- 2 of 8Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters
- 2 of 8Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Trainingcited here too
Occurrences it coded
- 4 of 8Flight control sys malf/fail
- 4 of 8Runway excursion
- 2 of 8Other weather encounter
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
- Aircraft systems › Flight control system
- Conditions/weather/phenomena › Wind
- Support/oversight/monitoring › Training
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
- —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
- Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters
- Action/decision › Action
- Action/decision › Info processing/decision
- Task performance › Use of equip/info
A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.
In the Board’s words — the closest cases
- DCA17FA0762017-03-08 · MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD80 · Ameristar Air Cargo, Inc.
the jammed condition of the airplane's right elevator, which resulted from exposure to localized, dynamic wind while the airplane was parked and rendered the airplane unable to rotate during takeoff. Contributing to the accident were (1) the effect of a large structure on the gusting surface wind at the airplane's parked location, which led to turbulent gust loads on the right elevator sufficient to jam it, even though the horizontal surface wind speed was below the certification design limit and maintenance inspec…
- DCA11IA0152010-12-29 · BOEING 757-223 · AMERICAN AIRLINES INC
a manufacturing defect in a clutch mechanism that prevented the speedbrakes from automatically deploying after touchdown, and the captain’s failure to monitor and extend the speedbrakes manually. Also causal was the failure of the thrust reversers to deploy when initially commanded. Contributing to the incident was the captain’s failure to confirm speedbrake extension before announcing their deployment, and his distraction caused by the thrust reversers’ failure to initially deploy after landing.
- ANC08IA0332008-01-18 · Fairchild SA227-AC
The disengagement of the rudder control cable and loose rudder cable retaining pins. A factor contributing to the accident was a wind gust.
- DCA20LA0132019-11-11 · Embraer EMB145 · Envoy Air Inc.
The flight crew’s inability to maintain the airplane on the runway centerline after touchdown due to the reduced braking action resulting from the deteriorating weather conditions, which caused the airplane’s departure from the runway surface. Contributing to the accident were the delay in performing the runway assessment for undetermined reasons and failure to close the runway. Also contributing to the accident was the controller’s failure to advise the accident flight crew that braking action was no longer cons…
- CEN10IA2192010-04-18 · BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2C10 · GOJET AIRLINES LLC
The malfunction of the airplane’s aileron control system due to ice accumulation.
What it recommended after them
- A-19-001TO THE BOEING COMPANY: Complete the development of a modification for Boeing DC-9/MD-80 series and 717 model airplanes that will prevent the possibility of elevator jamming due to ground wind exposure. · DCA17FA076Closed - Reconsidered
- A-19-002TO THE BOEING COMPANY: Develop new preflight procedures or other mitigations for Boeing DC-9/MD-80 series and 717 model airplanes that will enable a flight crew to verify before takeoff that the elevators are not jammed. · DCA17FA076Closed - Acceptable Action
- A-19-003TO THE BOEING COMPANY: Until the actions in Safety Recommendations A-19-1 and -2 are completed, revise the Aircraft Operating Manual and Aircraft Maintenance Manual for Boeing DC-9/MD-80 series and 717 model airplanes to lower the ground gu… · DCA17FA076Closed - Acceptable Action
- A-19-004TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Determine if the ground gust limit loads contained in Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations 25.415 adequately ensure that critical flight control systems are protected from hazards introduced by ground… · DCA17FA076Closed - Acceptable Action
- A-19-005TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Ensure the operators of Boeing DC-9/MD-80 series and 717 model airplanes have procedures that define who is responsible for monitoring the wind that affects parked airplanes and for notifying maintena… · DCA17FA076Closed - Acceptable Action
- A-19-006TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Revise Order JO 7900.5D, Surface Weather Observing, Change 1, to specify sign-off procedures and backup augmentation responsibilities for all types of weather-observing personnel when they are unable… · DCA17FA076Closed - Acceptable Action
- A-12-044TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all operators of existing speedbrake-equipped transport-category airplanes to develop and incorporate training to specifically address recognition of a situation in which the speedbrakes do no… · DCA11IA015Closed - Acceptable Action
- A-12-045TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all newly type-certificated 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 25 airplanes to have a clearly distinguishable and intelligible alert that warns pilots when the speedbrakes have not deployed d… · DCA11IA015Open Acceptable Alternate Response
This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).