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Cases › DCA11IA015 · Part 121 airline · Class 1

BOEING 757-223AMERICAN AIRLINES INC

Jackson Hole, WY, USA · 2010-12-29·N668AA

0
fatal
0
serious
No injury
highest injury
—
damage

What happened

NTSB summary, verbatim

The National Transportation Safety Board’s full report is available at http://www.ntsb.gov. The Aircraft Accident Report number is NTSB/AAR-12/01. On December 29, 2010, about 1138 mountain standard time, American Airlines flight 2253, a Boeing 757-200, N668AA, ran off the departure end of runway 19 after landing at Jackson Hole Airport (JAC), Jackson Hole, Wyoming. The airplane came to rest about 730 feet past the departure end of the runway in deep snow. The 179 passengers, 2 pilots, and 4 flight attendants on board were not injured, and the airplane sustained minor damage. The airplane was registered to and operated by American Airlines as a scheduled domestic flight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121. Instrument meteorological conditions in light snow prevailed at JAC at the time of the landing, and the flight operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan. The flight originated from Chicago O’Hare International Airport (ORD), Chicago, Illinois, about 0941 central standard time.

Photographs

23the aircraft, and what the investigators found
The aircraft before the accident
227af - American Airlines Boeing 757-223, N668AA@SXM,21.04.2003 - Flickr - Aero Icarus
Aero Icarus from Zürich, Switzerland · CC BY-SA 2.0 · Wikimedia Commons
Wreckage and site documentation · 22 photographs from the docket

Photographs are NTSB docket attachments — works of the US government, in the public domain. Captions are the Board’s own.

Probable cause

the Board's determination
a manufacturing defect in a clutch mechanism that prevented the speedbrakes from automatically deploying after touchdown, and the captain’s failure to monitor and extend the speedbrakes manually. Also causal was the failure of the thrust reversers to deploy when initially commanded. Contributing to the incident was the captain’s failure to confirm speedbrake extension before announcing their deployment, and his distraction caused by the thrust reversers’ failure to initially deploy after landing.

Occurrence sequence

3 stepsNTSB coding · CICTT taxonomy
  1. 1 · Landing-flare/touchdown
    Flight control sys malf/fail
  2. 2 · Landing-landing roll
    Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail
  3. 3 · Landing-landing roll
    Runway excursion
    defining event

Findings

6 causal · 0 contributing
  • CAUSE
    Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system › Drag control system — Malfunction
  • CAUSE
    Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring equip/instruments — Pilot
  • CAUSE
    Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of equip/system — Pilot
  • CAUSE
    Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine exhaust › Thrust reverser — Malfunction
  • CAUSE
    Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action — Pilot
  • CAUSE
    Organizational issues › Development › Manufacture/production › Equipment manufacture — Manufacturer

Safety recommendations

3 issuedwhat changed because of this accident
  • A-12-044Closed - Acceptable ActionCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all operators of existing speedbrake-equipped transport-category airplanes to develop and incorporate training to specifically address recognition of a situation in which the speedbrakes do not deploy as expected after landing.

  • A-12-045Open Acceptable Alternate ResponseCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all newly type-certificated 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 25 airplanes to have a clearly distinguishable and intelligible alert that warns pilots when the speedbrakes have not deployed during the landing roll.

  • A-12-046Closed - ReconsideredCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require Boeing to establish guidance for pilots of all relevant airplanes to follow when an unintended thrust reverser lockout occurs and to provide that guidance to all operators of those airplanes.

Sequence of events

2 timed eventsfrom the FDR factual report · claude-fable-5-1 (in-session)
  1. June 1, 2011regulatoryp.1
    FAA revised ATOS EPI/SAI criteria: inspectors must verify the operator maintains an FDR conversion document with an established correlation between recorded and measured values, and added oversight of the filtered-data rule (14 CFR 121.346)
  2. December 7, 2011regulatoryp.2
    FAA response: all connected parameters, including those beyond the mandatory set, must be inspected and maintained; no FDR-specific inspector training is required (CBI course 25813 is available); requirements for operational checks, reasonableness checks and inspection intervals reside in the TC/STC holder's instructions for continued airworthiness

NTSB analysis

from the final report

The National Transportation Safety Board’s full report is available at http://www.ntsb.gov. The Aircraft Accident Report number is NTSB/AAR-12/01. On December 29, 2010, about 1138 mountain standard time, American Airlines flight 2253, a Boeing 757-200, N668AA, ran off the departure end of runway 19 after landing at Jackson Hole Airport (JAC), Jackson Hole, Wyoming. The airplane came to rest about 730 feet past the departure end of the runway in deep snow. The 179 passengers, 2 pilots, and 4 flight attendants on board were not injured, and the airplane sustained minor damage. The airplane was registered to and operated by American Airlines as a scheduled domestic flight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121. Instrument meteorological conditions in light snow prevailed at JAC at the time of the landing, and the flight operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan. The flight originated from Chicago O’Hare International Airport (ORD), Chicago, Illinois, about 0941 central standard time.