Saab 2000Peninsula AviationServices Inc.,
Unalaska, AK, USA · 2019-10-18·N686PA
What happened
NTSB summary, verbatimOn October 17, 2019, about 1740 Alaska daylight time, PenAir flight 3296, a Saab 2000, N686PA, overran the runway while landing at the Thomas Madsen Airport (PADU), Unalaska, Alaska. The airplane passed through the airport perimeter fence, crossed a road, and came to rest on shoreline rocks. Of the 42 passengers and crewmembers on board, 1 passenger was fatally injured, and several other passengers sustained serious or minor injuries. The airplane received substantial damage. The regularly scheduled domestic passenger flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 from Ted Stevens International Airport (KANC), Anchorage, Alaska, to PADU.
Photographs
1the aircraft, and what the investigators foundProbable cause
the Board's determinationThe landing gear manufacturer’s incorrect wiring of the wheel speed transducer harnesses on the left main landing gear during overhaul. The incorrect wiring caused the antiskid system not to function as intended, resulting in the failure of the left outboard tire and a significant loss of the airplane’s braking ability, which led to the runway overrun. Contributing to the accident were (1) Saab’s design of the wheel speed transducer wire harnesses, which did not consider and protect against human error during maintenance; (2) the Federal Aviation Administration’s lack of consideration of the runway safety area dimensions at Unalaska Airport during the authorization process that allowed the Saab 2000 to operate at the airport; and (3) the flight crewmembers’ inappropriate decision, due to their plan continuation bias, to land on a runway with a reported tailwind that exceeded the airplane manufacturer’s limit. The safety margin was further reduced because of PenAir’s failure to correctly apply its company-designated pilot-in-command airport qualification policy, which allowed the accident captain to operate at one of the most challenging airports in PenAir’s route system with limited experience at the airport and in the Saab 2000 airplane.
Occurrence sequence
1 stepsNTSB coding · CICTT taxonomy- 1 · Landing-landing rollRunway excursiondefining event
Findings
10 causal · 0 contributing- CAUSEPersonnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Scheduled/routine maintenance — Other
- CAUSEAircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system › Main landing gear — Incorrect service/maintenance
- CAUSEAircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters — Attain/maintain not possible
- CAUSEPersonnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment — Pilot
- CAUSEEnvironmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Wind › Tailwind — Decision related to condition
- CAUSEOrganizational issues › Development › Design › Equipment design — Manufacturer
- CAUSEAircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system › Land gear sys wiring — Design
- CAUSEOrganizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure — Operator
- CAUSEOrganizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Oversight › Oversight of operation — FAA/Regulator
- CAUSEEnvironmental issues › Operating environment › Airport facilities/design — Decision related to condition
Safety recommendations
10 issuedwhat changed because of this accidentTO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Identify all currently certificated transport-category airplanes for which system safety assessments for landing gear systems did not consider human error that could lead to cross-wiring of antiskid brake system components, including the wheel speed transducers, and require manufacturers of transport-category airplanes without such assessments to perform the assessments and then implement mitigations to prevent cross-wiring of antiskid brake system components.
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require the submission and consideration of system safety assessments addressing the landing gear antiskid system for the certification of future transport-category airplane designs. The certification should ensure that the system safety assessments are consistent with the intent of Advisory Circular 25.1309, System Design and Analysis, and that the assessments evaluate and mitigate the potential for human error that can lead to a cross-wiring error.
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require organizations that design, manufacture, and maintain aircraft to establish a safety management system.
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Notify principal operations inspectors and frontline managers about the circumstances of this accident and emphasize the importance of existing Federal Aviation Administration guidance for detecting and mitigating the safety risks that can result when certificate holders experience significant organizational change, such as high personnel turnover, a reduction to route structures or flight schedules, bankruptcy, acquisition, and merger.
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Revise Order 8900.1, Flight Standards Information Management System, to include a formalized transition procedure to be used during a changeover of certificate management team personnel responsible for overseeing a certificate holder that is undergoing significant organizational change (for a reason described in volume 6, chapter 2, section 18 of the order) to ensure that incoming personnel are fully aware of potential safety risks.
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Include the runway design code for runways of intended use among the criteria assessed when authorizing a scheduled air carrier to operate its airplanes on a regular basis at an airport certificated under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 139.
TO EUROPEAN UNION AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY: Identify all currently certificated transport-category airplanes for which system safety assessments for landing gear systems did not consider human error that could lead to cross-wiring of antiskid brake system components, including the wheel speed transducers, and require manufacturers of transport-category airplanes without such assessments to perform the assessments and then implement mitigations to prevent cross-wiring of antiskid brake system components.
TO THE EUROPEAN UNION AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY: Require the submission and consideration of system safety assessments addressing the landing gear antiskid system for the certification of future transport-category airplane designs. The certification should ensure that the system safety assessments are consistent with the intent of Acceptable Means of Compliance 25.1309, Systems Design and Analysis, and that the assessments evaluate and mitigate the potential for human error that can lead to a cross-wiring error.
TO THE EUROPEAN UNION AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY: Require organizations that design, manufacture, and maintain aircraft to establish a safety management system.
TO THE SAAB GROUP: Redesign the wheel speed transducer wire harnesses for the Saab 2000 airplane to prevent the harnesses from being installed incorrectly during maintenance and overhaul.
Sequence of events
25 timed eventsfrom the FDR factual report · claude-sonnet-5- 1523Departurep.4Flight departed from ANC
- N/ACruisep.4Aircraft climbed to a pressure altitude of 30,000 ft and cruised on a southwesterly heading for about 1 hour and 26 minutes
- N/ADescentp.4Aircraft descended steadily for about 21 minutes
- 1733:00Approachp.4Autopilot was disconnected and remained disconnected for remainder of flight
- 1733:30First Approachp.4Aircraft began a descent from 950 ft AGL
- N/AFirst Approachp.4At 425 ft AGL the aircraft rolled 30 degrees left, rolling out at 172 ft AGL on a heading of 117 degrees, consistent with final approach to the runway
- 1735:30Go Aroundp.4Maneuvers consistent with a go around were performed
- N/ASecond Approachp.4Following the go around, aircraft climbed to 1150 ft AGL and began to descend again while performing a 300 degree left turn
- N/ASecond Approachp.4While descending through about 350 ft AGL, the aircraft rolled 30 degrees left, rolling out on the runway heading at about 100 ft AGL
- N/ASecond Approachp.4As the aircraft rolled out from 100 ft to 50 ft AGL, a Sink Rate warning was recorded from the GPWS
- N/ASecond Approachp.4Vertical speed recorded a peak of -1292 fpm during final descent
- N/ALanding Flarep.4Aircraft roll angle oscillated +/- 5 degrees as it pitched up consistent with a landing flare
- 1739:54Touchdownp.5Accelerations consistent with main gear touchdown occurred
- 1739:55Touchdownp.5Nose gear touchdown
- 1739:56Touchdownp.51 Hz Gear Weight on Wheels signal became true
- N/ARolloutp.5Rate of deceleration increased over three seconds following main gear touchdown to a peak of -0.48 g; flaps retracted by 5 degrees and both propellers transitioned to beta mode
- 1739:59Rolloutp.5Longitudinal deceleration changed from smooth to slightly oscillatory profile; Anti-Skid Inboard Fault Caution became active
- 1740:03Rolloutp.5Engines transitioned from ground idle beta to max reverse power
- 1740:10Rolloutp.5Longitudinal deceleration profile became smooth for 5.5 seconds; Anti-Skid Inboard Fault Caution transitioned to inactive
- 1740:16Rolloutp.5Oscillations in longitudinal acceleration resumed and Anti-Skid Inboard Fault Caution reactivated
- 1740:18Rolloutp.5Engine PLA began to increase from about 1 degree to about 35 degrees, consistent with idle power, over 3 seconds; engines and propellers transitioned to idle power and beta mode
- 1740:19Runway Excursionp.5Changes in pitch, roll, and vertical and longitudinal accelerations were consistent with a departure of the runway surface
- N/ARunway Excursionp.5One second after runway departure, the weight on wheels and left main gear down and locked signals became false, consistent with damage to the left main gear
- N/ARunway Excursionp.5About one second after that the left engine gas generator speed dropped to 0%, consistent with damage to the left engine
- 1740:31End of Recordingp.5The recording stopped, consistent with a sudden power interruption to the recorder