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Cases › DCA20MA002 · Major investigation · Class 1

Saab 2000Peninsula AviationServices Inc.,

Unalaska, AK, USA · 2019-10-18·N686PA

1
fatal
1
serious
Fatal
highest injury
Substantial
damage

What happened

NTSB summary, verbatim

On October 17, 2019, about 1740 Alaska daylight time, PenAir flight 3296, a Saab 2000, N686PA, overran the runway while landing at the Thomas Madsen Airport (PADU), Unalaska, Alaska. The airplane passed through the airport perimeter fence, crossed a road, and came to rest on shoreline rocks. Of the 42 passengers and crewmembers on board, 1 passenger was fatally injured, and several other passengers sustained serious or minor injuries. The airplane received substantial damage. The regularly scheduled domestic passenger flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 from Ted Stevens International Airport (KANC), Anchorage, Alaska, to PADU.

Photographs

1the aircraft, and what the investigators found
The aircraft before the accident
N686PA-ANC-04-07-2019
Steve Barnes · CC BY-SA 4.0 · Wikimedia Commons

Probable cause

the Board's determination
The landing gear manufacturer’s incorrect wiring of the wheel speed transducer harnesses on the left main landing gear during overhaul. The incorrect wiring caused the antiskid system not to function as intended, resulting in the failure of the left outboard tire and a significant loss of the airplane’s braking ability, which led to the runway overrun. Contributing to the accident were (1) Saab’s design of the wheel speed transducer wire harnesses, which did not consider and protect against human error during maintenance; (2) the Federal Aviation Administration’s lack of consideration of the runway safety area dimensions at Unalaska Airport during the authorization process that allowed the Saab 2000 to operate at the airport; and (3) the flight crewmembers’ inappropriate decision, due to their plan continuation bias, to land on a runway with a reported tailwind that exceeded the airplane manufacturer’s limit. The safety margin was further reduced because of PenAir’s failure to correctly apply its company-designated pilot-in-command airport qualification policy, which allowed the accident captain to operate at one of the most challenging airports in PenAir’s route system with limited experience at the airport and in the Saab 2000 airplane.

Occurrence sequence

1 stepsNTSB coding · CICTT taxonomy
  1. 1 · Landing-landing roll
    Runway excursion
    defining event

Findings

10 causal · 0 contributing
  • CAUSE
    Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Scheduled/routine maintenance — Other
  • CAUSE
    Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system › Main landing gear — Incorrect service/maintenance
  • CAUSE
    Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters — Attain/maintain not possible
  • CAUSE
    Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment — Pilot
  • CAUSE
    Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Wind › Tailwind — Decision related to condition
  • CAUSE
    Organizational issues › Development › Design › Equipment design — Manufacturer
  • CAUSE
    Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system › Land gear sys wiring — Design
  • CAUSE
    Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure — Operator
  • CAUSE
    Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Oversight › Oversight of operation — FAA/Regulator
  • CAUSE
    Environmental issues › Operating environment › Airport facilities/design — Decision related to condition

Safety recommendations

10 issuedwhat changed because of this accident
  • A-21-046Open - Acceptable ResponseCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Identify all currently certificated transport-category airplanes for which system safety assessments for landing gear systems did not consider human error that could lead to cross-wiring of antiskid brake system components, including the wheel speed transducers, and require manufacturers of transport-category airplanes without such assessments to perform the assessments and then implement mitigations to prevent cross-wiring of antiskid brake system components.

  • A-21-047Closed - Unacceptable ActionCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require the submission and consideration of system safety assessments addressing the landing gear antiskid system for the certification of future transport-category airplane designs. The certification should ensure that the system safety assessments are consistent with the intent of Advisory Circular 25.1309, System Design and Analysis, and that the assessments evaluate and mitigate the potential for human error that can lead to a cross-wiring error.

  • A-21-048Open - Unacceptable ResponseCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require organizations that design, manufacture, and maintain aircraft to establish a safety management system.

  • A-21-049Closed - Unacceptable ActionCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Notify principal operations inspectors and frontline managers about the circumstances of this accident and emphasize the importance of existing Federal Aviation Administration guidance for detecting and mitigating the safety risks that can result when certificate holders experience significant organizational change, such as high personnel turnover, a reduction to route structures or flight schedules, bankruptcy, acquisition, and merger.

  • A-21-050Closed - Unacceptable ActionCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Revise Order 8900.1, Flight Standards Information Management System, to include a formalized transition procedure to be used during a changeover of certificate management team personnel responsible for overseeing a certificate holder that is undergoing significant organizational change (for a reason described in volume 6, chapter 2, section 18 of the order) to ensure that incoming personnel are fully aware of potential safety risks.

  • A-21-051Open - Acceptable ResponseCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Include the runway design code for runways of intended use among the criteria assessed when authorizing a scheduled air carrier to operate its airplanes on a regular basis at an airport certificated under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 139.

  • A-21-052Open - Acceptable ResponseCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO EUROPEAN UNION AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY: Identify all currently certificated transport-category airplanes for which system safety assessments for landing gear systems did not consider human error that could lead to cross-wiring of antiskid brake system components, including the wheel speed transducers, and require manufacturers of transport-category airplanes without such assessments to perform the assessments and then implement mitigations to prevent cross-wiring of antiskid brake system components.

  • A-21-053Open - Acceptable ResponseCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE EUROPEAN UNION AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY: Require the submission and consideration of system safety assessments addressing the landing gear antiskid system for the certification of future transport-category airplane designs. The certification should ensure that the system safety assessments are consistent with the intent of Acceptable Means of Compliance 25.1309, Systems Design and Analysis, and that the assessments evaluate and mitigate the potential for human error that can lead to a cross-wiring error.

  • A-21-054Open - Initial Response ReceivedCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE EUROPEAN UNION AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY: Require organizations that design, manufacture, and maintain aircraft to establish a safety management system.

  • A-21-055Open - Acceptable ResponseCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE SAAB GROUP: Redesign the wheel speed transducer wire harnesses for the Saab 2000 airplane to prevent the harnesses from being installed incorrectly during maintenance and overhaul.

Sequence of events

25 timed eventsfrom the FDR factual report · claude-sonnet-5
  1. 1523Departurep.4
    Flight departed from ANC
  2. N/ACruisep.4
    Aircraft climbed to a pressure altitude of 30,000 ft and cruised on a southwesterly heading for about 1 hour and 26 minutes
  3. N/ADescentp.4
    Aircraft descended steadily for about 21 minutes
  4. 1733:00Approachp.4
    Autopilot was disconnected and remained disconnected for remainder of flight
  5. 1733:30First Approachp.4
    Aircraft began a descent from 950 ft AGL
  6. N/AFirst Approachp.4
    At 425 ft AGL the aircraft rolled 30 degrees left, rolling out at 172 ft AGL on a heading of 117 degrees, consistent with final approach to the runway
  7. 1735:30Go Aroundp.4
    Maneuvers consistent with a go around were performed
  8. N/ASecond Approachp.4
    Following the go around, aircraft climbed to 1150 ft AGL and began to descend again while performing a 300 degree left turn
  9. N/ASecond Approachp.4
    While descending through about 350 ft AGL, the aircraft rolled 30 degrees left, rolling out on the runway heading at about 100 ft AGL
  10. N/ASecond Approachp.4
    As the aircraft rolled out from 100 ft to 50 ft AGL, a Sink Rate warning was recorded from the GPWS
  11. N/ASecond Approachp.4
    Vertical speed recorded a peak of -1292 fpm during final descent
  12. N/ALanding Flarep.4
    Aircraft roll angle oscillated +/- 5 degrees as it pitched up consistent with a landing flare
  13. 1739:54Touchdownp.5
    Accelerations consistent with main gear touchdown occurred
  14. 1739:55Touchdownp.5
    Nose gear touchdown
  15. 1739:56Touchdownp.5
    1 Hz Gear Weight on Wheels signal became true
  16. N/ARolloutp.5
    Rate of deceleration increased over three seconds following main gear touchdown to a peak of -0.48 g; flaps retracted by 5 degrees and both propellers transitioned to beta mode
  17. 1739:59Rolloutp.5
    Longitudinal deceleration changed from smooth to slightly oscillatory profile; Anti-Skid Inboard Fault Caution became active
  18. 1740:03Rolloutp.5
    Engines transitioned from ground idle beta to max reverse power
  19. 1740:10Rolloutp.5
    Longitudinal deceleration profile became smooth for 5.5 seconds; Anti-Skid Inboard Fault Caution transitioned to inactive
  20. 1740:16Rolloutp.5
    Oscillations in longitudinal acceleration resumed and Anti-Skid Inboard Fault Caution reactivated
  21. 1740:18Rolloutp.5
    Engine PLA began to increase from about 1 degree to about 35 degrees, consistent with idle power, over 3 seconds; engines and propellers transitioned to idle power and beta mode
  22. 1740:19Runway Excursionp.5
    Changes in pitch, roll, and vertical and longitudinal accelerations were consistent with a departure of the runway surface
  23. N/ARunway Excursionp.5
    One second after runway departure, the weight on wheels and left main gear down and locked signals became false, consistent with damage to the left main gear
  24. N/ARunway Excursionp.5
    About one second after that the left engine gas generator speed dropped to 0%, consistent with damage to the left engine
  25. 1740:31End of Recordingp.5
    The recording stopped, consistent with a sudden power interruption to the recorder