Cases › DCA20IA014 › The analyst
Embraer ERJ170Republic Airline Inc
What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.
38
timed facts
8
precedents
54
passages to ask
Ask the docket
passages, not paraphrasesTry
Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.
One timeline
38 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report- 00:00:00.0CVR STARTp.7“OF RECORDING”read in context ↗
- 00:00:44.4CVR EICASwarningp.7“[sound similar to Master Warning]”read in context ↗
- 00:01:08.7CVR EICASwarningp.8“[sound similar to Master Caution]”read in context ↗
- 00:03:15.1CVR EICASwarningp.9“[sounds similar to Master Cautions]”read in context ↗
- 00:08:17.2CVR EICASwarningp.13“[sound similar to Master Caution]”read in context ↗
- 00:11:15.2CVR EICASwarningp.15“[sound similar to Master Caution]”read in context ↗
- 00:12:36.8CVR EICASwarningp.16“[sound similar to Master Caution]”read in context ↗
- 00:14:11.5CVR EICASwarningp.17“[sound similar to Master Caution]”read in context ↗
- 00:20:27.1CVR EICASwarningp.18“[sound similar to Master Caution]”read in context ↗
- 00:24:06.6CVR EICASwarningp.19“[sound similar to Master Caution]”read in context ↗
- 00:24:29.4CVR EICASwarningp.20“[sound similar to Master Caution]”read in context ↗
- 00:39:52.9CVR EICASwarningp.27“[sound similar to Master Warning]”read in context ↗
- 00:39:56.5CVR EICASwarningp.27“[sound similar to Master Caution]”read in context ↗
- 00:40:16.5CVR EICASwarningp.27“[sounds similar to Master Cautions]”read in context ↗
- 00:49:20.6CVR EICASwarningp.32“[sound similar to Master Caution]”read in context ↗
- 00:50:34.0CVR EICASwarningp.32“[sound similar to Master Caution]”read in context ↗
- 00:52:55.4CVR EICASwarningp.33“[sound similar to Master Caution]”read in context ↗
- 00:53:40.6CVR EICASwarningp.33“[sound similar to Master Caution] DCA20IA014 Time and Intra-Aircraft Communication Source”read in context ↗
- 00:55:10.8CVR EICASwarningp.35“[sound similar to Master Caution]”read in context ↗
- 00:56:31.0CVR EICASwarningp.35“[sound similar to Master Caution]”read in context ↗
- 00:57:36.6CVR EICASwarningp.36“[sound similar to Master Caution]”read in context ↗
- 00:58:28.0CVR EICASwarningp.36“[sounds similar to Master Cautions]”read in context ↗
- 01:10:48.4CVR CAM-?final secondsp.37“uhh...ground service?”read in context ↗
- 01:10:49.9CVR CAM-?final secondsp.37“yeah.”read in context ↗
- 01:10:50.6CVR CAM-?final secondsp.37“yeah.”read in context ↗
- 01:10:51.1CVR CAM-?final secondsp.37“all right press that. DCA20IA014 Time and Intra-Aircraft Communication Source”read in context ↗
- 01:10:51.3CVR CAMfinal secondsp.38“[sound similar to power cycle]”read in context ↗
- 01:24:00.2CVR CAMfinal secondsp.38“[discussion among unidentified flight crew]”read in context ↗
- 02:04:47.3CVR EICASfinal secondsp.38“[sound similar to Master Caution]”read in context ↗
- 02:05:08.8CVR CAM-6final secondsp.38“[call to MCC - discussed pulling FDR/CVR circuit breaker.]”read in context ↗
- 21:05:15FDRTakeoffp.4Aircraft began its takeoff rollsee the traces at this moment ↗
- 21:05:40FDRTakeoffp.4Aircraft rotated and became airborne shortly thereaftersee the traces at this moment ↗
- 21:05:50FDRInitial climbp.4Stabilizer, initially set at 3.88 degrees nose up, began transiting toward a further nose up positionsee the traces at this moment ↗
- 21:07:45FDRClimbp.4Stabilizer reached a maximum nose up position of 13 degreessee the traces at this moment ↗
- 21:08:08FDRClimb/pitch eventp.4Aircraft experienced several pitch oscillations, reaching a maximum pitch up attitude of 27.070 degreessee the traces at this moment ↗
- 21:10:36FDRPitch event resolutionp.3Stabilizer parameter abruptly went to zero degrees, consistent with trim cutout switch actuationsee the traces at this moment ↗
- After 21:10:36FDRPost-eventp.4After the stabilizer was cutout, the pitch oscillations subsidedsee the traces at this moment ↗
- 21:25:32FDRLandingp.4Aircraft continued to a landing at ATLsee the traces at this moment ↗
FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - SPECIALISTA��S FACTUAL REPORT · 8 events extracted by claude-sonnet-5COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER - GROUP CHAIR'S FACTUAL REPORT · 30 of 365 lines shown
How the Board coded the sequence
- Initial climb: Flight control sys malf/fail→
- Initial climb: Loss of control in flight
Precedents
8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded- AIRBUS A330-243 · Hawaiian AirlinesLos Angeles, CA
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system
Flight control sys malf/fail - BOEING 737-8 · UNITED AIRLINES INCHouston, TX
- ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
- DASSAULT Falcon 20 · Pak West Airlines Inc.Thomson, GA
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system
- ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
- AIRBUS A320 - 214 · US AIRWAYS INCPhiladelphia, PA
- ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
- Embraer EMB145 · Envoy Air Inc.Chicago, IL
- ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
- CONVAIR CV-580Columbus, OH
- ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
Flight control sys malf/fail - BOEING 757-223 · AMERICAN AIRLINES INCJackson Hole, WY
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system
- ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
Flight control sys malf/fail - BOEING 737-823 · American AirlinesLos Angeles, CA
- ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
What the record says
a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable causeFindings the Board cited in those cases
- 7 of 8Personnel issues › Action/decision › Actioncited here too
- 3 of 8Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control systemcited here too
- 3 of 8Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
Occurrences it coded
- 3 of 8Flight control sys malf/fail
- 2 of 8Landing gear collapse
- 2 of 8Collision with terr/obj (non-CFIT)
- 2 of 8Runway excursion
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
- Aircraft systems › Flight control system
- Action/decision › Action
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
- —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
- Action/decision › Info processing/decision
A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.
In the Board’s words — the closest cases
- DCA22LA2122022-09-22 · AIRBUS A330-243 · Hawaiian Airlines
Uncommanded movement of the trimmable horizontal stabilizer control wheel for reasons that could not be determined based on the available evidence.
- DCA24FA1202024-03-08 · BOEING 737-8 · UNITED AIRLINES INC
The captain's decision not to establish and maintain deceleration devices in accordance with company training and standard operating procedures.
- ERA22FA0042021-10-05 · DASSAULT Falcon 20 · Pak West Airlines Inc.
The flight crew’s continuation of an unstable dark night visual approach and the captain’s instruction to use air brakes during the approach contrary to airplane operating limitations, which resulted in a descent below the glide path, and a collision with terrain. Contributing to the accident was the captain’s poor crew resource management and failure to take over pilot flying responsibilities after the first officer repeatedly demonstrated deficiencies in flying the airplane, and the operator’s lack of safety mana…
- DCA14MA0812014-03-13 · AIRBUS A320 - 214 · US AIRWAYS INC
the captain's decision to reject the takeoff after the airplane had rotated. Contributing to the accident was the flight crew's failure to follow standard operating procedures by not verifying that the airplane's flight management computer was properly configured for takeoff and the captain's failure to perform the correct action in response to the electronic centralized aircraft monitoring alert.
- DCA20LA0132019-11-11 · Embraer EMB145 · Envoy Air Inc.
The flight crew’s inability to maintain the airplane on the runway centerline after touchdown due to the reduced braking action resulting from the deteriorating weather conditions, which caused the airplane’s departure from the runway surface. Contributing to the accident were the delay in performing the runway assessment for undetermined reasons and failure to close the runway. Also contributing to the accident was the controller’s failure to advise the accident flight crew that braking action was no longer cons…
What it recommended after them
- A-12-044TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all operators of existing speedbrake-equipped transport-category airplanes to develop and incorporate training to specifically address recognition of a situation in which the speedbrakes do no… · DCA11IA015Closed - Acceptable Action
- A-12-045TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all newly type-certificated 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 25 airplanes to have a clearly distinguishable and intelligible alert that warns pilots when the speedbrakes have not deployed d… · DCA11IA015Open Acceptable Alternate Response
- A-12-046TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require Boeing to establish guidance for pilots of all relevant airplanes to follow when an unintended thrust reverser lockout occurs and to provide that guidance to all operators of those airplanes. · DCA11IA015Closed - Reconsidered
This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).