FlarePath
Cases › DCA17LA145 › The analyst

AIRBUS A321Delta Air Lines, Inc.

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

8
timed facts
8
precedents
10
passages to ask

Ask the docket

passages, not paraphrases
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Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.

One timeline

8 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report
  1. 13:35:55FDRApproachp.3
    Aircraft descended below 2000 feet AGL; airspeed about 160 knots, vertical speed 500-1000 fpm descent, landing gear selected down, autopilot not engaged, autothrottle engaged
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  2. 13:37:58FDRApproach/Flarep.3
    Pitch began increasing from 2 degrees
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  3. 13:38:03FDRFlarep.3
    Flare law mode activated
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  4. 13:38:06FDRFlarep.3
    Autothrottle disengaged
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  5. 13:38:07FDRTouchdownp.3
    Both main gear weight on wheels (WOW) status switched from air to ground; aircraft experienced maximum vertical acceleration of 1.89 g
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  6. 13:38:08FDRTouchdown/Bouncep.3
    Both main gear WOW status switched briefly back to air
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  7. 13:38:09FDRSecond touchdown/Tail strikep.3
    Both main gear WOW status switched back to ground; aircraft experienced maximum primary pitch angle of 9.7 degrees nose up, maximum standby pitch angle of 9.8 degrees nose up, and a spike in vertical acceleration of 1.65 g
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  8. 13:38:12FDRLanding rollp.3
    Nose gear WOW status transitioned to ground and the aircraft decelerated using brakes, spoilers, and thrust reversers
    see the traces at this moment ↗
FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - SPECIALIST'S FACTUAL REPORT · 8 events extracted by claude-sonnet-5
How the Board coded the sequence
  1. Landing-flare/touchdown: Abnormal runway contact→
  2. Landing-flare/touchdown: Tailstrike

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • WPR10IA4302010-08-26no fatalitiesmatch 74
    AIRBUS A320-232 · JETBLUE AIRWAYS CORP
    Sacramento, CA
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    • ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info
  • DCA17LA1222017-05-21substantialmatch 73
    BOEING 757 · Delta Air Lines
    Raleigh, NC
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    Tailstrike
  • DCA13FA0712013-04-05substantialmatch 70
    AIRBUS 321 · U.A Airways Inc
    Las Vegas, NV
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    Tailstrike
  • DCA14FA0022013-10-23substantialmatch 65
    BEECH 1900C · ERA AVIATION INC
    Homer, AK
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    • ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info
  • DCA16LA1002016-02-24substantialmatch 65
    EMBRAER EMB145 · TRANS STATES AIRLINES INC
    St Louis, MO
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    Abnormal runway contact
  • DCA14FA1222014-06-20substantialmatch 64
    BOEING 767 36N · OMNI AIR INTERNATIONAL INC
    Kabul, AF
    • ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info
    Abnormal runway contactTailstrike
  • DCA16CA1132016-03-05substantialmatch 63
    BOEING 767 34AF · UNITED PARCEL SERVICE CO
    Albuquerque, NM
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    • ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info
    Tailstrike
  • DCA25LA2512025-07-02substantialmatch 61
    BOEING 737-924ER · UNITED AIRLINES INC
    Las Vegas, NV
    • ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info
    Tailstrike

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Occurrences it coded
  • 5 of 8Tailstrike
  • 2 of 8Abnormal runway contact
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
  • Action/decision › Action
  • Task performance › Use of equip/info
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
  • —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
  • Action/decision › Info processing/decision

A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.

In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • WPR10IA4302010-08-26 · AIRBUS A320-232 · JETBLUE AIRWAYS CORP
    The first officer’s inadvertent activation of the parking brake in flight, which led to the airplane abruptly stopping and all four of its main landing gear tires deflating, and his use of a nonstandard procedure to cancel the airplane's monitoring alert system.
  • DCA17LA1222017-05-21 · BOEING 757 · Delta Air Lines
    the first officer's failure to attain a proper landing flare, which resulted in a tail strike.
  • DCA13FA0712013-04-05 · AIRBUS 321 · U.A Airways Inc
    the captain's improper recovery from a bounced landing which resulted in a tailstrike.
  • DCA14FA0022013-10-23 · BEECH 1900C · ERA AVIATION INC
    The first officer inadvertently selecting the landing gear handle up after touchdown during the landing rollout. Contributing to the accident was the first officer's decision to reconfigure the airplane while still on the active runway.
  • DCA16LA1002016-02-24 · EMBRAER EMB145 · TRANS STATES AIRLINES INC
    the flight crews' failure to consider all available runways for landing to minimize the gusty crosswind component. Contributing to the accident was the captain's reduction of the engine thrust for about 1 second at low altitude immediately after the first officer applied maximum thrust to conduct a go-around.

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).