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Cases › DCA17FA076 › The analyst

MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD80Ameristar Air Cargo, Inc.

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

58
timed facts
8
precedents
103
passages to ask

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passages, not paraphrases
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Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.

One timeline

58 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report
  1. 01:04 EST (178,423 SRN)FDRPost-landing/taxip.4
    FDR stopped recording after previous landing (parking brake applied)
  2. 01:25 EST (178,432 SRN)FDRPost-landing/taxip.3
    FDR started recording
  3. 01:33 EST (178,933 SRN)FDRPost-landing/taxip.3
    FDR stopped recording
  4. 07:10 EST (178,940 SRN)FDRGroundp.3
    FDR started recording
  5. 07:12 EST (179,059 SRN)FDRGroundp.3
    FDR stopped recording
  6. 12:36 EST (179,068 SRN)FDRGroundp.3
    FDR started recording
  7. 12:37 EST (179,129 SRN)FDRGroundp.3
    FDR stopped recording
  8. 12:42 EST (179,140 SRN)FDRGroundp.3
    FDR started recording
  9. 12:49 EST (179,569 SRN)FDRGroundp.3
    FDR stopped recording
  10. 12:50:06CVR CAM-2p.7
    “ah we wanna see that right side put back.”
    read in context ↗
  11. 13:09:32CVR CAM-2calloutp.16
    “alright. it's gonna be a left seat takeoff. a hundred and forty six thousand pounds flaps fifteen. speeds one thirty nine, one forty tow, one fifty, one sixty five, one ninety nine, two forty eight. max thrust we are going to delay our rotation because of the gusty, strong gusty winds, do the short segment climb checklist * better immediate return, quite honestly, I think it would be prudent to go over to Metro for the longer runway -”
    read in context ↗
  12. 13:10:01CVR CAM-2warningp.17
    “there are no M-E-Ls here. ah taxi operations we'll just go right here golf to two three left. no hot spots. departure NOTAMS * frequencies are out of service we'll have to get our clearance some other way. and we'll use C-TAF to announce our intentions. departure SID ahm there is none, initial course of whatever they give us to ah join the ah course into CARLETON. two thirty three the initial heading, just runway heading. altitude we know is gonna be three thousand feet, probably eighteen ninety five for a Detroit ah departure, transponder code * *. call out any abnormals that you see. really keep an eye out on what our airspeed is doing today. ahm, in the event of an engine fire or failure at or after V-1 we're going to continue the takeoff, treat it as an inflight emergency just head on over to Metro. level off height here is fifteen sixteen and is no * * procedure. and ah we'll head on over to Metro and do it visually. ah stall warning or windshear warning, we're not expecting any kind of stall today, but ah windshear for sure, keep an eye out on the ah, if you get any kind of a warning it's gonna be max thrust, ah all the way to firewall thrust if necessary, leave the aircraft configured, we'll fly out of the shear, back me up on the ah airspeed calls and the * speed calls. any questions anything to add?”
    read in context ↗
  13. 13:12:44CVR CAM-1calloutp.20
    “takeoff warning?”
    read in context ↗
  14. 13:13:49CVR CAM-2calloutp.22
    “at least long haul you can take off and get outta here.”
    read in context ↗
  15. 13:15:31CVR CAM-1calloutp.22
    “I'm gonna, I'm gonna call ask @ can we legally use this weather? because I'm not, I'm not gonna have the FAA come afterwards, how did you guys take off outta there? hold on one second.”
    read in context ↗
  16. 13:16:11CVR CAM-1calloutp.23
    “* got a little problem. ahm Willow Run. ah. tower is closed. airport uncontrolled because they lost power. ATIS is out of service. * last weather reported. you gotta call in to * * * one six five three. ah how do we legally take off? [consistent with cell phone call].”
    read in context ↗
  17. 13:17:25CVR FAAcalloutp.23
    “comes back and say how did you guys take off. [consistent with cell phone call].”
    read in context ↗
  18. 13:21:52CVR FA-4calloutp.26
    “ah we'll do that during takeoff, I'm sure.”
    read in context ↗
  19. 14:25:32CVR CAM-1calloutp.47
    “takeoff weight one four five zero seven six.”
    read in context ↗
  20. 14:32:14CVR HOT-1warningp.52
    “anti-collision lights.”
    read in context ↗
  21. 14:35 EST (179,580 SRN)FDRGroundp.3
    FDR started recording
  22. 14:35:00CVR CAM-2p.56
    “auto.”
    read in context ↗
  23. 14:35:00CVR CAM-1p.56
    “* * *.”
    read in context ↗
  24. 14:36:36CVR CAM-2calloutp.58
    “umh, fifteen, fifteen, fifteen, takeoff and a blue light.”
    read in context ↗
  25. 14:36:41CVR HOT-1calloutp.58
    “fifteen, fifteen, fifteen, takeoff, blue light.”
    read in context ↗
  26. 14:37:58CVR HOT-1p.60
    “I don't see anything in the system. [consistent with cell phone call].”
    read in context ↗
  27. 14:38 EST (179,755 SRN)FDRGroundp.3
    FDR stopped recording
  28. 14:38:06CVR HOT-1p.60
    “no flightplan stored that's just great, ah, okay I guess we need to ah call the company and have them refile then. [consistent with cell phone call].”
    read in context ↗
  29. 14:44:47CVR CAM-2calloutp.63
    “I have fifteen, fifteen, fifteen, takeoff and a blue light.”
    read in context ↗
  30. 14:44:51CVR HOT-1calloutp.63
    “fifteen, fifteen, fifteen, takeoff blue light. flight controls elevator on.”
    read in context ↗
  31. 14:45:00CVR HOT-1calloutp.63
    “off. takeoff briefing? DCA17FA076”
    read in context ↗
  32. 14:45:02CVR CAM-2calloutp.64
    “ah left seat takeoff. assigned headings, probably three thousand feet. emergency return we'll just take it right over to Metro airport landing on one of the two one * *.”
    read in context ↗
  33. 14:45:16CVR HOT-1calloutp.64
    “before takeoff the line flaps and slats.”
    read in context ↗
  34. 14:45:18CVR CAM-2calloutp.64
    “are fifteen, fifteen, fifteen, takeoff and a blue light.”
    read in context ↗
  35. 14:45:21CVR HOT-1calloutp.64
    “fifteen, fifteen, fifteen, takeoff blue light. V-speeds?”
    read in context ↗
  36. 14:46:20CVR HOT-1calloutp.65
    “yeah I'll just call rotate.”
    read in context ↗
  37. 14:48:47CVR CAM-2p.66
    “Akron five?”
    read in context ↗
  38. 14:48:49CVR HOT-1p.66
    “yeah.”
    read in context ↗
  39. 14:49 EST (179,764 SRN)FDRPre-takeoffp.3
    FDR started recording (last time before rejected takeoff)
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  40. 14:49:33CVR HOT-1p.67
    “yup.”
    read in context ↗
  41. 14:49:35CVR RDO-1p.67
    “Willow Run traffic ah Ameristar ninety three sixty three is taking an active runway ah two three left for departure and ah it will be a right turn out ah north west departure any inboud traffic please advise Willow Run.”
    read in context ↗
  42. 14:49:43 ESTFDRTaxip.4
    Aircraft began taxiing to the departure runway
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  43. 14:50:02CVR CAM-2calloutp.67
    “before takeoff to the line.”
    read in context ↗
  44. 14:51:11CVR CAM-2calloutp.68
    “before takeoff is complete.”
    read in context ↗
  45. 14:51:27CVR CAM-2calloutp.68
    “autothrottles on please. set takeoff thrust. DCA17FA076”
    read in context ↗
  46. 14:52 EST (179,924 SRN)FDRTakeoff/Rejected takeoffp.3
    End of FDR recording (rejected takeoff, runway excursion)
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  47. 14:52:01CVR HOT-1p.69
    “rotate.”
    read in context ↗
  48. 14:52:04CVR HOT-1p.69
    “V-two.”
    read in context ↗
  49. 14:52:08CVR CAM-2calloutp.69
    “abort.”
    read in context ↗
  50. 14:52:15CVR HOT-1calloutp.69
    “# don't abort above V-one like that.”
    read in context ↗
  51. 14:52:27CVR FA-1final secondsp.70
    “heads down, stay down, heads down, stay down, heads down, stay down.”
    read in context ↗
  52. 14:52:32CVR CAMfinal secondsp.70
    “landing gear landing gear [multiple repetitions electronic voice].”
    read in context ↗
  53. 14:52:37CVR PA-1final secondsp.70
    “evacuate, evacuate, evacuate.”
    read in context ↗
  54. 14:52:41CVR CAM-2final secondsp.70
    “it wasn't flying. it wasn't - I had it all the way back here it wasn't flying.”
    read in context ↗
  55. 14:52:46CVR CAMfinal secondsp.70
    “[sounds consistent with emergency evacuation of the cabin].”
    read in context ↗
  56. 14:53:12CVR CAM-2final secondsp.70
    “it was not rotating I had it all the way back here.”
    read in context ↗
  57. 14:53:29CVR CAM-2final secondsp.70
    “#.”
    read in context ↗
  58. 14:53:47CVR HOT-1final secondsp.70
    “evacuation checklist. 14:53:49 End of Recording 14:53:49 End of Transcript DCA17FA076”
    read in context ↗
Flight Data Recorder - Specialist's Factual Report · 14 events extracted by claude-sonnet-5Cockpit Voice Recorder - Group Chairman's Factual Report · 44 of 800 lines shown
How the Board coded the sequence
  1. Takeoff-rejected takeoff: Flight control sys malf/fail

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • DCA22MA0092021-10-19destroyedmatch 75
    MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DC-9-87 (MD-87) · 987 Investments, LLC
    Brookshire, TX
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system
    • ●Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Wind
    Flight control sys malf/fail
  • CEN10IA0842009-12-26no fatalitiesmatch 56
    ATR ATR72 · EXECUTIVE AIRLINES INC
    Dallas, TX
    Flight control sys malf/fail
  • CEN10IA1572010-03-13no fatalitiesmatch 52
    EMBRAER EMB-145LR · EXPRESSJET AIRLINES INC
    Chicago, IL
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system
    Flight control sys malf/fail
  • CEN10IA2192010-04-18no fatalitiesmatch 52
    BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2C10 · GOJET AIRLINES LLC
    Kansas City, MO
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system
    Flight control sys malf/fail
  • ANC08IA0332008-01-18no fatalitiesmatch 50
    Fairchild SA227-AC
    Dutch Harbor, AK
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system
    • ●Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Wind
  • DCA11IA0152010-12-29no fatalitiesmatch 47
    BOEING 757-223 · AMERICAN AIRLINES INC
    Jackson Hole, WY
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system
    Flight control sys malf/fail
  • IAD00IA0262000-03-12no fatalitiesmatch 45
    Boeing - Canada (de Havilland) DHC-8-102 ·
    BALTIMORE, MD
    matched on what happened, as the Board wrote it · same aircraft family
  • ANC23FA0422023-06-162 fatalmatch 44
    CESSNA 180 · JAMES B. TWETO
    Shaktoolik, AK
    • ●Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Wind
    • ●Environmental issues › Physical environment › Object/animal/substance

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 7 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Occurrences it coded
  • 5 of 8Flight control sys malf/fail
  • 2 of 8Runway excursion
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
  • Aircraft systems › Flight control system
  • Conditions/weather/phenomena › Wind
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
  • —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
  • Action/decision › Action
  • Task performance › Use of equip/info

A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.

In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • DCA22MA0092021-10-19 · MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DC-9-87 (MD-87) · 987 Investments, LLC
    The jammed condition of both elevators, which resulted from exposure to localized, dynamic high wind while the airplane was parked and prevented the airplane from rotating during the takeoff roll. Also causal was the failure of Everts Air Cargo, the pilots’ primary employer, to maintain awareness of Boeing-issued, required updates for its manuals, which resulted in the pilots not receiving the procedures and training that addressed the requirement to visually verify during the preflight checks that the elevators ar…
  • CEN10IA0842009-12-26 · ATR ATR72 · EXECUTIVE AIRLINES INC
    A fatigue failure of an elevator stop bracket, which resulted in a partial jam of the elevator control. Contributing to the failure was the improper installation of shim stacks, poor alignment of the brackets, and cyclic stresses acting on the lower stop, generated by the repeated improper use of the gust lock system.
  • CEN10IA1572010-03-13 · EMBRAER EMB-145LR · EXPRESSJET AIRLINES INC
    An in-flight encounter with lightning. Contributing to the incident was the damaged and displaced tailcone bulkhead frame that inhibited the full travel of the elevator during approach.
  • CEN10IA2192010-04-18 · BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2C10 · GOJET AIRLINES LLC
    The malfunction of the airplane’s aileron control system due to ice accumulation.
  • ANC08IA0332008-01-18 · Fairchild SA227-AC
    The disengagement of the rudder control cable and loose rudder cable retaining pins. A factor contributing to the accident was a wind gust.
What it recommended after them
  • A-12-044TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all operators of existing speedbrake-equipped transport-category airplanes to develop and incorporate training to specifically address recognition of a situation in which the speedbrakes do no… · DCA11IA015Closed - Acceptable Action
  • A-12-045TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all newly type-certificated 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 25 airplanes to have a clearly distinguishable and intelligible alert that warns pilots when the speedbrakes have not deployed d… · DCA11IA015Open Acceptable Alternate Response
  • A-12-046TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require Boeing to establish guidance for pilots of all relevant airplanes to follow when an unintended thrust reverser lockout occurs and to provide that guidance to all operators of those airplanes. · DCA11IA015Closed - Reconsidered

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).