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Cases › DCA13MA133 · Major investigation · Class 1

AIRBUS A300 - F4 622RUNITED PARCEL SERVICE CO

Birmingham, AL, USA · 2013-08-14·N155UP

2
fatal
0
serious
Fatal
highest injury
Destroyed
damage

What happened

NTSB summary, verbatim

The Safety Board's full report is available at http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/aviation.aspx. The Aircraft Accident Report number is NTSB/AAR-14/02. On August 14, 2013, about 0447 central daylight time (CDT), United Parcel Service (UPS) flight 1354, an Airbus A300-600, N155UP, crashed short of runway 18 during a localizer nonprecision approach to runway 18 at Birmingham-Shuttlesworth International Airport (BHM), Birmingham, Alabama. The captain and first officer were fatally injured, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and postcrash fire. The nonscheduled cargo flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan, and dark night visual flight rules conditions prevailed at the airport; variable instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) with a variable ceiling were present north of the airport on the approach course at the time of the accident. The flight originated from Louisville International Airport-Standiford Field (SDF), Louisville, Kentucky, about 0503 eastern daylight time (EDT).

Probable cause

the Board's determination
the flight crew's continuation of an unstabilized approach and their failure to monitor the aircraft's altitude during the approach, which led to an inadvertent descent below the minimum approach altitude and subsequently into terrain. Contributing to the accident were (1) the flight crew's failure to properly configure and verify the flight management computer for the profile approach; (2) the captain's failure to communicate his intentions to the first officer once it became apparent the vertical profile was not captured; (3) the flight crew's expectation that they would break out of the clouds at 1,000 feet above ground level due to incomplete weather information; (4) the first officer's failure to make the required minimums callouts; (5) the captain's performance deficiencies likely due to factors including, but not limited to, fatigue, distraction, or confusion, consistent with performance deficiencies exhibited during training; and (6) the first officer's fatigue due to acute sleep loss resulting from her ineffective off-duty time management and circadian factors.

Occurrence sequence

1 stepsNTSB coding · CICTT taxonomy
  1. 1 · Approach-IFR final approach
    Controlled flight into terr/obj (CFIT)
    defining event

Findings

10 causal · 3 contributing
  • CAUSE
    Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Descent/approach/glide path — Not attained/maintained
  • CAUSE
    Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring equip/instruments — Flight crew
  • CAUSE
    Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Navigation system › Flt management computing sys — Incorrect use/operation
  • CAUSE
    Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of automation — Flight crew
  • CAUSE
    Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Lack of communication — Pilot
  • CAUSE
    Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Ceiling/visibility/precip — Awareness of condition
  • CAUSE
    Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Ceiling/visibility/precip › Low ceiling — Accuracy of related info
  • CAUSE
    Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Lack of communication — Copilot
  • CAUSE
    Personnel issues › Task performance › (general) — Pilot
  • CAUSE
    Personnel issues › Physical › Alertness/Fatigue › Lack of sleep — Copilot
  • FACTOR
    Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Training — Operator
  • FACTOR
    Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Oversight › Oversight of operation — FAA/Regulator
  • FACTOR
    Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Navigation system › Ground proximity system — Related maintenance info

Safety recommendations

20 issuedwhat changed because of this accident
  • A-14-072Closed - Unacceptable ActionCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require principal operations inspectors to ensure that operators with flight crews performing 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91 subpart K overnight operations brief the threat of fatigue before each departure, particularly those occurring during the window of circadian low.

  • A-14-073Closed - Unacceptable ActionCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require operators to develop an annual recurrent dispatcher resource management module for dispatchers that includes participation of pilots to reinforce the need for open communication.

  • A-14-074Closed - Acceptable ActionCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require principal operations inspectors to work with operators to ensure that their operating procedures explicitly state that any changes to an approach after the completion of the approach briefing should be rebriefed by the flight crewmembers so that they have a common expectation of the approach to be conducted.

  • A-14-075Closed - Acceptable ActionCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require principal operations inspectors to ensure consistency among their operators’ training documents, their operators’ Federal Aviation Administration-approved and -accepted documents, such as the aircraft operating manual, and manufacturers’ guidance related to terrain awareness and warning system caution and warning alert responses, and ensure that responses are used during night and/or instrument meteorological conditions that maximize safety.

  • A-14-076Closed - Unacceptable ActionCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require principal operations inspectors of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91 subpart K operators to ensure that Federal Aviation Administration-approved nonprecision instrument approach landing procedures prohibit “dive and drive” as defined in Advisory Circular 120-108. (Supersedes Safety Recommendation A-06-8)

  • A-14-077Closed - Acceptable ActionCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require that the remarks section of meteorological aerodrome reports be provided to all dispatchers and pilots in flight dispatcher papers and through the aircraft communication addressing and reporting system.

  • A-14-078Closed - Acceptable Alternate ActionCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Expand the current guidance available in Federal Aviation Administration Order 7110.65, “Air Traffic Control,” to further define meteorological aerodrome report pertinent remarks.

  • A-14-079Closed - Acceptable ActionCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Issue a safety advisory bulletin to air traffic controllers providing examples of the types of meteorological aerodrome report remarks information considered pertinent and reminding them of the requirement to add such pertinent remarks to automatic terminal information service broadcasts.

  • A-14-080Closed - Acceptable ActionCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Issue a special airworthiness information bulletin to notify operators about the circumstances of this accident and the potential safety improvements related to the Honeywell enhanced ground proximity warning system part number 965-0976-003-218-218 or later software update.

  • A-14-081Closed - Unacceptable ActionCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Advise operators of aircraft equipped with terrain awareness and warning systems (TAWS) of the circumstances of this accident, including that, in certain situations, an escalating series of TAWS warnings may not occur before impact with terrain or obstacles. Encourage operators to review their procedures for responding to alerts on final approach to ensure that these procedures are sufficient to enable pilots to avoid impact with terrain or obstacles in such situations.

  • A-14-082Closed - Acceptable ActionCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Revise the minimum operational performance standards to improve the effectiveness of terrain awareness and warning systems when an airplane is configured for landing and near the airport, including when the airplane is descending at a high rate and there is rising terrain near the airport.

  • A-14-083Open - Unacceptable ResponseCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all operators of airplanes equipped with the automated “minimums” alert to activate it.

  • A-14-084Open - Unacceptable ResponseCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: For those airplanes not equipped with an automated “minimums” alert, require all operators of airplanes equipped with terrain awareness and warning systems (TAWS) to activate the TAWS 500-ft voice callout or similar alert.

  • A-14-085Closed - Acceptable Alternate ActionCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require principal operations inspectors of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91 subpart K operators to verify that procedures critical to approach setup, like configuring an approach in the flight management computer for those approaches dependent on that step, are included in Federal Aviation Administration-approved or -accepted manuals.

  • A-14-086Closed - Acceptable Alternate ActionCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Work with industry, for all applicable aircraft, to develop and implement means of providing pilots with a direct and conspicuous cue when they program the flight management computer flight plan incorrectly such that it contains such elements as improper waypoints or discontinuities that would allow the vertical deviation indicator to present misleading information for an approach.

  • A-14-087Closed - Acceptable ActionCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO UPS (UNITED PARCEL SERVICE) AIRLINES: Work with the Independent Pilots Association to conduct an independent review of the fatigue event reporting system to determine the program’s effectiveness as a nonpunitive mechanism to identify and effectively address the reported fatigue issues. Based on the findings, implement changes to enhance the safety effectiveness of the program.

  • A-14-088Closed - Acceptable ActionCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO UPS (UNITED PARCEL SERVICE) AIRLINES: Work with the Independent Pilots Association to counsel pilots who call in fatigued and whose sick bank is debited to understand why the fatigue call was made and how to prevent it from recurring.

  • A-14-089Closed - Acceptable ActionCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE INDEPENDENT PILOTS ASSOCIATION: Work with UPS to conduct an independent review of the fatigue event reporting system to determine the program’s effectiveness as a nonpunitive mechanism to identify and effectively address the reported fatigue issues. Based on the findings, implement changes to enhance the safety effectiveness of the program.

  • A-14-090Closed - Acceptable ActionCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE INDEPENDENT PILOTS ASSOCIATION: Work with UPS to counsel pilots who call in fatigued and whose sick bank is debited to understand why the fatigue call was made and how to prevent it from recurring.

  • A-14-091Open Acceptable Alternate ResponseCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO AIRBUS INDUSTRIE: Develop and implement, for applicable Airbus models, means of providing pilots with a direct and conspicuous cue when they program the flight management computer flight plan incorrectly such that it contains such elements as improper waypoints or discontinuities that would allow the vertical deviation indicator to present misleading information for an approach.

Sequence of events

21 timed eventsfrom the FDR factual report · claude-fable-5-1 (in-session)
  1. 04:42:35 CDTapproachp.11
    About 5 minutes before the end of the recording: pressure altitude about 10,000 ft, DME 20.6 NM, computed airspeed about 248 knots, speed brake handle fully extended
  2. 04:42:55 CDTapproachp.11
    Landing gear discretes indicated all three gear down and locked
  3. 04:44:22 CDTapproachp.11
    Lateral AFCS mode changed to localizer track mode
  4. 04:44:41 CDTapproachp.11
    Speed brake handle retracted, then moved periodically between retracted and full extension over the next 60 seconds; slats/flaps lever moved from detent 1 (slats/flaps up) to detent 2 (slats 15/flaps 0)
  5. 04:45:12 CDTapproachp.11
    Longitudinal AFCS mode changed to altitude mode; pressure altitude about 2,500 ft, DME about 9 NM, computed airspeed about 213 knots; selected airspeed changed from 170 to 160 knots
  6. 04:45:15 CDTapproachp.11
    Slats/flaps lever moved to detent 3 (slats 15/flaps 15)
  7. 04:45:32 CDTapproachp.11
    Lateral AFCS mode changed to NAV, to heading at 04:45:34, to localizer capture at 04:45:38, and about 9 seconds later back to localizer track where it remained
  8. 04:45:42 CDTapproachp.11
    Slats/flaps lever moved to detent 4 (slats 15/flaps 20)
  9. 04:45:45 CDTapproachp.12
    Speed brake handle returned to 0 and remained there; ground spoilers armed at 04:45:47
  10. 04:45:48 CDTapproachp.12
    Selected airspeed changed to 137 knots and remained there
  11. 04:45:56 CDTapproachp.12
    Slats/flaps lever moved to detent 5 (slats 30/flaps 40)
  12. 04:46:01 CDTapproachp.12
    Longitudinal AFCS mode changed to vertical speed mode; selected vertical speed set to about -700 fpm at 04:46:08
  13. 04:46:15 CDTfinal approachp.12
    Computed airspeed converged to the selected 137 knots; pressure altitude decreased below 2,500 ft marking the start of the final descent, DME about 5.75 NM (79 seconds before end of recording)
  14. 04:46:20 CDTfinal approachp.12
    Selected vertical speed changed to about -1000 fpm, then to about -1500 fpm at 04:46:34
  15. 04:46:38 CDTfinal approachp.12
    Selected altitude changed from about 2,500 ft to about 3,775 ft; no significant change in aircraft state over the next 45 seconds
  16. 04:47:25 CDTfinal approachp.12
    Three-second EGPWS sink rate warning recorded; vertical speed -1536 fpm, radio altitude 235 ft
  17. 04:47:26 CDTfinal approachp.12
    Selected vertical speed changed to about -640 fpm, then -448 fpm 3 seconds later; control column began increasing to a final value of about 5 degrees nose up with pitch increasing similarly
  18. 04:47:30 CDTfinal approachp.12
    Slight increase in thrust indicated by engine parameters
  19. 04:47:32 CDTfinal approachp.12
    Throttle resolver angle indicated an additional request for increased thrust; N1, N2, EGT and fuel flow show the engines responded
  20. 04:47:33 CDTimpactp.13
    Last second of recording: left autopilot command changed to disengaged, autopilot off warning indicated, autothrottle changed from speed mode to retard mode; last recorded pitch about 7 degrees nose up, airspeed about 138 knots, radio altitude 14 ft
  21. 04:47:34 CDTimpactp.13
    FDR recording ended

NTSB analysis

from the final report

The Safety Board's full report is available at http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/aviation.aspx. The Aircraft Accident Report number is NTSB/AAR-14/02. On August 14, 2013, about 0447 central daylight time (CDT), United Parcel Service (UPS) flight 1354, an Airbus A300-600, N155UP, crashed short of runway 18 during a localizer nonprecision approach to runway 18 at Birmingham-Shuttlesworth International Airport (BHM), Birmingham, Alabama. The captain and first officer were fatally injured, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and postcrash fire. The nonscheduled cargo flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan, and dark night visual flight rules conditions prevailed at the airport; variable instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) with a variable ceiling were present north of the airport on the approach course at the time of the accident. The flight originated from Louisville International Airport-Standiford Field (SDF), Louisville, Kentucky, about 0503 eastern daylight time (EDT).