AIRBUS A320US AIRWAYS INC
Weehawken, NJ, USA · 2009-01-15·N106US
What happened
NTSB summary, verbatimThe Safety Board’s full report is available at http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/A_Acc1.htm. The Aircraft Accident Report number is NTSB/AAR-10/03. On January 15, 2009, about 1527 eastern standard time, US Airways flight 1549, an Airbus Industrie A320-214, N106US, experienced an almost complete loss of thrust in both engines after encountering a flock of birds and was subsequently ditched on the Hudson River about 8.5 miles from LaGuardia Airport (LGA), New York City, New York. The flight was en route to Charlotte Douglas International Airport, Charlotte, North Carolina, and had departed LGA about 2 minutes before the in-flight event occurred. The 150 passengers, including a lap held child, and 5 crewmembers evacuated the airplane via the forward and overwing exits. One flight attendant and four passengers were seriously injured, and the airplane was substantially damaged. The scheduled, domestic passenger flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.
Photographs
146the aircraft, and what the investigators foundPhotographs are NTSB docket attachments — works of the US government, in the public domain. Captions are the Board’s own.
Probable cause
the Board's determinationThe ingestion of large birds into each engine, which resulted in an almost total loss of thrust in both engines and the subsequent ditching on the Hudson River. Contributing to the fuselage damage and resulting unavailability of the aft slide/rafts were (1) the Federal Aviation Administration’s approval of ditching certification without determining whether pilots could attain the ditching parameters without engine thrust, (2) the lack of industry flight crew training and guidance on ditching techniques, and (3) the captain’s resulting difficulty maintaining his intended airspeed on final approach due to the task saturation resulting from the emergency situation. Contributing to the survivability of the accident was (1) the decision-making of the flight crewmembers and their crew resource management during the accident sequence; (2) the fortuitous use of an airplane that was equipped for an extended overwater flight, including the availability of the forward slide/rafts, even though it was not required to be so equipped; (3) the performance of the cabin crewmembers while expediting the evacuation of the airplane; and (4) the proximity of the emergency responders to the accident site and their immediate and appropriate response to the accident.
Occurrence sequence
4 stepsNTSB coding · CICTT taxonomy- 1 · Initial climbBirdstrikedefining event
- 2 · LandingDitching
- 3 · Post-impactAircraft structural failure
- 4 · Post-impactEvacuation
Findings
5 causal · 6 contributing- CAUSEEnvironmental issues › Physical environment › Object/animal/substance › Animal(s)/bird(s) — Effect on equipment
- CAUSEOrganizational issues › Development › Selection/certification/testing › Equip certification/testing — FAA/Regulator
- CAUSEAircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters — Related operating info
- CAUSEAircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Airspeed — Not attained/maintained
- CAUSEEnvironmental issues › Task environment › Pressures/demands › Other pressure/demand — Effect on personnel
- FACTORAircraft › Aircraft systems › Indicating/recording systems — Not specified
- FACTOROrganizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure — Airport
- FACTORAircraft › Aircraft systems › Equipment/furnishings › Passenger compartment equip — Related operating info
- FACTOREnvironmental issues › Operating environment › Air traffic/operating proc — Not specified
- FACTORAircraft › Aircraft structures › Fuselage — Design
- FACTORPersonnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Following instructions — Passenger
Safety recommendations
35 issuedwhat changed because of this accidentTO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Modify Federal Aviation Administration radar data processing systems so that air traffic controllers can instruct the systems to process the discrete transponder code of an aircraft experiencing an emergency as if it were an emergency transponder code.
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Work with the military, manufacturers, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration to complete the development of a technology capable of informing pilots about the continuing operational status of an engine.
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Once the development of the engine technology has been completed, as asked for in Safety Recommendation A-10-62, require the implementation of the technology on transport-category airplane engines equipped with full-authority digital engine controls.
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Modify the 14 Code of Federal Regulations 33.76(c) small and medium flocking bird certification test standard to require that the test be conducted using the lowest expected fan speed, instead of 100-percent fan speed, for the minimum climb rate.
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: During the bird-ingestion rulemaking database (BRDB) working group‘s reevaluation of the current engine bird-ingestion certification regulations, specifically reevaluate the 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 33.76(d) large flocking bird certification test standards to determine whether they should 1) apply to engines with an inlet area of less than 3,875 square inches and 2) include a requirement for engine core ingestion. If the BRDB working group‘s reevaluation determines that such requirements are needed, incorporate them into 14 CFR 33.76(d) and require that newly certificated engines be designed and tested to these requirements.
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require manufacturers of turbine-powered aircraft to develop a checklist and procedure for a dual-engine failure occurring at a low altitude.
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Once the development of the checklist and procedure for a dual-engine failure occurring at a low altitude has been completed, as asked for in Safety Recommendation A-10-66, require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, Part 135, and Part 91 Subpart K operators of turbine-powered aircraft to implement the checklist and procedure.
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Develop and validate comprehensive guidelines for emergency and abnormal checklist design and development. The guidelines should consider the order of critical items in the checklist (for example, starting the auxiliary power unit), the use of opt outs or gates to minimize the risk of flight crewmembers becoming stuck in an inappropriate checklist or portion of a checklist, the length of the checklist, the level of detail in the checklist, the time needed to complete the checklist, and the mental workload of the flight crew.
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, Part 135, and Part 91 Subpart K operators to include a dual-engine failure scenario occurring at a low altitude in initial and recurrent ground and simulator training designed to improve pilots‘ critical-thinking, task-shedding, decision-making, and workload-management skills.
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, Part 135, and Part 91 Subpart K operators to provide training and guidance to pilots that inform them about the visual illusions that can occur when landing on water and that include approach and touchdown techniques to use during a ditching, with and without engine power.
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Work with the aviation industry to determine whether recommended practices and procedures need to be developed for pilots regarding forced landings without power both on water and land.
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require applicants for aircraft certification to demonstrate that their ditching parameters can be attained without engine power by pilots without the use of exceptional skill or strength.
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require Airbus operators to amend the ditching portion of the Engine Dual Failure checklist and any other applicable checklists to include a step to select the ground proximity warning system and terrain alerts to OFF during the final descent.
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require Airbus operators to expand the angle-of-attack-protection envelope limitations ground-school training to inform pilots about alpha-protection mode features while in normal law that can affect the pitch response of the airplane.
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 139-certificated airports to conduct wildlife hazard assessments (WHA) to proactively assess the likelihood of wildlife strikes, and, if the WHA indicates the need for a wildlife hazard management plan (WHMP), require the airport to implement a WHMP into its airport certification manual.
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Work with the U.S. Department of Agriculture to develop and implement innovative technologies that can be installed on aircraft that would reduce the likelihood of a bird strike.
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require Airbus to redesign the frame 65 vertical beam on A318, A319, A320, and A321 series airplanes to lessen the likelihood that it will intrude into the cabin during a ditching or gear-up landing and Airbus operators to incorporate these changes on their airplanes.
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Conduct research to determine the most beneficial passenger brace position in airplanes with nonbreakover seats installed. If the research deems it necessary, issue new guidance material on passenger brace positions.
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require, on all new and in-service transport-category airplanes, that cabin safety equipment be stowed in locations that ensure that life rafts and/or slide/rafts remain accessible and that sufficient capacity is available for all occupants after a ditching.
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require quick-release girts and handholds on all evacuation slides and ramp/slide combinations.
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, Part 135, and Part 91 Subpart K operators to provide information about life lines, if the airplane is equipped with them, to passengers to ensure that the life lines can be quickly and effectively retrieved and used.
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require that aircraft operated by 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, Part 135, and Part 91 Subpart K operators be equipped with flotation seat cushions and life vests for each occupant on all flights, regardless of the route.
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, Part 135, and Part 91 Subpart K operators to brief passengers on all flotation equipment installed on an airplane, including a full demonstration of correct life vest retrieval and donning procedures, before all flights, regardless of route.
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require modifications to life vest stowage compartments or stowage compartment locations to improve the ability of passengers to retrieve life vests for all occupants.
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Revise the life vest performance standards contained in Technical Standard Order-C13f to ensure that they result in a life vest that passengers can quickly and correctly don.
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Conduct research on, and require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, Part 135, and Part 91 Subpart K operators to implement, creative and effective methods of overcoming passengers‘ inattention and providing them with safety information.
TO THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE: Develop and implement, in conjunction with the Federal Aviation Administration, innovative technologies that can be installed on aircraft that would reduce the likelihood of a bird strike.
TO THE EUROPEAN AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY: Modify the small and medium flocking bird certification test standard in Joint Aviation Regulations Engines to require that the test be conducted using the lowest expected fan speed, instead of 100-percent fan speed, for the minimum climb rate.
TO THE EUROPEAN AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY: During the bird-ingestion rulemaking database (BRDB) working group‘s reevaluation of the current engine bird-ingestion certification regulations, specifically reevaluate the Joint Aviation Regulations Engines (JAR-E) large flocking bird certification test standards to determine whether they should 1) apply to engines with an inlet area of less than 3,875 square inches and 2) include a requirement for engine core ingestion. If the BRDB working group‘s reevaluation determines that such requirements are needed, incorporate them into JAR-E and require that newly certificated engines be designed and tested to these requirements.
TO THE EUROPEAN AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY: Require manufacturers of turbine-powered aircraft to develop a checklist and procedure for a dual-engine failure occurring at a low altitude.
TO THE EUROPEAN AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY: Require applicants for aircraft certification to demonstrate that their ditching parameters can be attained without engine power by pilots without the use of exceptional skill or strength.
TO THE EUROPEAN AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY: Require Airbus to redesign the frame 65 vertical beam on A318, A319, A320, and A321 series airplanes to lessen the likelihood that it will intrude into the cabin during a ditching or gear-up landing and Airbus operators to incorporate these changes on their airplanes.
TO THE EUROPEAN AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY: Require, on all new and in-service transport-category airplanes, that cabin safety equipment be stowed in locations that ensure that life rafts and/or slide/rafts remain accessible and that sufficient capacity is available for all occupants after a ditching.
TO THE EUROPEAN AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY: Require quick-release girts and handholds on all evacuation slides and ramp/slide combinations.
TO THE EUROPEAN AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY: Require modifications to life vest stowage compartments or stowage compartment locations to improve the ability of passengers to retrieve life vests for all occupants.
Sequence of events
5 timed eventsfrom the FDR factual report · claude-fable-5-1 (in-session)- engine startengine startp.3First recording discontinuity after engine 2 spooled up enough for generator 2 to power AC bus 2 and the Flight Data Interface Unit
- before takeofftaxip.8Fluctuations in indicated airspeed before takeoff indicate the FDIU was not receiving valid airspeed at that time
- about 15:27:19 ESTclimbp.3Second recording discontinuity during the accident flight (annotated on the plots; not long enough to reset the FDIU frame counter)
- about 15:28:30 ESTdescentp.3Third recording discontinuity during the accident flight
- about 15:27-15:31 ESTditchingp.8Bird ingestion into both engines, loss of thrust and landing in the Hudson River (engine parameters, flight controls, flaps/slats/spoilers, roll/yaw, electrical and smoke parameters presented in plots 1-12; recording ended 5 minutes 49 seconds after takeoff thrust)
NTSB analysis
from the final reportThe Safety Board’s full report is available at http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/A_Acc1.htm. The Aircraft Accident Report number is NTSB/AAR-10/03. On January 15, 2009, about 1527 eastern standard time, US Airways flight 1549, an Airbus Industrie A320-214, N106US, experienced an almost complete loss of thrust in both engines after encountering a flock of birds and was subsequently ditched on the Hudson River about 8.5 miles from LaGuardia Airport (LGA), New York City, New York. The flight was en route to Charlotte Douglas International Airport, Charlotte, North Carolina, and had departed LGA about 2 minutes before the in-flight event occurred. The 150 passengers, including a lap held child, and 5 crewmembers evacuated the airplane via the forward and overwing exits. One flight attendant and four passengers were seriously injured, and the airplane was substantially damaged. The scheduled, domestic passenger flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.