Cases › DCA07MA310 › The analyst
MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DC-9-82 (MD-82)American Airlines
What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.
68
timed facts
8
precedents
210
passages to ask
Ask the docket
passages, not paraphrasesTry
Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.
One timeline
68 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report- 12:29:55.8CVR CAMp.9“[The captain and FO review the guidance for Engine Start Valve Manual Operation Procedure in the QRH].”read in context ↗
- 12:40:57.3CVR CAMcalloutp.9“[The captain and FO perform the before starting engines checklist and takeoff briefing].”read in context ↗
- 13:07:12.8CVR METp.21“American fourteen hundred monitor ground point niner.”read in context ↗
- 13:07:13.0 CDTFDRpre-flightp.3FDR powered and recording for the event flight; takeoff flap 8.4 degreessee the traces at this moment ↗
- 13:07:15.3CVR CAM-1p.21“good day.”read in context ↗
- 13:09:00.6CVR CAM-1calloutp.25“okay T-P-S said eight I got eight I got eight got eight and takeoff.”read in context ↗
- 13:09:14.6CVR CAM-1calloutp.25“takeoff and armed.”read in context ↗
- 13:09:36.1CVR PA-1calloutp.26“and folks we'll be down to the departure end of the runway in about a minute or so uh like the flight attendants prepare for takeoff now.”read in context ↗
- 13:10:14.0CVR CAM-2calloutp.27“I know I almost did it in the simulator, but we we uh * Chicago long time ago in the F-one hundred one of these things we we're ah going off of three two left * * ten they're like yeah cleared to hold no okay you know we were sittin' in line and we're like okay we'll get ready to start ah well you guys go to the other side you got a you know little bit a * in trail so we cut across the * * * side hey you guys are cleared to make a loop back around and we're like, cleared for takeoff like * * (instruments). * * * * * * they knock you out of your routine * *.”read in context ↗
- 13:11:05.4CVR TWRcalloutp.28“American fourteen hundred St. Louis tower runway three zero left turn right heading three four five cleared for takeoff with the transponder.”read in context ↗
- 13:11:12.2CVR RDO-2calloutp.28“all righty uh transponder's on up to uh make it a left uh right turn to three forty-five cleared take off thirty left American ah fourteen hundred.”read in context ↗
- 13:11:32.4CVR CAM-2calloutp.29“complete for the takeoff checklist then.”read in context ↗
- 13:12:21.0CVR CAM-2p.29“V one.”read in context ↗
- 13:12:22.1CVR CAM-2p.29“rotate.”read in context ↗
- 13:12:22.4 CDTFDRtakeoffp.3Gear weight-on-wheels transitioned from Ground to Air (takeoff)see the traces at this moment ↗
- 13:12:28.1CVR CAM-1calloutp.29“positive rate, gear up.”read in context ↗
- 13:13:54.7 CDTFDRclimbp.3Engine 1 fire warning transitioned from Off to On, 1 minute 32 seconds after liftoffsee the traces at this moment ↗
- 13:13:55.0CVR CAMwarningp.32“[sound similar to fire warning bell] fire left engine [sound similar to fire warning bell] fire left engine [sound similar to fire warning bell] fire left engine [sound similar to fire warning bell] fire left engine [sound similar to fire warning bell] fire left engine.”read in context ↗
- 13:13:58.9CVR CAM-2warningp.32“fire light oh my gosh.”read in context ↗
- 13:14:02.5CVR CAM-1p.32“alright we have to go back and land.”read in context ↗
- 13:14:10.7CVR CAM-1warningp.32“declare an emergency.”read in context ↗
- 13:14:15.7CVR RDO-2warningp.32“yeah we're gonna have to uh declare an emergency swing back around there and land at St. Louis.”read in context ↗
- 13:14:29.8CVR RDO-2warningp.33“ah no we're gonna come right back around uh we've just got a uh left engine fire indication.”read in context ↗
- 13:14:49.8CVR CAM-2warningp.34“engine failure * * * fire one * * damage separation let's see auto-throttles pilot flying off.”read in context ↗
- 13:15:24.7CVR RDO-2warningp.35“yeah you're gonna have to roll the trucks for us ah I got a left indication of a left engine fire.”read in context ↗
- 13:15:29.5CVR DEPwarningp.35“left engine fire you wannoo ah you wanna do thirty right or do you wanna ah do two four?”read in context ↗
- 13:16:59.0 CDTFDRclimbp.3FDR lost power (first gap, 22 seconds)see the traces at this moment ↗
- 13:16:59.0CVR CAM-2p.38“okay it says ah fuel lever.”read in context ↗
- 13:17:01.3CVR CAM-1p.39“okay.”read in context ↗
- 13:17:01.7CVR CAMwarningp.39“[sound similar to fire warning bell] fire left engine [sound similar to fire warning bell] fire left engine [sound similar to fire warning bell] fire left engine.”read in context ↗
- 13:17:01.8CVR CAM-2warningp.39“fire light.”read in context ↗
- 13:17:16.7CVR CAMwarningp.40“[sound similar to fire warning bell] fire left engine [sound similar to fire warning bell] fire [sound similar to fire warning bell] fire left engine [sound similar to fire warning bell] fire left engine [sound similar to fire warning bell] fire left engine.”read in context ↗
- 13:17:19.3CVR CAM-2p.40“I just got power transfer too.”read in context ↗
- 13:17:21.0-13:17:24.5 CDTFDRreturnp.3FDR powered for 3.5 seconds, then lost power again (second gap, 12 minutes 12.5 seconds)see the traces at this moment ↗
- 13:17:21.6CVR CAM-2p.40“do you want me to kill this one?”read in context ↗
- 13:17:37.1CVR CAMwarningp.41“[sound similar to fire warning bell] fire left engine.”read in context ↗
- 13:19:58.2CVR CAM-1calloutp.47“eh let's put the gear down.”read in context ↗
- 13:20:34.8CVR TWRcalloutp.48“American fourteen hundred St. Louis tower runway three zero right, cleared to land. wind three one zero at one three.”read in context ↗
- 13:20:39.8CVR RDO-2calloutp.49“cleared to land thirty right American five hundred.”read in context ↗
- 13:26:57.6CVR RDO-1warningp.65“and uh just in case we haven’t said these words yet American fourteen hundred we are declaring an emergency.”read in context ↗
- 13:29:33.8CVR CAM-?p.70“where's the ah.”read in context ↗
- 13:29:36.3CVR CAM-?p.70“* *.”read in context ↗
- 13:29:37.0 CDTFDRapproachp.3FDR powered and recording again; Eng1 N1 and N2 recorded out-of-range values (set to 999) from this pointsee the traces at this moment ↗
- 13:31:54.7CVR CAMwarningp.74“too low, terrain [electronic voice].”read in context ↗
- 13:31:59.7CVR CAMwarningp.74“too low, terrain. too low, terrain. too low, terrain. too low, terrain. too low, terrain. [electronic voice].”read in context ↗
- 13:32:11.9CVR CAMp.74“ten [electronic voice].”read in context ↗
- 13:32:16.7CVR CAM-2p.75“* have deployed.”read in context ↗
- 13:32:19.4 CDTFDRlandingp.3Gear WOW transitioned from Air to Ground (landing) with flaps at 6.0 degrees; flap position then continued increasing for 56 seconds to 27.1 degrees and stayed theresee the traces at this moment ↗
- 13:38:56.3CVR RDO-2warningp.90“they didn't call you huh? ahm yeah we're * on the ground had an engine ah left engine fire and a multitude of other failures and ah we're on the ground now they've got it all * * uhm and ah were gonna taxi * * Victor Charlie * * * .”read in context ↗
- 13:39:51.8CVR RDO-2warningp.93“yeah I don't know if you copy just what's goin' on uhm went back we had a left engine fire indication * * fire we had gotten the fire out and one of the mult- multitude of problems one of the things is there are no both hydraulics are out we are on thirty left we gonna need someone to pin and pin the gear and send a tug out to pull us * *.”read in context ↗
- 13:42:34.8CVR CAM-2warningp.98“...right after that this kicked in I'm like well okay maybe its a loop but then the fire bell started going off and then that's when we.”read in context ↗
- 14:01:35.6CVR CAM-?p.139“*.”read in context ↗
- 14:01:36.6CVR CAM-2p.139“see if that works.”read in context ↗
- 14:01:39.6 CDTFDRgroundp.3End of FDR datasee the traces at this moment ↗
- 14:03:56.3CVR RDO-1warningp.144“yes sir uuuh some of the crash folks are saying they want to deplane the people here but we don't understand why they want to do that we d- we're ready to we're hooked up and ready to be towed t- ah in just a couple of minutes and uh that's all just going to take that much longer.”read in context ↗
- 14:13:28.2CVR CAM-1warningp.167“time to think about yeah before we had time to even figure out okay what are w- do with that next thing we got was * fire light and ah and then we're losin' stuff and ah.”read in context ↗
- 14:17:32.7CVR CAM-1warningp.172“and @ was able to pull up the emergency gear handle and when he pulled that up that unlocked at that point we lost all the power that would've unlatched should have unlatched the gear when we put the put the main gear handle down. whatever was supposed to have unlocked the nosegear didn't unlock it.”read in context ↗
- 14:18:35.1CVR CAM-2warningp.175“so like I said it just everything started going start valve light came on and then the then the fire light came on and then after tha- everything just went * * *.”read in context ↗
- 14:20:40.6CVR CAM-1warningp.178“and then I don't know within ten or fifteen seconds they had an engine fire *.”read in context ↗
- 14:22:07.7CVR CAM-1warningp.181“yeah and then shortly after that we got the engine fire light and uh fire left engine warning and all that stuff.”read in context ↗
- 14:28:25.3CVR CAM-?final secondsp.196“ah he wants to pull the ah if you got voice recorder and flight recorder”read in context ↗
- 14:28:28.8CVR CAM-2final secondsp.196“(look) at this left engine oil pressure (popped).”read in context ↗
- 14:28:30.9CVR CAM-?final secondsp.196“should be on the emergency checklist look on you yoke clip.”read in context ↗
- 14:28:31.7CVR CAM-2final secondsp.196“yeah it would it woulda popped.”read in context ↗
- 14:28:33.7CVR CAM-?final secondsp.196“it'll tell ya on the yoke clip.”read in context ↗
- 14:28:35.3CVR CAM-2final secondsp.196“look at you guys man.”read in context ↗
- 14:28:38.1CVR CAM-2final secondsp.196“voice recorder F-six.”read in context ↗
- 14:28:40.4CVR CAM-1final secondsp.196“(okay) there we go.”read in context ↗
Flight Data Recorder 10 - Specialist's Factual Report · 8 events extracted by claude-fable-5-1 (in-session)Cockpit Voice Recorder 12 - Factual Report of Group Chairman · 60 of 1,694 lines shown
Precedents
8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded- McDonnell Douglas MD-10-10FMemphis, TNmatched on what happened, as the Board wrote it · same aircraft family
- BOEING 757 · DELTA AIR LINES INCAtlanta, GAmatched on what happened, as the Board wrote it · same aircraft family
- BOEING 767 · AMERICAN AIRLINES INCChicago, ILmatched on what happened, as the Board wrote it · same aircraft family
- BOEING 737-8 · American Airlines, Inc.Denver, COmatched on what happened, as the Board wrote it · same aircraft family
- Boeing 757-232 · Delta Air Lines, Inc.Tampa, FLmatched on what happened, as the Board wrote it · same aircraft family
- Douglas DC-8 · UNITED PARCEL SERVICE COPhiladelphia, PAmatched on what happened, as the Board wrote it · same aircraft family
- BOEING 737-900ER · Delta Air LinesQueens, NYmatched on what happened, as the Board wrote it · same aircraft family
- McDonnell Douglas DC-9-41 · Northwest AirlinesIndianapolis, INmatched on what happened, as the Board wrote it · same aircraft family
What the record says
a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 4 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable causeFindings the Board cited in those cases
- 2 of 8Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
Occurrences it coded
- 2 of 8Evacuation
In the Board’s words — the closest cases
- DCA04MA0112003-12-18 · McDonnell Douglas MD-10-10F
1) the first officer's failure to properly apply crosswind landing techniques to align the airplane with the runway centerline and to properly arrest the airplane's descent rate (flare) before the airplane touched down; and 2) the captain's failure to adequately monitor the first officer's performance and command or initiate corrective action during the final approach and landing.
- DCA25LA0842025-01-10 · BOEING 757 · DELTA AIR LINES INC
Substantial injury to a passenger sustained during evacuation.
- DCA17FA0212016-10-28 · BOEING 767 · AMERICAN AIRLINES INC
The failure of the high-pressure turbine (HPT) stage 2 disk, which severed the main engine fuel feed line and breached the right main wing fuel tank, releasing fuel that resulted in a fire on the right side of the airplane during the takeoff roll. The HPT stage 2 disk failed because of low-cycle fatigue cracks that initiated from an internal subsurface manufacturing anomaly that was most likely not detectable during production inspections and subsequent in service inspections using the procedures in place. Contribu…
- DCA25LA2752025-07-26 · BOEING 737-8 · American Airlines, Inc.
The failure of the airplane’s left main landing gear tires and wheels during the takeoff roll due to the thermal relief plugs melting and releasing tire pressure, which resulted in abnormal airplane handling characteristics and led the flight crew to reject the takeoff at high speed.
- MIA03FA1302003-06-23 · Boeing 757-232 · Delta Air Lines, Inc.
a torching of the right engine caused by an abnormally high flow fuel during engine start for undetermined reasons. The torching resulted in an unwarranted evacuation of the airplane and serious injuries to three passengers . A contributing factor in the accident was the failure of the flightcrew to abort the engine start due to abnormally high fuel flow indication during the right engine start.
What it recommended after them
- A-05-014TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 air carrier operators to establish programs for flight crewmembers who have demonstrated performance deficiencies or experienced failures in the tr… · DCA04MA011Closed - Acceptable Action
- A-05-015TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Amend the emergency exit training information contained in the flight crew and cabin crew sections in Federal Aviation Administration Order 8400.10, Air Transportation Aviation Inspectors Handbook,… · DCA04MA011Closed - Acceptable Action
- A-05-016TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Verify that all 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 operators emergency door/slide trainers are configured to accurately represent the actual airplane exit door/slide and that their flight… · DCA04MA011Closed - Acceptable Action
- A-05-017TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Inform all air traffic control tower controllers of the circumstances of this accident, including the need to ensure that aircraft rescue and firefighting (ARFF) vehicles are not delayed without good… · DCA04MA011Closed - Acceptable Action
- A-05-018TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: In cooperation with the Memphis/Shelby County Airport Authority and Memphis Fire Department, modify the November 1, 2001, letter of agreement, titled, Airport Emergency .Procedures, to fully describe… · DCA04MA011Closed - Acceptable Action
- A-18-003TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Establish and lead an industry group that evaluates current and enhanced inspection technologies regarding their appropriateness and effectiveness for applications using nickel alloys, and use the res… · DCA17FA021Open - Acceptable Response
- A-18-004TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require subsurface in-service inspection techniques, such as ultrasonic inspections, for critical high-energy, life-limited rotating parts for all engines. · DCA17FA021Open - Acceptable Response
- A-18-005TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Revise Advisory Circular (AC) 20-128A, “Design Considerations for Minimizing Hazards Caused by Uncontained Turbine Engine and Auxiliary Power Unit Rotor Failure,” based on an analysis of uncontained e… · DCA17FA021Open - Acceptable Response
This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).