Douglas DC-8UNITED PARCEL SERVICE CO
Philadelphia, PA, USA · 2006-02-08·N748UP
What happened
NTSB summary, verbatimThe Safety Board's full report is available at http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2007/AAR0707.pdf. The Aircraft Accident Report number is NTSB/AAR-07/07. On February 7, 2006, about 2359 eastern standard time, United Parcel Service Company flight 1307, a McDonnell Douglas DC-8-71F, N748UP, landed at its destination airport, Philadelphia International Airport, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, after a cargo smoke indication in the cockpit. The captain, first officer, and flight engineer evacuated the airplane after landing. The flight crewmembers sustained minor injuries, and the airplane and most of the cargo were destroyed by fire after landing. The scheduled cargo flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Night visual conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.
Photographs
9the aircraft, and what the investigators foundPhotographs are NTSB docket attachments — works of the US government, in the public domain. Captions are the Board’s own.
Probable cause
the Board's determinationan in-flight cargo fire that initiated from an unknown source, which was most likely located within cargo container 12, 13, or 14. Contributing to the loss of the aircraft were the inadequate certification test requirements for smoke and fire detection systems and the lack of an on-board fire suppression system.
Safety recommendations
17 issuedwhat changed because of this accidentTO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Amend FAA Order 7110.65, "Air Traffic Control," to require that, when amending a runway assignment, controllers provide a specific instruction to the pilot advising of the runway change. For example, "UPS 1307, change to runway 25L, cleared to land."
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Provide clear guidance to operators of passenger and cargo aircraft operating under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Parts 121, 135, and 91K on flight crew procedures for responding to evidence of a fire in the absence of a cockpit alert based on the guidance developed by the 2004 smoke, fire, and fumes industry initiative.
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Ensure that the performance requirements for smoke and fire detection systems account for the effects of cargo and cargo containers on airflow around the detection sensors and on the containment of smoke from a fire inside a container and should establish standardized methods of demonstrating compliance with those requirements. (Superseded by safety recommendation A-12-68)
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require that fire suppression systems be installed in the cargo compartments of all cargo airplanes operating under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121.
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Provide guidance to aircraft rescue and firefighting personnel on the best training methods to obtain and maintain proficiency with the high-reach extendable turret with skin-penetrating nozzle.
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require airport inspectors to ensure that Part 139 airports with cargo operations include cargo aircraft in their aircraft rescue and firefighting aircraft familiarization training programs.
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require cargo operators to designate at least one floor level door as a required emergency exit and equip the door with an evacuation slide, when appropriate.
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all emergency exits on cargo aircraft that are operable from the outside to have a 2-inch contrasting colored band outlining the exit.
TO THE PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION: Require aircraft operators to implement measures to reduce the risk of primary lithium batteries becoming involved in fires on cargo-only aircraft, such as transporting such batteries in fire resistant containers and/or in restricted quantities at any single location on the aircraft.
TO THE PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION: Until fire suppression systems are required on cargo-only aircraft, as asked for in Safety Recommendation A-07-99, require that cargo shipments of secondary lithium batteries, including those contained in or packed with equipment, be transported in crew-accessible locations where portable fire suppression systems can be used.
TO THE PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION: Require aircraft operators that transport hazardous materials to immediately provide consolidated and specific information about hazardous materials on board an aircraft, including proper shipping name, hazard class, quantity, number of packages, and location, to on-scene emergency responders upon notification of an accident or incident.
TO THE PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION: Require commercial cargo and passenger operators to report to the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration all incidents involving primary and secondary lithium batteries, including those contained in or packed with equipment, that occur either on board or during loading or unloading operations and retain the failed items for evaluation purposes.
TO THE PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION: Analyze the causes of all thermal failures and fires involving secondary and primary lithium batteries and, based on this analysis, take appropriate action to mitigate any risks determined to be posed by transporting secondary and primary lithium batteries, including those contained in or packed with equipment, on board cargo and passenger aircraft as cargo; checked baggage; or carry-on items.
TO THE PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION: Eliminate regulatory exemptions for the packaging, marking, and labeling of cargo shipments of small secondary lithium batteries (no more than 8 grams equivalent lithium content) until the analysis of the failures and the implementation of risk-based requirements asked for in Safety Recommendation A-07-108 are completed.
TO THE CARGO AIRLINE ASSOCIATION: Work with your member airlines and other groups, such as the Air Transport Association, major aircraft manufacturers, and the Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) Working Group, to develop and disseminate accurate and complete airplane Emergency Response diagrams for ARFF personnel at airports with cargo operations.
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION AND THE PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION: In collaboration with air carriers, manufacturers of lithium batteries and electronic devices, air travel associations, and other appropriate government and private organizations, establish a process to ensure wider, highly visible, and continuous dissemination of guidance and information to the air-traveling public, including flight crews, about the safe carriage of secondary (rechargeable) lithium batteries or electronic devices containing these batteries on board passenger aircraft.
TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION AND THE PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION: In collaboration with air carriers, manufacturers of lithium batteries and electronic devices, air travel associations, and other appropriate government and private organizations, establish a process to periodically measure the effectiveness of your efforts to educate the air-traveling public, including flight crews, about the safe carriage of secondary (rechargeable) lithium batteries or electronic devices containing these batteries on board passenger aircraft.
Sequence of events
5 timed eventsfrom the FDR factual report · claude-fable-5-1 (in-session)- 22:30:00-24:00:00 EST (plot 2)descentp.3Last 30 minutes of the recording including the descent from cruise altitude
- 23:55:41 ESTapproachp.4Autopilot appears to be disconnected at 1,858 ft, 3 min 17 s before touchdown
- 23:56:41 ESTapproachp.4Bad data begins on Engine 1 N1 (2:17 before touchdown), followed by Roll and Engine 4 N1 (23:56:48), Elevator (23:56:52), Altitude (23:56:56), Pitch (23:57:05), Engine 2 N1 (23:57:09), Control Column (23:57:20), Engine 3 N1 (23:57:22), Control Wheel (23:57:25), Rudder Pedal, Rudder and Aileron (23:57:26), Airspeed (23:57:43), Air/Ground (23:57:59, 0:59 before touchdown)
- 23:58:58 ESTlandingp.4Touchdown, based on vertical acceleration
- 23:59:42 ESTlanding rollp.4End of the recording; bad data in the last second
NTSB analysis
from the final reportThe Safety Board's full report is available at http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2007/AAR0707.pdf. The Aircraft Accident Report number is NTSB/AAR-07/07. On February 7, 2006, about 2359 eastern standard time, United Parcel Service Company flight 1307, a McDonnell Douglas DC-8-71F, N748UP, landed at its destination airport, Philadelphia International Airport, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, after a cargo smoke indication in the cockpit. The captain, first officer, and flight engineer evacuated the airplane after landing. The flight crewmembers sustained minor injuries, and the airplane and most of the cargo were destroyed by fire after landing. The scheduled cargo flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Night visual conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.