Cases › DCA07MA072 › The analyst
Embraer ERJ-170Delta Connection
What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.
44
timed facts
8
precedents
143
passages to ask
Ask the docket
passages, not paraphrasesTry
Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.
One timeline
44 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report- 13:16:13.5CVR HOT-2p.9“wonder if they give us a heading * out of here? they usually do. they are going to do that today.”read in context ↗
- 13:24:28.6CVR HOT-2calloutp.17“takeoff data one thirty-six, one forty-one, one forty-four, one ninety-four, flex thirty-six.”read in context ↗
- 13:26:54.5CVR PA-2calloutp.19“ladies and gentlemen, we're now number two. flight attendants please prepare the cabin for takeoff, thank you.”read in context ↗
- 13:29:54.6CVR HOT-2calloutp.20“takeoff min fuel quantity verified. nine thousand four hundred eighty-five required. ** ten thousand six ten on board.”read in context ↗
- 13:30:03.9CVR HOT-2calloutp.21“TA/RA takeoff config.”read in context ↗
- 13:30:06.6CVR HOT-3calloutp.21“takeoff okay.”read in context ↗
- 13:30:56.9CVR TWRAcalloutp.21“Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight, the wind is three two zero at one seven, at the middle marker turn right heading runway two eight five, runway two six left, cleared for takeoff.”read in context ↗
- 13:31:05.4CVR RDO-2calloutp.21“two eight five at the marker two six left, cleared takeoff, Shuttlecraft six-four forty-eight.”read in context ↗
- 13:31:37.0CVR HOT-1calloutp.22“rotate.”read in context ↗
- 13:31:43.9CVR HOT-2calloutp.22“gear up.”read in context ↗
- 13:31:44.3CVR HOT-1calloutp.22“gear up.”read in context ↗
- 13:35:01.1CVR HOT-3warningp.24“traffic, traffic.”read in context ↗
- 13:35:04.1CVR HOTwarningp.24“[sound similar to altitude alerter]”read in context ↗
- 13:43:52.7CVR HOTwarningp.28“[sound similar to altitude alerter]”read in context ↗
- 13:45:41.1CVR HOT-2calloutp.29“autopilot on please. thanks.”read in context ↗
- 13:45:42.9CVR HOT-1calloutp.29“autopilot on.”read in context ↗
- 13:50:46.5CVR HOTwarningp.31“[sound similar to altitude alerter]”read in context ↗
- 13:55:15.8CVR HOTwarningp.36“[sound similar to altitude alert signal]”read in context ↗
- 13:56:44.4CVR HOT-?warningp.38“[sound similar to altitude alerter]”read in context ↗
- 14:23:04.0CVR HOT-1warningp.42“[sound similar to altitude alerter]”read in context ↗
- 14:38:17.7CVR HOTwarningp.49“[sound similar to altitude alerter]”read in context ↗
- 14:43:27.8CVR HOTwarningp.52“[sound similar to altitude alerter]”read in context ↗
- 14:51:25.6CVR HOT-?warningp.59“[sound similar to altitude alerter]”read in context ↗
- 14:53:06.0CVR HOT-2calloutp.60“'kay, let's see. okay we got PARMA and OPTOO. 'kay uh, one ten point seven, * ten point seven, I-P-X-P. two eighty inbound. glideslope’s at PARMA at twenty-six fifty-eight. descent altitudes a thousand twenty in the baro. touchdown is seven ninety-one. minimum safe is thirty-one hundred to the east, twenty-seven to the west. if we have to go missed, climb to fourteen hundred feet, then climbing left turn to three thousand to the Dryer VOR and hold, teardrop. two and a half we have. PAPI on the right hand side. we'll get off at uh, I don't know, all the way down at Delta, I guess.”read in context ↗
- 14:55:52.6CVR HOTwarningp.62“[sound similar to altitude alert] CHI07MA072”read in context ↗
- 14:57:56.6CVR CAMwarningp.63“[sound similar to altitude alerter]”read in context ↗
- 15:01:15.1CVR TWRCcalloutp.68“Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight Cleveland tower, runway two eight, cleared to land. wind three one zero at one two. braking action reported fair.”read in context ↗
- 15:01:22.8CVR RDO-1calloutp.68“cleared to land two eight, Shuttlecraft sixty-four forty-eight.”read in context ↗
- 15:01:33.8CVR CAMwarningp.68“[sound of tone similar to altitude alerter]”read in context ↗
- 15:01:44.9CVR HOT-2calloutp.69“all right, you know what, gear down, landing checklist.”read in context ↗
- 15:01:47.6CVR HOT-1calloutp.69“gear down.”read in context ↗
- 15:02:45.9CVR HOT-2calloutp.71“if we have to go around, go around TOGA. flaps two, positive rate, gear up. heading or FMS nav. tell tower, flaps one, flaps up.”read in context ↗
- 15:03:41.3CVR HOT-1calloutp.71“we're cleared to land.”read in context ↗
- 15:04:46.4CVR HOT-3calloutp.72“approaching minimums.”read in context ↗
- 15:04:52.6CVR HOT-3calloutp.72“two hundred, minimums....”read in context ↗
- 15:04:54.5CVR HOT-3calloutp.72“...minimums.”read in context ↗
- 15:10:11.1CVR TWRCfinal secondsp.77“do you know the uh, number of persons on board?”read in context ↗
- 15:10:15.4CVR RDO-1final secondsp.77“seventy plus four crew.”read in context ↗
- 15:10:17.7CVR TWRCfinal secondsp.77“seventy plus four crew, thank you.”read in context ↗
- 15:10:19.4CVR RDO-1final secondsp.77“and the braking action is nil.”read in context ↗
- 15:10:21.7CVR TWRCfinal secondsp.77“got that.”read in context ↗
- 15:10:22.0CVR ENDfinal secondsp.77“of TRANSCRIPT”read in context ↗
- 15:10:22.0CVR CAMfinal secondsp.77“[the recorder remained powered for the next nine minutes]”read in context ↗
- 15:19:16.3CVR ENDfinal secondsp.77“of RECORDING CHI07MA072”read in context ↗
Recorder events without a clock time
- before elapsed 98,074 sApproach with minimal ILS glideslope and localizer deviation; aircraft configured with Flaps 25
- elapsed 98,074 sTouchdown: right main gear WOW activated, Air Ground switch records ground, autothrottle disengaged; pitch about 9 degrees nose up, heading about 280 degrees; all left and right spoilers (L3/L4/L5, R3/R4/R5, inboard and outboard) fully deployed to 40 degrees
- elapsed 98,077-98,081 sThrust reversers in transit and fully deployed at 98,080 s; nose gear WOW activated the following second; brake pressure increase recorded 7 seconds after the air-ground switch
- elapsed 98,096-98,102 sHand wheel command to the left and a heading change; recorded heading 264 degrees at 98,102 s after which the heading goes to 0 degrees (invalid)
- elapsed 98,098 s16 seconds after touchdown, variable signals on the vertical, longitudinal and lateral accelerometers (runway overrun); maximum longitudinal acceleration -0.615 g at 98,099 s
- elapsed 98,102-98,107 sSpoilers stowed except left L3, L4, L5, which stowed four seconds later
- elapsed 98,109 sAccelerometer signals stable around equilibrium (aircraft stopped)
Flight Data Recorder 10 - Specialist's Factual Report · 7 events extracted by claude-fable-5-1 (in-session)Cockpit Voice Recorder 12 - Factual Report of Group Chairman · 44 of 763 lines shown
Precedents
8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded- MCDONNELL DOUGLAS AIRCRAFT CO MD 88 · Delta Air LinesNew York, NYmatched on what happened, as the Board wrote it
- Beech H-18 · BYGONE AVIATION LLCGreat Bend, KSmatched on what happened, as the Board wrote it
- AIRBUS A300 - F4 622R · UNITED PARCEL SERVICE COBirmingham, ALmatched on what happened, as the Board wrote it
- Embraer EMB145 · CommutairPresque Isle, MEmatched on what happened, as the Board wrote it · same aircraft family
- Bombardier, Inc. CRJ-100 · COMAIR INCLexington, KYmatched on what happened, as the Board wrote it
- Cessna 208B · PlanemastersRockford, ILmatched on what happened, as the Board wrote it
- Embraer EMB145 · Envoy Air Inc.Chicago, ILmatched on what happened, as the Board wrote it · same aircraft family
- BOEING 767 · Delta Air Lines, Inc.Atlanta Hartsfield Intl. Apt. (KATL), GAmatched on what happened, as the Board wrote it
What the record says
a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 5 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable causeFindings the Board cited in those cases
- 3 of 8Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
- 2 of 8Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters
- 2 of 8Personnel issues › Physical › Alertness/Fatigue
- 2 of 8Environmental issues › Operating environment › Approach aid coverage/avail
- 2 of 8Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
Occurrences it coded
- 2 of 8Runway excursion
- 2 of 8Wrong surface or wrong airport
In the Board’s words — the closest cases
- DCA15FA0852015-03-05 · MCDONNELL DOUGLAS AIRCRAFT CO MD 88 · Delta Air Lines
the captain's inability to maintain directional control of the airplane due to his application of excessive reverse thrust, which degraded the effectiveness of the rudder in controlling the airplane's heading. Contributing to the accident were the captain's (1) situational stress resulting from his concerns about stopping performance and (2) attentional limitations due to the high workload during the landing, which prevented him from immediately recognizing the use of excessive reverse thrust.
- DEN07FA0592007-02-09 · Beech H-18 · BYGONE AVIATION LLC
The pilot's failure to maintain aircraft control during the missed approach which resulted in an inadvertent stall and impact with terrain. A contributing factor was the icing conditions.
- DCA13MA1332013-08-14 · AIRBUS A300 - F4 622R · UNITED PARCEL SERVICE CO
the flight crew's continuation of an unstabilized approach and their failure to monitor the aircraft's altitude during the approach, which led to an inadvertent descent below the minimum approach altitude and subsequently into terrain. Contributing to the accident were (1) the flight crew's failure to properly configure and verify the flight management computer for the profile approach; (2) the captain's failure to communicate his intentions to the first officer once it became apparent the vertical profile was not…
- DCA19FA0892019-03-04 · Embraer EMB145 · Commutair
The flight crew’s decision, due to confirmation bias, to continue the descent below the decision altitude when the runway had not been positively identified. Contributing to the accident were (1) the first officer’s fatigue, which exacerbated his confirmation bias, and (2) the failure of CommutAir pilots who had observed the localizer misalignment to report it to the company and air traffic before the accident.
- DCA06MA0642006-08-27 · Bombardier, Inc. CRJ-100 · COMAIR INC
the flight crewmembers's failure to use available cues and aids to identify the airplane's location on the airport surface during taxi and their failure to cross-check and verify that the airplane was on the correct runway before takeoff. Contributing to the accident were the flight crew's nonpertinent conversation during taxi, which resulted in a loss of positional awareness, and the Federal Aviation Administration's failure to require that all runway crossings be authorized only by specific air traffic control cl…
What it recommended after them
- A-16-020TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Collaborate with Boeing and US operators of MD-80 series airplanes to (1) conduct a study to examine reverse thrust engine pressure ratio (EPR)-related operational data, procedures, and training and (… · DCA15FA085Closed - Acceptable Action
- A-16-021TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Encourage US operators of MD-80 series airplanes to (1) implement the best practices identified in Safety Recommendation A-16-20 and (2) participate in an industry-wide monitoring program to verify th… · DCA15FA085Closed--No Longer Applicable
- A-16-022TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require operators of MD-80 series airplanes to revise operational procedures to include a callout when reverse thrust power exceeds 1.3 engine pressure ratio during landings on a contaminated runway. · DCA15FA085Closed--No Longer Applicable
- A-16-023TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Continue to work with industry to develop the technology to outfit transport-category airplanes with equipment and procedures to routinely calculate, record, and convey the airplane braking ability re… · DCA15FA085Closed - Acceptable Action
- A-16-024TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: If the systems described in Safety Recommendation A-16-23 are shown to be technically and operationally feasible, work with operators and the system manufacturers to develop procedures that ensure tha… · DCA15FA085Open - Acceptable Response
- A-16-025TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 operators to provide (1) guidance that instructs flight attendants to remain at their assigned exits and actively monitor exit availability in all non-n… · DCA15FA085Closed - Unacceptable Action
- A-16-026TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Develop best practices related to evacuation communication, coordination, and decision-making during emergencies through the establishment of an industry working group and then issue guidance for 14 C… · DCA15FA085Closed - Unacceptable Action
- A-16-027TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Clarify guidance to all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 air carriers to reinforce the importance of (1) having precise information about the number of passengers aboard an airplane, including… · DCA15FA085Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action
This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).