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Cases › DCA01MA005 · Major investigation

Douglas DC-9AIRTRAN AIRWAYS INC

ATLANTA, GA, USA · 2000-11-29·N826AT

0
fatal
0
serious
Minor injury
highest injury
Substantial
damage

What happened

NTSB summary, verbatim

Shortly after takeoff, the airplane experienced electrical problems, including numerous tripped circuit breakers. The flight crew requested a return to airport. During the landing rollout, the lead flight attendant and air traffic control personnel reported to the flight crew that smoke was coming from the left side of the airplane; subsequently, the flight crew initiated an emergency evacuation on one of the taxiways. Examination of the airplane revealed fire damage to the left, forward areas of the fuselage, cabin, and forward cargo compartment. The greatest amount of fire damage was found just aft of the electrical disconnect panel located at fuselage station 237. There was no evidence that the drip shield normally installed over the disconnect panel was present at the time of the accident. Bluish stains caused by lavatory rinse fluid were observed on surfaces near the disconnect panel on the accident airplane and in the same areas on another of AirTran's DC-9 airplanes. Examination of one of the connectors from the disconnect panel on the accident airplane revealed light-blue and turquoise-green deposits on its internal surfaces and evidence of shorting between the connector pins. It could not be determined when the drip shield over the disconnect panel was removed; however, this likely contributed to the lavatory fluid contamination of the connectors. Following the accident, AirTran revised its lavatory servicing procedures to emphasize the importance of completely draining the waste tank to avoid overflows. Boeing issued an alert service bulletin recommending that operators of DC-9 airplanes visually inspect the connectors at the FS 237 disconnect panel for evidence of lavatory rinse fluid contamination and that they install a drip shield over the disconnect panel. Boeing also issued a service letter to operators to stress the importance of properly sealing floor panels and adhering to lavatory servicing procedures specified in its DC-9 Maintenance Manual. The Safety Board is aware of two incidents involving the military equivalent of the DC-9 that involved circumstances similar to the accident involving N826AT. Drip shields were installed above the FS 237 disconnect panels on both airplanes.

Photographs

19the aircraft, and what the investigators found
Wreckage and site documentation · 19 photographs from the docket

Photographs are NTSB docket attachments — works of the US government, in the public domain. Captions are the Board’s own.

Probable cause

the Board's determination
the leakage of lavatory fluid from the airplane's forward lavatory onto electrical connectors, which caused shorting that led to a fire. Contributing to the accident were the inadequate servicing of the lavatory and the failure of maintenance to ensure reinstallation of the shield over the fuselage station 237 disconnect panel.

Safety recommendations

2 issuedwhat changed because of this accident
  • A-02-013Closed - Acceptable ActionCLASS IIletter ↗

    The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Federal Aviation Administration: Require all DC-9 operators to visually inspect the electrical connectors at fuselage station 237 for evidence of lavatory rinse fluid contamination and for the presence of a drip shield above the disconnect panel in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin DC9-24A190. Connectors with internal contamination should be replaced.

  • A-02-014Closed - Acceptable ActionCLASS IIletter ↗

    The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Federal Aviation Administration: Issue a flight standards information bulletin to principal inspectors of DC-9 operators that discusses the circumstances of the accident involving AirTran flight 956 and stresses the importance of properly servicing and draining lavatory waste tanks and sealing floor panels in areas of probable fluid contamination, as indicated in Boeing Service Letter DC-9-SL-53-101.

Sequence of events

4 timed eventsfrom the FDR factual report · claude-fable-5-1 (in-session)
  1. 233 s from start of takeoff rolltakeoff/climbp.4
    Takeoff roll, climb and descent to 2,535 ft plotted (figure 2 without flight controls, figure 3 without accelerations/engines)
  2. climb to about 1,400 ftclimbp.5
    ATC radar transponder lost at 1,400 ft (electrical fire progressing); circuit breakers tripping, crew declared emergency
  3. 15:44:47 ESTdescentp.1
    FDR stopped recording at 2,535 ft during the descent (loss of power)
  4. 15:44:51 ESTapproach/landingp.5
    CVR recording stopped; regained only for 37 s from 15:48:34 to 15:49:11

NTSB analysis

from the final report

Shortly after takeoff, the airplane experienced electrical problems, including numerous tripped circuit breakers. The flight crew requested a return to airport. During the landing rollout, the lead flight attendant and air traffic control personnel reported to the flight crew that smoke was coming from the left side of the airplane; subsequently, the flight crew initiated an emergency evacuation on one of the taxiways. Examination of the airplane revealed fire damage to the left, forward areas of the fuselage, cabin, and forward cargo compartment. The greatest amount of fire damage was found just aft of the electrical disconnect panel located at fuselage station 237. There was no evidence that the drip shield normally installed over the disconnect panel was present at the time of the accident. Bluish stains caused by lavatory rinse fluid were observed on surfaces near the disconnect panel on the accident airplane and in the same areas on another of AirTran's DC-9 airplanes. Examination of one of the connectors from the disconnect panel on the accident airplane revealed light-blue and turquoise-green deposits on its internal surfaces and evidence of shorting between the connector pins. It could not be determined when the drip shield over the disconnect panel was removed; however, this likely contributed to the lavatory fluid contamination of the connectors. Following the accident, AirTran revised its lavatory servicing procedures to emphasize the importance of completely draining the waste tank to avoid overflows. Boeing issued an alert service bulletin recommending that operators of DC-9 airplanes visually inspect the connectors at the FS 237 disconnect panel for evidence of lavatory rinse fluid contamination and that they install a drip shield over the disconnect panel. Boeing also issued a service letter to operators to stress the importance of properly sealing floor panels and adhering to lavatory servicing procedures specified in its DC-9 Maintenance Manual. The Safety Board is aware of two incidents involving the military equivalent of the DC-9 that involved circumstances similar to the accident involving N826AT. Drip shields were installed above the FS 237 disconnect panels on both airplanes.