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Cases › CEN16MA036 · Major investigation · Class 1

BRITISH AEROSPACE HS 125 700AExecuflight

Akron, OH, USA · 2015-11-10·N237WR

9
fatal
0
serious
Fatal
highest injury
Destroyed
damage

What happened

NTSB summary, verbatim

The Safety Board's full report is available at http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/aviation.aspx. The Aircraft Accident Report number is NTSB/AAR-16/03. On November 10, 2015, about 1453 eastern standard time (EST), Execuflight flight 1526, a British Aerospace HS 125-700A (Hawker 700A), N237WR, departed controlled flight while on a nonprecision localizer approach to runway 25 at Akron Fulton International Airport (AKR) and impacted a four-unit apartment building in Akron, Ohio. The captain, first officer, and seven passengers died; no one on the ground was injured. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and postcrash fire. The airplane was registered to Rais Group International NC LLC and operated by Execuflight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 as an on-demand charter flight. Instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) prevailed, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed. The flight departed from Dayton-Wright Brothers Airport (MGY), Dayton, Ohio, about 1413 and was destined for AKR.

Photographs

1the aircraft, and what the investigators found
The aircraft before the accident
N237WR
Cfichad49 · CC BY-SA 4.0 · Wikimedia Commons

Probable cause

the Board's determination
The flight crew's mismanagement of the approach and multiple deviations from company standard operating procedures, which placed the airplane in an unsafe situation and led to an unstabilized approach, a descent below minimum descent altitude without visual contact with the runway environment, and an aerodynamic stall. Contributing to the accident were Execuflight's casual attitude toward compliance with standards; its inadequate hiring, training, and operational oversight of the flight crew; the company's lack of a formal safety program; and the Federal Aviation Administration's insufficient oversight of the company's training program and flight operations.

Occurrence sequence

2 stepsNTSB coding · CICTT taxonomy
  1. 1 · Approach-IFR final approach
    Aerodynamic stall/spin
    defining event
  2. 2 · Approach-IFR final approach
    Collision with terr/obj (non-CFIT)

Findings

8 causal · 3 contributing
  • CAUSE
    Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action performance — Flight crew
  • CAUSE
    Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Descent/approach/glide path — Not attained/maintained
  • CAUSE
    Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Angle of attack — Capability exceeded
  • CAUSE
    Organizational issues › Development › Selection/certification/testing › Personnel selection/training — Operator
  • CAUSE
    Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure › Adequacy of policy/proc — Operator
  • CAUSE
    Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Safety programs › Adequacy of safety program — Operator
  • CAUSE
    Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Oversight › Oversight of reg compliance — FAA/Regulator
  • CAUSE
    Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Oversight › Oversight of operation — FAA/Regulator
  • FACTOR
    Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure › Adequacy of policy/proc — Manufacturer
  • FACTOR
    Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Indicating/recording systems › Data recorders (flight/maint) — Damaged/degraded
  • FACTOR
    Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Indicating/recording systems › Data recorders (flight/maint) — Inadequate inspection

Safety recommendations

13 issuedwhat changed because of this accident
  • A-16-034Open - Unacceptable ResponseCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 operators to install flight data recording devices capable of supporting a flight data monitoring program.

  • A-16-035Open - Unacceptable ResponseCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: After the action in Safety Recommendation A-16-34 is completed, require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 operators to establish a structured flight data monitoring program that reviews all available data sources to identify deviations from established norms and procedures and other potential safety issues.

  • A-16-036Closed - Acceptable ActionCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 operators to establish safety management system programs.

  • A-16-037Closed - Acceptable Alternate ActionCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: In conjunction with Textron Aviation and Hawker 700- and 800-series training centers, develop and incorporate into Hawker 700- and 800-series pilot training programs a nonprecision approach procedure that aligns with the stabilized approach criteria outlined in Advisory Circular 120-71A and eliminates configuration changes at low altitudes.

  • A-16-038Closed - ReconsideredCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: In conjunction with Textron Aviation and Hawker 700- and 800-series training centers, develop and incorporate into Hawker 700- and 800-series pilot training programs a definition of the term “landing assured” that aligns with the language of 14 Code of Federal Regulations 91.175(c)(1).

  • A-16-039Closed - Unacceptable ActionCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121, 135, and 91 subpart K operators and 14 CFR Part 142 training centers to train flight crews in the performance and use of the continuous descent final approach technique as their primary means for conducting nonprecision approaches.

  • A-16-040Closed - Acceptable ActionCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Issue a safety alert for operators describing the circumstances of this accident and reminding operators to ensure that current and accurate information is entered into weight-and-balance software programs used in their operations.

  • A-16-041Closed - Acceptable ActionCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Review the Safety Assurance System and develop and implement procedures needed to identify 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 operators that do not comply with standard operating procedures.

  • A-16-042Open - Acceptable ResponseCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Review the problems with the quality of the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) data in this accident to (1) determine why the problems were not detected and corrected before the accident, despite the requirements in Federal Aviation Administration Order 8900.1 and the guidance in Safety Alert for Operators 06019, and (2) determine if the procedures in Advisory Circular (AC) 20-186 would have ensured that the CVR problems were identified and corrected before the accident, and if not, revise AC 20-186 to ensure that such problems will be identified and corrected.

  • A-16-043Closed - Acceptable Alternate ActionCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO TEXTRON AVIATION: Work with the Federal Aviation Administration and Hawker 700- and 800-series training centers to develop and incorporate into Hawker 700- and 800-series pilot training programs a nonprecision approach procedure that aligns with the stabilized approach criteria outlined in Advisory Circular 120-71A and eliminates configuration changes at low altitudes.

  • A-16-044Closed - ReconsideredCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO TEXTRON AVIATION: Work with the Federal Aviation Administration and Hawker 700- and 800-series training centers to develop and incorporate into Hawker 700-and 800-series pilot training programs a definition of the term “landing assured” that aligns with the language of 14 Code of Federal Regulations 91.175(c)(1).

  • A-16-045Open - Acceptable ResponseCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO SIMCOM AVIATION TRAINING AND FLIGHT SAFETY INTERNATIONAL: Work with the Federal Aviation Administration and Textron Aviation to develop and incorporate into Hawker 700-and 800-series pilot training programs a nonprecision approach procedure that aligns with the stabilized approach criteria outlined in Advisory Circular 120-71A and eliminates configuration changes at low altitudes.

  • A-16-046Open - Acceptable ResponseCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO SIMCOM AVIATION TRAINING AND FLIGHT SAFETY INTERNATIONAL: Work with the Federal Aviation Administration and Textron Aviation to develop and incorporate into Hawker 700-and 800-series pilot training programs a definition of the term “landing assured” that aligns with the language of 14 Code of Federal Regulations 91.175(c)(1).

NTSB analysis

from the final report

The Safety Board's full report is available at http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/aviation.aspx. The Aircraft Accident Report number is NTSB/AAR-16/03. On November 10, 2015, about 1453 eastern standard time (EST), Execuflight flight 1526, a British Aerospace HS 125-700A (Hawker 700A), N237WR, departed controlled flight while on a nonprecision localizer approach to runway 25 at Akron Fulton International Airport (AKR) and impacted a four-unit apartment building in Akron, Ohio. The captain, first officer, and seven passengers died; no one on the ground was injured. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and postcrash fire. The airplane was registered to Rais Group International NC LLC and operated by Execuflight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 as an on-demand charter flight. Instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) prevailed, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed. The flight departed from Dayton-Wright Brothers Airport (MGY), Dayton, Ohio, about 1413 and was destined for AKR.