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Cases › ANC15MA041 · Major investigation · Class 1

DEHAVILLAND DHC-3Promech Air, Inc.

Ketchikan, AK, USA · 2015-06-25·N270PA

9
fatal
0
serious
Fatal
highest injury
Substantial
damage

What happened

NTSB summary, verbatim

The Safety Board's full report is available at http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/aviation.aspx. The Aircraft Accident Report number is NTSB/AAR-17/02.  On June 25, 2015, about 1215 Alaska daylight time, a single-engine, turbine-powered, float-equipped de Havilland DHC-3 (Otter) airplane, N270PA, collided with mountainous, tree-covered terrain about 24 miles east-northeast of Ketchikan, Alaska. The commercial pilot and eight passengers sustained fatal injuries, and the airplane was destroyed. The airplane was owned by Pantechnicon Aviation, of Minden, Nevada, and operated by Promech Air, Inc., of Ketchikan. The flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 as an on-demand sightseeing flight; a company visual flight rules flight plan (by which the company performed its own flight-following) was in effect. Marginal visual flight rules conditions were reported in the area at the time of the accident. The flight departed about 1207 from Rudyerd Bay about 44 miles east-northeast of Ketchikan and was en route to the operator's base at the Ketchikan Harbor Seaplane Base, Ketchikan.

Photographs

77the aircraft, and what the investigators found
Wreckage and site documentation · 77 photographs from the docket

Photographs are NTSB docket attachments — works of the US government, in the public domain. Captions are the Board’s own.

Probable cause

the Board's determination
(1) the pilot's decision to continue visual flight into an area of instrument meteorological conditions, which resulted in his geographic disorientation and controlled flight into terrain; and (2) Promech's company culture, which tacitly endorsed flying in hazardous weather and failed to manage the risks associated with the competitive pressures affecting Ketchikan-area air tour operators; its lack of a formal safety program; and its inadequate operational control of flight releases.

Occurrence sequence

1 stepsNTSB coding · CICTT taxonomy
  1. 1 · Enroute-cruise
    Controlled flight into terr/obj (CFIT)
    defining event

Findings

7 causal · 2 contributing
  • CAUSE
    Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment — Pilot
  • CAUSE
    Personnel issues › Psychological › Perception/orientation/illusion › Geographic disorient (lost) — Pilot
  • CAUSE
    Organizational issues › Management › Culture › Safety — Operator
  • CAUSE
    Organizational issues › Management › Culture › Pressures/demands — Operator
  • CAUSE
    Organizational issues › Management › Culture › Standard operating practices — Operator
  • CAUSE
    Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Oversight › Oversight of operation — Operator
  • CAUSE
    Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Ceiling/visibility/precip — Decision related to condition
  • FACTOR
    Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Navigation system › Ground proximity system — Design
  • FACTOR
    Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Navigation system — Design

Safety recommendations

10 issuedwhat changed because of this accident
  • A-17-035Open - Acceptable ResponseCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Implement ways to provide effective terrain awareness and warning system (TAWS) protections while mitigating nuisance alerts for single-engine airplanes operated under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 that frequently operate at altitudes below their respective TAWS class design alerting threshold.

  • A-17-036Closed - Acceptable ActionCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Discuss at the next Ketchikan Air Safety meeting the database and software considerations for legacy Chelton systems and encourage operators to use the most current terrain database and electronic flight instrument system software.

  • A-17-037Closed - Unacceptable Action/SupersededCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Work with members of the Ketchikan air tour industry to improve existing training programs aimed at reducing the risk of weather-related accidents involving continuation of flight under visual flight rules into instrument meteorological conditions, with special attention paid to the human factors issues identified in this investigation, including (1) the need to help pilots better calibrate what constitutes safe weather conditions to conduct flights based on objective standards and requirements, such as set criteria for what landmarks must be clearly visible from which locations in order to proceed on a particular route; (2) the need to help pilots who are new to the area recognize dynamic local weather patterns that can place them in a dangerous situation; and (3) operational influences on pilot decision-making. (Superseded by A-22-26)

  • A-17-038Closed - Acceptable ActionCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Expand the application of Federal Aviation Administration Order 8900.1, volume 3, chapter 19, section 6, “Safety Assurance System: Flight Training Curriculum Segments,” paragraphs 3-1251(B) and 3-1252, which address controlled flight into terrain-avoidance training programs for 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 helicopter operations, to all 14 CFR Part 135 operations.

  • A-17-039Closed - Unacceptable ActionCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Establish minimum initial and recurrent training requirements for personnel authorized to exercise operational control, including, but not limited to, approved subject knowledge areas, training hours, subject hours, and qualification modules.

  • A-17-040Open - Unacceptable ResponseCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Publish an advisory circular that provides guidance on operational control best practices, including, but not limited to, such areas as risk mitigation strategies, joint flight safety responsibilities, prior experience of operational control personnel, and operational control personnel duty time limitations.

  • A-17-041Closed - Unacceptable ActionCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Revise Federal Aviation Administration Order 8900.1 to include guidance for inspector oversight of operational control training program subject areas, including, but not limited to, the criteria for a qualification module.

  • A-17-042Closed - Unacceptable ActionCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Analyze automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data from Ketchikan air tour operations on an ongoing basis and meet annually with Ketchikan air tour operators to engage in a nonpunitive discussion of any operational hazards reflected in the data and collaborate on mitigation strategies for any hazards identified.

  • A-17-043Closed - Unacceptable Action/SupersededCLASS IIletter ↗

    TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Develop and implement special operating rules for the Ketchikan air tour industry that include en route visual flight rules weather minimums that are tailored to the industry’s unique requirements and are more conservative than those specified in 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135. (Superseded by A-22-25)

  • A-17-044Closed - Acceptable ActionCLASS IIletter ↗

    CRUISE LINES INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION: Encourage your members that sell air tours as shore excursions to review the circumstances of this accident and to consider ways to mitigate associated risks.

NTSB analysis

from the final report

The Safety Board's full report is available at http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/aviation.aspx. The Aircraft Accident Report number is NTSB/AAR-17/02.  On June 25, 2015, about 1215 Alaska daylight time, a single-engine, turbine-powered, float-equipped de Havilland DHC-3 (Otter) airplane, N270PA, collided with mountainous, tree-covered terrain about 24 miles east-northeast of Ketchikan, Alaska. The commercial pilot and eight passengers sustained fatal injuries, and the airplane was destroyed. The airplane was owned by Pantechnicon Aviation, of Minden, Nevada, and operated by Promech Air, Inc., of Ketchikan. The flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 as an on-demand sightseeing flight; a company visual flight rules flight plan (by which the company performed its own flight-following) was in effect. Marginal visual flight rules conditions were reported in the area at the time of the accident. The flight departed about 1207 from Rudyerd Bay about 44 miles east-northeast of Ketchikan and was en route to the operator's base at the Ketchikan Harbor Seaplane Base, Ketchikan.