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EMBRAER EMB-120ERSKYWEST AIRLINES INC

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

3
timed facts
8
precedents
10
passages to ask

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passages, not paraphrases
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Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.

One timeline

3 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report
  1. 06:02:10 PSTFDRFinal Approachp.4
    Plot 1 begins, covering final approach including descent from a pressure altitude of 6,800 feet through landing
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  2. 06:07:50 PSTFDRLandingp.4
    Plot 2 begins, covering final touchdown
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  3. 06:14:43 PSTFDRTaxi/Gate Arrivalp.4
    Event occurred approximately 6 minutes and 43 seconds after touchdown when engine 1 propeller and longitudinal acceleration parameters decreased from 49% to 0% and 0.03 g's to -0.17 g's, respectively
    see the traces at this moment ↗
Recorder events without a clock time
  • 0554 PSTScheduled domestic passenger flight originated from Carlsbad, California
  • 0634 PSTSkyWest Airlines Embraer EMB-120ER, N226SW, taxied into a jet bridge while parking at its assigned terminal gate at LAX
  • N/AFDR data ended about 4.5 seconds after the event, which occurred about 7 minutes after the last recorded landing
Flight Data Recorder 10 - Specialist's Factual Report · 6 events extracted by claude-sonnet-5
How the Board coded the sequence
  1. Taxi-from runway: Ground collision

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • WPR09IA1232009-02-21no fatalitiesmatch 93
    EMBRAER EMB-120ER · SKYWEST AIRLINES INC
    Salt Lake City, UT
    • ●Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring
    Ground collision
  • CEN15IA3372015-08-05no fatalitiesmatch 85
    BOEING 737 · Southwest Airlines
    Denver, CO
    • ●Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring
    Ground collision
  • DFW08IA0742008-03-01no fatalitiesmatch 78
    BOEING 737-7H4 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
    Dallas, TX
    • ●Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring
    Ground collision
  • ANC16FA0612016-08-315 fatalmatch 69
    CESSNA 208 · Hageland Aviation Services, Inc.
    Russian Mission, AK
    • ●Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring
  • CEN09LA1142008-12-23substantialmatch 68
    BOEING 747-212B · EVERGREEN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES INC
    Rockford, IL
    • ●Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring
    Ground collision
  • DCA10IA0012009-10-21no fatalitiesmatch 66
    AIRBUS A320 · NORTHWEST AIRLINES INC
    Minneapolis, MN
    • ●Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring
  • DCA09FA0112008-11-13substantialmatch 62
    BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2B19 · Pinnacle Airlines, Inc
    Detroit, MI
    • ●Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring
    Ground collision
  • DCA13CA0912013-05-09no fatalitiesmatch 58
    AIRBUS 320 · Delta Air Lines
    Dallas, TX
    • ●Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Occurrences it coded
  • 5 of 8Ground collision
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
  • Psychological › Attention/monitoring
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
  • —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
  • —

A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.

In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • WPR09IA1232009-02-21 · EMBRAER EMB-120ER · SKYWEST AIRLINES INC
    The flight crew's failure to maintain clearance from the stationary vehicle while taxiing.
  • CEN15IA3372015-08-05 · BOEING 737 · Southwest Airlines
    The gate lead/pushback driver's failure to recognize that the provisioning truck was within the safety zone of the gate during his walkaround due to distractions, which resulted in the subsequent collision between the airplane and the truck. Contributing to the collision was the provisioning truck driver's failure to recognize he was parked in the safety zone of an active gate adjacent to his assigned gate, and the guide agent's improper assumption that the safety zone was properly cleared by the gate lead/pushback…
  • DFW08IA0742008-03-01 · BOEING 737-7H4 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
    The failure of the taxiing flight crew to maintain an adequate clearance from the stationary airplane.
  • ANC16FA0612016-08-31 · CESSNA 208 · Hageland Aviation Services, Inc.
    The failure of both pilots to see and avoid each other while in level cruise flight, which resulted in a midair collision.
  • CEN09LA1142008-12-23 · BOEING 747-212B · EVERGREEN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES INC
    The ground crew's failure to maintain clearance from the light pole while directing the airplane to parking.
What it recommended after them
  • A-10-042TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Establish and implement standard procedures to document and share control information, such as frequency changes, contact with pilots, and the confirmation of the receipt of weather information, at ai… · DCA10IA001Closed - Unacceptable Action
  • A-10-043TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require air traffic controllers to use standard phraseology, such as on guard, to verbally identify transmissions over emergency frequencies as emergencies. · DCA10IA001Closed - Unacceptable Action

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).