EMBRAER EMB-135American Eagle Airlines Inc
What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.
Ask the docket
passages, not paraphrasesEvery answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.
One timeline
0 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each reportNo timed facts: this docket has no extracted recorder sequence and no transcript.
- approximately 3 minutes 30 seconds after FDR began recordingThe airplane began to move
- approximately 1 minute after airplane began to moveMovement was halted
- following haltEngine 1 was then powered up to 25% N1
- after Engine 1 power upThe N1 of Engine 1 increased and the plane began to move again
- approximately 15 seconds after resuming movementAirplane came to an abrupt halt; airplane was turning to the right during this movement
- approximately 1 minute 15 seconds after airplane haltedEngine 1 was shut down
- during recordingThe pilot's brake pedals were being manipulated, whereas the copilot's brake pedals were not
- Taxi-to runway: Ground collision
Precedents
8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded- EMBRAER EMB-120ER · SKYWEST AIRLINES INCSalt Lake City, UT
- ●Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring
Ground collision - BOEING 747-212B · EVERGREEN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES INCRockford, IL
- ●Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring
Ground collision - BOEING 737-7H4 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CODallas, TX
- ●Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring
Ground collision - DE HAVILLAND DHC-8 · Mesa AirlinesPhoenix, AZ
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft handling/service › Parking/securing
- ●Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring
Ground collision - BOEING 737-7H4 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES COPhoenix, AZ
- ●Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring
Ground collision - BOEING 737 · Southwest AirlinesDenver, CO
- ●Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring
Ground collision - EMBRAER S A ERJ 170-200 LR · Envoy Air Inc.Chicago, ILGround collision
- EMBRAER-EMPRESA BRASILEIRA DE ERJ 170 200 LR · Compass AirlinesMinneapolis, MNGround collision
What the record says
a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause- 6 of 8Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoringcited here too
- 2 of 8Aircraft › Aircraft handling/service › Towing and taxiing
- 2 of 8Personnel issues › Psychological › Perception/orientation/illusion
- 8 of 8Ground collision
- Psychological › Attention/monitoring
- —
- Aircraft handling/service › Towing and taxiing
- Psychological › Perception/orientation/illusion
A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.
- WPR09IA1232009-02-21 · EMBRAER EMB-120ER · SKYWEST AIRLINES INC
The flight crew's failure to maintain clearance from the stationary vehicle while taxiing.
- CEN09LA1142008-12-23 · BOEING 747-212B · EVERGREEN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES INC
The ground crew's failure to maintain clearance from the light pole while directing the airplane to parking.
- DFW08IA0742008-03-01 · BOEING 737-7H4 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
The failure of the taxiing flight crew to maintain an adequate clearance from the stationary airplane.
- WPR09LA2112009-04-21 · DE HAVILLAND DHC-8 · Mesa Airlines
The failure of ramp personnel and the flight crew to maintain clearance from ground equipment while taxiing. Contributing to the accident was the improper positioning of the ground equipment.
- WPR13IA2262013-05-10 · BOEING 737-7H4 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
The failure of the tug operator and wing walker to adequately monitor the environment during pushback of the airplane from the gate in preparation for flight, which led to the collision of the airplane with an adjacently parked airplane.
This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).