Cases › ENG11IA047 › The analyst
EMBRAER EMB145EXPRESSJET AIRLINES INC
What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.
19
timed facts
8
precedents
41
passages to ask
Ask the docket
passages, not paraphrasesTry
Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.
One timeline
19 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report- 10:35:58.3CVR STARTp.7“OF RECORDING”read in context ↗
- 12:31:16.0CVR HOT-1calloutp.9“how about ahhh [sound of smacking of lips] gear down please. ENG11IA047”read in context ↗
- 12:32:21.5CVR HOT-2calloutp.11“I'm like do we get penalized for go arounds?”read in context ↗
- 12:33:01.6CVR TWRcalloutp.12“Jetlink fifty eight twenty one Quad City Tower traffic just coming up over the numbers runway one zero cleared to land. wind one five zero at tree.”read in context ↗
- 12:33:08.1CVR RDO-2calloutp.12“one zero cleared to land fifty eight twenty one.”read in context ↗
- 12:33:16.1CVR HOT-1calloutp.12“[low volume] cleared to land.”read in context ↗
- 12:33:45.7CVR AWUwarningp.14“[sound of three buzzes, similar to altitude alerter]”read in context ↗
- 12:35:32.5CVR AWUwarningp.15“[sound of three buzzes, similar to altitude alerter] ENG11IA047”read in context ↗
- 12:36:21.7CVR AWUcalloutp.17“approaching minimums.”read in context ↗
- 12:36:26.1CVR AWUcalloutp.17“minimums minimums.”read in context ↗
- 12:37:25.4CVR CAMwarningp.21“[sound of click click, similar to master caution button being pressed]”read in context ↗
- 12:40:33.0CVR CAMfinal secondsp.27“[sound of multiple clicks, similar to master caution button being pressed]”read in context ↗
- 12:40:36.2CVR CAMfinal secondsp.27“[sound of single chime]”read in context ↗
- 12:40:39.7CVR RDO-2final secondsp.27“***.”read in context ↗
- 12:40:40.3CVR CAMfinal secondsp.27“[sound of sirens in background] ENG11IA047”read in context ↗
- 12:40:49.2CVR HOT-2final secondsp.28“alright dude. hey we did what we could man. did you pull the breaker? * find it?”read in context ↗
- 12:40:52.3CVR HOT-1final secondsp.28“yeah.”read in context ↗
- 12:40:54.9CVR HOT-1final secondsp.28“no its bravo thirty one.”read in context ↗
- 12:40:58.2CVR HOT-2final secondsp.28“i've seen it a million times. here it is.”read in context ↗
Recorder events without a clock time
- 1236 CDTExpressJet Airlines flight 5821 departed the left side of Runway 10 during the landing roll out at Quad City International Airport, Moline, Illinois.
Flight Data Recorder 10 - Factual Report · 1 events extracted by claude-sonnet-5Cockpit Voice Recorder - Group Chairman's Factual Report · 19 of 217 lines shown
How the Board coded the sequence
- Landing-landing roll: Loss of control on ground→
- Landing-landing roll: Runway excursion
Precedents
8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded- DeHavilland DHC-8-311 · Piedmont AirlinesPhiladelphia, PA
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
- BOMBARDIER INC CL 600 2C10 · GOJET AIRLINES LLCChicago, IL
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
- BOEING 737-8 · American Airlines, Inc.Denver, CO
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
- BOEING 737-3B7 · US AIRWAYS INCCharlotte (CLT), NC
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
- BOEING 737 · Southwest Airlines, Co.Chicago, IL
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
- BOEING 757-236 · FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPChattanooga, TN
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
- BOEING 737-824 · United AirlinesDenver, CO
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
- BOEING 767-322 · UNITED AIRLINES INCChantilly, VA
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
What the record says
a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable causeFindings the Board cited in those cases
- 8 of 8Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear systemcited here too
Occurrences it coded
- 3 of 8Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
- 3 of 8Aircraft structural failure
- 2 of 8Abnormal runway contact
- 2 of 8Aircraft maintenance event
- 2 of 8Landing gear collapse
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
- Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
- —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
- —
A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.
In the Board’s words — the closest cases
- ERA09IA0562008-11-16 · DeHavilland DHC-8-311 · Piedmont Airlines
The mechanical overload of the nosewheel steering links for undetermined reasons, which resulted in nose landing gear rotation and its subsequent wedging within the wheel well structure.
- DCA15IA0892015-03-14 · BOMBARDIER INC CL 600 2C10 · GOJET AIRLINES LLC
The nose landing gear’s failure to fully extend due to missing and damaged fastening hardware on the drive arm assembly.
- DCA25LA2752025-07-26 · BOEING 737-8 · American Airlines, Inc.
The failure of the airplane’s left main landing gear tires and wheels during the takeoff roll due to the thermal relief plugs melting and releasing tire pressure, which resulted in abnormal airplane handling characteristics and led the flight crew to reject the takeoff at high speed.
- ENG09IA0092009-07-15 · BOEING 737-3B7 · US AIRWAYS INC
The failure of the left hand main landing gear was caused by heat induced cracks resulting from abusive grinding/polishing of the chrome plate that was applied during the last overhaul.
- ENG08IA0422008-10-01 · BOEING 737 · Southwest Airlines, Co.
The right nose landing gear axle's failure from intergranular and fatigue cracking due to an earlier bearing failure.
What it recommended after them
- A-25-003TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all Boeing 757 operators to inspect the bannis latches on Boeing 757-200, -200CB, and -300 series airplane doors and, if necessary, modify or replace them so they comply with the correct confi… · DCA24FA002Open - Initial Response Received
- A-25-004TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all operators of Boeing 727 and 737 airplane models that use the same bannis latch design as Boeing 757 airplanes (757-200, -200CB, and 300 series) to inspect and, if necessary, modify or rep… · DCA24FA002Open - Initial Response Received
- A-25-005TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all Boeing 757 operators to update their Boeing 757 200, 200CB, and -300 series airplane aircraft maintenance manuals (AMM) in accordance with the revised Boeing AMM and illustrated parts cat… · DCA24FA002Open - Initial Response Received
- A-25-006TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all operators of Boeing 727 and 737 airplane models that use the same bannis latch design as Boeing 757 airplanes (757-200, -200CB, and 300 series) to update their aircraft maintenance manual… · DCA24FA002Open - Initial Response Received
- A-25-007TO BOEING: Once the Boeing 757 aircraft maintenance manual and illustrated parts catalog are updated to provide a consistent and accurate depiction of the bannis latch assembly, issue a service bulletin advising Boeing 757 operators to insp… · DCA24FA002Open - Initial Response Received
- A-25-008TO BOEING: Issue a service bulletin advising operators of Boeing 727 and 737 airplanes that use the same bannis latch design as Boeing 757 airplanes (757 200, 200CB, and -300 series) to inspect those airplanes and, if necessary, modify or… · DCA24FA002Open - Initial Response Received
- A-25-009TO BOEING: Review all pertinent aircraft maintenance manuals and illustrated parts catalogs for Boeing 727 and 737 model airplanes that use the same bannis latch design as Boeing 757 airplanes (757-200, -200CB, and -300 series) to ensure th… · DCA24FA002Open - Initial Response Received
This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).