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BOEING 737-8H4SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

17
timed facts
8
precedents
12
passages to ask

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passages, not paraphrases
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Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.

One timeline

17 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report
  1. 09:25:18 EDTFDRTaxi outp.5
    Ground speed began to increase from 0 knots (kts), consistent with the aircraft beginning to taxi.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  2. 09:26:01 EDTFDRTaxi outp.5
    The aircraft position data began recording via ADS-B. The aircraft was on the north-northwest side of AIRSIDE 2 headed northeast, perpendicular to taxiway juliet 3.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  3. 09:26:16 EDTFDRTaxi outp.5
    Both engines 1 and 2 TRA were reduced to 35.7 degree (deg).
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  4. 09:27:26 EDTFDRTaxi outp.5
    Ground speed was 0 kts. The aircraft was on the east side of AIRSIDE 2, on the ramp, facing south, and perpendicular to taxiway hotel 1.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  5. 09:27:33 EDTFDRTaxi outp.5
    Main brake pressure began to increase to approximately 3000 pounds per square inch (psi).
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  6. 09:29:03 EDTFDRTaxi outp.5
    Main brake pressure began to reduce to approximately 55 psi.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  7. 09:29:04 EDTFDRTaxi outp.6
    Engine 1 TRA began to increase to 41.7 deg. Less than one second later, engine 2 TRA began to increase to 40.6 deg.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  8. 09:29:06 EDTFDRTaxi outp.6
    Ground speed began to increase from 0 kts, consistent with the aircraft continuing to taxi.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  9. 09:29:27 EDTFDRTaxi outp.6
    Engines 1 and 2 TRA were 44.1 deg. Engine 1 and 2 N1 commands were 38.8 percent revolutions per minute (%RPM). Ground speed was 6 kts.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  10. 09:29:34 EDTFDRTaxi outp.6
    The aircraft began a left turn onto taxiway hotel 2. Ground speed was 9 kts.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  11. 09:30:00 EDTFDRTaxi outp.6
    The aircraft began a right turn onto taxiway hotel. The ground speed was 14 kts.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  12. 09:30:04 EDTFDRTaxi outp.6
    Engines 1 and 2 TRA began to increase.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  13. 09:30:10 EDTFDRTaxi outp.6
    Engines 1 and 2 TRA were 71.4 deg. Engines 1 and 2 N1 commands were 90.6 %RPM and 90.9 %RPM, respectively. Engines 1 and 2 N1 were 90.0 %RPM and 90.8 %RPM, respectively. Ground speed was 28 kts and rapidly increasing.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  14. 09:30:18 EDTFDRTaxi outp.6
    The aircraft reached a maximum of 71 kts computed airspeed and 65 kts ground speed. Main brake pressure began to increase. The auto brakes were not active, speed brake handle remained in the down position, ground spoilers were not up, and engines 1 and 2 thrust reversers were never in transit. The aircraft had traveled approximately 800 feet from taxiway hotel 2 down taxiway hotel.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  15. 09:30:19 EDTFDRTaxi outp.6
    Computed airspeed and ground speed rapidly began to decrease.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  16. 09:30:34 EDTFDRTaxi outp.6
    The aircraft made a right turn onto taxiway hotel 3. Shortly thereafter, the aircraft made another right turn onto taxiway golf.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  17. 10:08:48 EDTFDRPost-incident/at gatep.6
    The last recorded sample. The aircraft was back at the gate.
Recorder events without a clock time
  • unspecifiedThe aircraft would taxi back to the gate via taxiway golf to golf 1. The aircraft stopped and held short of taxiway hotel 2 before continuing on to the ramp back to the gate.
FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - SPECIALIST'S FACTUAL REPORT · 18 events extracted by claude-sonnet-5
How the Board coded the sequence
  1. Takeoff-rejected takeoff: Wrong surface or wrong airport

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • DCA22LA2012022-09-11no fatalitiesmatch 82
    BOEING 737-7H4 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
    Chicago, IL
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
  • DCA16IA0362015-12-19no fatalitiesmatch 79
    BOEING 737 · ALASKA AIRLINES INC
    Seattle, WA
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
    Wrong surface or wrong airport
  • DCA11FA0502011-01-03substantialmatch 76
    BOEING 737-823 · American Airlines
    Los Angeles, CA
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
  • DCA13CA0432013-01-25substantialmatch 72
    MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD11 · FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP
    Denver, CO
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
  • DCA19CA0662018-12-31substantialmatch 69
    Boeing 757 · American Airlines
    Charlotte, NC
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
  • DCA19FA0892019-03-04substantialmatch 69
    Embraer EMB145 · Commutair
    Presque Isle, ME
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
    Wrong surface or wrong airport
  • DCA21LA1372021-05-28substantialmatch 66
    BOEING 737-823 · AMERICAN AIRLINES INC
    Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport, TX
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
  • DCA16CA0942016-02-17no fatalitiesmatch 65
    Boeing 737 · American Airlines
    Detroit, MI
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Occurrences it coded
  • 3 of 8Ground collision
  • 3 of 8Tailstrike
  • 2 of 8Wrong surface or wrong airport
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
  • Action/decision › Action
  • Action/decision › Info processing/decision
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
  • —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
  • —

A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.

In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • DCA22LA2012022-09-11 · BOEING 737-7H4 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
    Southwest Airlines flight crew’s misjudgment of the distance required to safely pass the American Airlines airplane.
  • DCA16IA0362015-12-19 · BOEING 737 · ALASKA AIRLINES INC
    the flight crew's misidentification of the taxiway as the landing runway.
  • DCA11FA0502011-01-03 · BOEING 737-823 · American Airlines
    the early rotation of the airplane to an angle at which the fuselage contacted the runway. Contributing to early rotation was the Captain’s reaction to the erroneous V1 automated callout, likely assuming that the airplane was at or close to the correct Vr at the same time. The erroneous automated callout was likely due to a keystroke entry error by the FO when manually entering takeoff data for a newly assigned departure runway.
  • DCA13CA0432013-01-25 · MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD11 · FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP
    the flight crews failure to perform a takeoff performance data briefing following the final entries into the Flight Management System, which would have alerted them to the incorrect weight entry and resulting incorrect landing speeds. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the flight crew to recognize and respond to various visual cues indicating the airplane's airspeed was too slow, resulting in a higher than normal pitch during landing and the tail of the airplane striking the runway.
  • DCA19CA0662018-12-31 · Boeing 757 · American Airlines
    an inadvertent loss of airspeed and increased pitch attitude prior to touchdown.

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).