Cases › DCA25LA163 › The analyst
BOEING 737-8H4SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.
17
timed facts
8
precedents
12
passages to ask
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passages, not paraphrasesTry
Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.
One timeline
17 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report- 09:25:18 EDTFDRTaxi outp.5Ground speed began to increase from 0 knots (kts), consistent with the aircraft beginning to taxi.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 09:26:01 EDTFDRTaxi outp.5The aircraft position data began recording via ADS-B. The aircraft was on the north-northwest side of AIRSIDE 2 headed northeast, perpendicular to taxiway juliet 3.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 09:26:16 EDTFDRTaxi outp.5Both engines 1 and 2 TRA were reduced to 35.7 degree (deg).see the traces at this moment ↗
- 09:27:26 EDTFDRTaxi outp.5Ground speed was 0 kts. The aircraft was on the east side of AIRSIDE 2, on the ramp, facing south, and perpendicular to taxiway hotel 1.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 09:27:33 EDTFDRTaxi outp.5Main brake pressure began to increase to approximately 3000 pounds per square inch (psi).see the traces at this moment ↗
- 09:29:03 EDTFDRTaxi outp.5Main brake pressure began to reduce to approximately 55 psi.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 09:29:04 EDTFDRTaxi outp.6Engine 1 TRA began to increase to 41.7 deg. Less than one second later, engine 2 TRA began to increase to 40.6 deg.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 09:29:06 EDTFDRTaxi outp.6Ground speed began to increase from 0 kts, consistent with the aircraft continuing to taxi.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 09:29:27 EDTFDRTaxi outp.6Engines 1 and 2 TRA were 44.1 deg. Engine 1 and 2 N1 commands were 38.8 percent revolutions per minute (%RPM). Ground speed was 6 kts.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 09:29:34 EDTFDRTaxi outp.6The aircraft began a left turn onto taxiway hotel 2. Ground speed was 9 kts.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 09:30:00 EDTFDRTaxi outp.6The aircraft began a right turn onto taxiway hotel. The ground speed was 14 kts.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 09:30:04 EDTFDRTaxi outp.6Engines 1 and 2 TRA began to increase.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 09:30:10 EDTFDRTaxi outp.6Engines 1 and 2 TRA were 71.4 deg. Engines 1 and 2 N1 commands were 90.6 %RPM and 90.9 %RPM, respectively. Engines 1 and 2 N1 were 90.0 %RPM and 90.8 %RPM, respectively. Ground speed was 28 kts and rapidly increasing.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 09:30:18 EDTFDRTaxi outp.6The aircraft reached a maximum of 71 kts computed airspeed and 65 kts ground speed. Main brake pressure began to increase. The auto brakes were not active, speed brake handle remained in the down position, ground spoilers were not up, and engines 1 and 2 thrust reversers were never in transit. The aircraft had traveled approximately 800 feet from taxiway hotel 2 down taxiway hotel.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 09:30:19 EDTFDRTaxi outp.6Computed airspeed and ground speed rapidly began to decrease.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 09:30:34 EDTFDRTaxi outp.6The aircraft made a right turn onto taxiway hotel 3. Shortly thereafter, the aircraft made another right turn onto taxiway golf.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 10:08:48 EDTFDRPost-incident/at gatep.6The last recorded sample. The aircraft was back at the gate.
Recorder events without a clock time
- unspecifiedThe aircraft would taxi back to the gate via taxiway golf to golf 1. The aircraft stopped and held short of taxiway hotel 2 before continuing on to the ramp back to the gate.
FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - SPECIALIST'S FACTUAL REPORT · 18 events extracted by claude-sonnet-5
How the Board coded the sequence
- Takeoff-rejected takeoff: Wrong surface or wrong airport
Precedents
8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded- BOEING 737-7H4 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES COChicago, IL
- ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
- ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
- BOEING 737 · ALASKA AIRLINES INCSeattle, WA
- ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
Wrong surface or wrong airport - BOEING 737-823 · American AirlinesLos Angeles, CA
- ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
- ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
- MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD11 · FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPDenver, CO
- ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
- ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
- Boeing 757 · American AirlinesCharlotte, NC
- ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
- ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
- Embraer EMB145 · CommutairPresque Isle, ME
- ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
- ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
Wrong surface or wrong airport - BOEING 737-823 · AMERICAN AIRLINES INCDallas/Fort Worth International Airport, TX
- ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
- Boeing 737 · American AirlinesDetroit, MI
- ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
What the record says
a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable causeFindings the Board cited in those cases
- 8 of 8Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decisioncited here too
- 5 of 8Personnel issues › Action/decision › Actioncited here too
Occurrences it coded
- 3 of 8Ground collision
- 3 of 8Tailstrike
- 2 of 8Wrong surface or wrong airport
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
- Action/decision › Action
- Action/decision › Info processing/decision
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
- —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
- —
A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.
In the Board’s words — the closest cases
- DCA22LA2012022-09-11 · BOEING 737-7H4 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
Southwest Airlines flight crew’s misjudgment of the distance required to safely pass the American Airlines airplane.
- DCA16IA0362015-12-19 · BOEING 737 · ALASKA AIRLINES INC
the flight crew's misidentification of the taxiway as the landing runway.
- DCA11FA0502011-01-03 · BOEING 737-823 · American Airlines
the early rotation of the airplane to an angle at which the fuselage contacted the runway. Contributing to early rotation was the Captain’s reaction to the erroneous V1 automated callout, likely assuming that the airplane was at or close to the correct Vr at the same time. The erroneous automated callout was likely due to a keystroke entry error by the FO when manually entering takeoff data for a newly assigned departure runway.
- DCA13CA0432013-01-25 · MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD11 · FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP
the flight crews failure to perform a takeoff performance data briefing following the final entries into the Flight Management System, which would have alerted them to the incorrect weight entry and resulting incorrect landing speeds. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the flight crew to recognize and respond to various visual cues indicating the airplane's airspeed was too slow, resulting in a higher than normal pitch during landing and the tail of the airplane striking the runway.
- DCA19CA0662018-12-31 · Boeing 757 · American Airlines
an inadvertent loss of airspeed and increased pitch attitude prior to touchdown.
This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).