Cases › DCA24MA063 › The analyst
BOEING 737-9ALASKA AIRLINES INC
What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.
24
timed facts
8
precedents
35
passages to ask
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passages, not paraphrasesTry
Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.
One timeline
24 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report- 17:06:47 PSTFDRTakeoffp.7The aircraft departed runway 28L at Portland International Airport (PDX).see the traces at this moment ↗
- 17:06:48 QAR PSTFDRTakeoffp.9The aircraft departed runway 28L at PDX. Cabin pressure controller (CPC) 1 was in automatic control.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 17:12:33 PSTFDRClimbp.7The recorded cabin pressure dropped from 14.09 to 11.64 psi when the aircraft was at 14,830 ft and 271 kts. The "Cabin Altitude Greater than (>) 10k ft Warning" activated.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 17:12:33 QAR PSTFDRClimbp.9The cabin differential pressure dropped from 5.72 psi to 3.28 psi and 2.48 psi for CPC1 and CPC2, respectively.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 17:12:34 PSTFDRClimbp.7The master caution activated. The cabin pressure continued decreasing and was 9.08 psi at 14,850 ft and 271 kts. The aircraft magnetic heading was 123 deg.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 17:12:34 QAR PSTFDRClimbp.9The recorded cabin pressure dropped from 14.09 to 10.67 psi for CPC1 when the aircraft was at 14,859 ft and 271 kts. CPC2 did not record a change in pressure.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 17:12:35 QAR PSTFDRClimbp.9The "Cabin Altitude Greater than (>) 10k ft Warning" activated. The cabin pressure dropped to 9.43 psi and 10.67 psi for CPC1 and CPC2, respectively, at 14,883 ft and 271 kts. The aircraft magnetic heading was 122 deg. The differential pressure was 0.22 psi and 0.17 psi for CPC1 and CPC2, respectively.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 17:12:40 QAR PSTFDRClimbp.9The outflow valve (OFV) switch was activated.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 17:12:52 PSTFDRClimbp.7The master caution deactivated.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 17:13:36 PSTFDRClimbp.7The cabin pressure was 7.89 psi and was at the lowest value recorded. The aircraft was at 16,293 ft and 278 kts.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 17:13:41 PSTFDRClimb/Descentp.7The aircraft continued to climb and reached a maximum altitude of 16,320 ft and began to descend. The airspeed was 276 kts on a magnetic heading of 120 deg.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 17:13:48 PSTFDRDescentp.7The cabin pressure began to increase from 7.89 psi to 7.91 psi. The aircraft was at 16,266 ft and was descending.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 17:13:56 PSTFDRDescentp.8The selected altitude changed from 23,000 ft to 10,000 ft. The cabin pressure was 7.95 psi and continued to increase for the remainder of the flight.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 17:14:28 QAR PSTFDRDescentp.9The OFV switch was deactivated. The OFV position began to increase from 1.06 deg and -0.63 deg to 8.19 deg and 1.69 deg for CPC1 and CPC2, respectively.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 17:14:35 PSTFDRDescentp.9The master caution activated for 3 seconds.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 17:14:37 QAR PSTFDRDescentp.9The OFV position reached a maximum 109.50 deg and 108.69 deg for CPC1 and CPC2, respectively.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 17:15:05 QAR PSTFDRDescentp.9The OPMODE for CPC1 changed from auto to manual.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 17:15:06 QAR PSTFDRDescentp.9The automatic CPC1 in control changed from operational to standby. The OPMODE for CPC2 changed from auto to manual.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 17:16:56 PSTFDRDescentp.9The aircraft began a left turn from 121 deg. The altitude was approximately 10,120 ft.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 17:17:00 PSTFDRDescentp.9The aircraft descended below 10,000 ft.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 17:17:00 QAR PSTFDRDescentp.9The aircraft descended below 10,000 ft. The "Cabin Altitude Greater than (>) 10k ft Warning" deactivated.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 17:18:05 PSTFDRDescentp.9The aircraft altitude was approximately 9,050 ft and the airspeed was 271 kts. The "Cabin Altitude Greater than (>) 10k ft Warning" deactivated. The cabin pressure was 10.48 psi.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 17:26:46 PSTFDRLandingp.9The aircraft landed on runway 28L at PDX.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 17:26:47 QAR PSTFDRLandingp.9The aircraft landed on runway 28L at PDX.see the traces at this moment ↗
10-A FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - SPECIALIST'S FACTUAL REPORT · 24 events extracted by claude-sonnet-5
How the Board coded the sequence
- Enroute-climb to cruise: Part(s) separation from AC
Precedents
8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded- MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DC 9 33F · Everts AirBethel, AK
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft structures › Fuselage
- BOEING B17 · Commemorative Air ForceDallas, TX
- ●Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Oversight
- ●Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Safety programs
- MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DC-9-87 (MD-87) · 987 Investments, LLCBrookshire, TX
- ●Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Training
- BOEING 737-79P · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES COAustin, TX
- ●Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Enforcement
- ●Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Training
- BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2C10 · PSA AirlinesWashington, DC
- ●Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Enforcement
- ●Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Oversight
- ●Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Safety programs
- BOEING 737 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES COCharleston, WV
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft structures › Fuselage
- BOEING 777 222 · UNITED AIRLINES INCHonolulu, HI
- ●Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Oversight
- ●Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Training
- Douglas MD-83 · ALASKA AIRLINES INCPort Hueneme, CAmatched on what happened, as the Board wrote it · same aircraft family
What the record says
a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 7 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable causeFindings the Board cited in those cases
- 3 of 8Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Oversightcited here too
- 3 of 8Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Trainingcited here too
- 2 of 8Aircraft › Aircraft structures › Fuselagecited here too
- 2 of 8Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure
- 2 of 8Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Safety programscited here too
- 2 of 8Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Enforcementcited here too
- 2 of 8Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring
Occurrences it coded
- 2 of 8Midair collision
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
- Aircraft structures › Fuselage
- Support/oversight/monitoring › Enforcement
- Support/oversight/monitoring › Oversight
- Support/oversight/monitoring › Safety programs
- Support/oversight/monitoring › Training
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
- —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
- Management › Policy/procedure
- Psychological › Attention/monitoring
A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.
In the Board’s words — the closest cases
- DCA18CA0562017-12-23 · MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DC 9 33F · Everts Air
failure of a cargo tie-down fastener, resulting in unsecured cargo striking the pressure bulkhead.
- CEN23MA0342022-11-12 · BOEING B17 · Commemorative Air Force
the air boss’s and air show event organizer’s lack of an adequate, prebriefed aircraft separation plan for the air show performance, relying instead on the air boss’s real-time deconfliction directives and the see-and-avoid strategy for collision avoidance, which allowed for the loss of separation between the Boeing B-17G and the Bell P-63F airplanes. Also causal was the diminished ability of the accident pilots to see and avoid the other aircraft due to flight path geometry, out-the-window view obscuration by airc…
- DCA22MA0092021-10-19 · MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DC-9-87 (MD-87) · 987 Investments, LLC
The jammed condition of both elevators, which resulted from exposure to localized, dynamic high wind while the airplane was parked and prevented the airplane from rotating during the takeoff roll. Also causal was the failure of Everts Air Cargo, the pilots’ primary employer, to maintain awareness of Boeing-issued, required updates for its manuals, which resulted in the pilots not receiving the procedures and training that addressed the requirement to visually verify during the preflight checks that the elevators ar…
- DCA23FA1492023-02-04 · BOEING 737-79P · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
the local controller’s incorrect assumption that the Southwest Airlines (SWA) airplane would depart from the runway before the Federal Express airplane arrived on the same runway, which resulted in a loss of separation between both airplanes. Contributing to the controller’s incorrect assumption were his expectation bias regarding the SWA airplane’s departure, his lack of situational awareness regarding the SWA airplane’s position when the flight crew requested takeoff clearance, and the air traffic control tower’s…
- DCA25MA1082025-01-30 · BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2C10 · PSA Airlines
The Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) placement of a helicopter route in close proximity to a runway approach path; their failure to regularly review and evaluate helicopter routes and available data, and their failure to act on recommendations to mitigate the risk of a midair collision near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA); as well as the air traffic system’s overreliance on visual separation in order to promote efficient traffic flow without consideration for the limitations of the see-and-av…
What it recommended after them
- A-24-031TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Work with the International Council of Air Shows Inc. (ICAS) and the warbird community to establish standard operating procedures for air show event organizers and air bosses that include: 1) applying… · CEN23MA034Open - Acceptable Response
- A-24-032TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require recurrent air boss evaluations as part of the letter of authorization renewal process. · CEN23MA034Open - Acceptable Response
- A-24-033TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Work with the International Council of Air Shows Inc. and other air show industry stakeholders to develop standardized, unambiguous terms to help ensure that the directives that air bosses provide per… · CEN23MA034Open - Acceptable Response
- A-24-034TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Revise Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Order 8900.1 to provide guidance and a job aid for FAA inspectors who evaluate an air boss’s performance and require the FAA inspector-in-charge of an air… · CEN23MA034Open - Acceptable Response
- A-24-035TO THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF AIR SHOWS, INC.: In collaboration with the Federal Aviation Administration and other air show industry stakeholders develop standardized, unambiguous terms to help ensure that the directives that air bosses p… · CEN23MA034Open - Acceptable Response
- A-24-036TO THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF AIR SHOWS, INC.: In collaboration with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the warbird community establish standard operating procedures for air show event organizers and air bosses that include: 1)… · CEN23MA034Open - Acceptable Response
- A-24-037TO COMMEMORATIVE AIR FORCE: Using the guidance provided in Advisory Circular 120-92D, “Safety Management Systems for Aviation Service Providers,” revise your safety risk assessment process for identifying and mitigating risks, tracking safe… · CEN23MA034Open - Acceptable Response
- A-24-010TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: For airports that are certificated under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 139 and are currently not equipped with airport surface detection equipment, model X (ASDE-X) or airport surface surv… · DCA23FA149Open - Acceptable Response
This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).