Cases › DCA24LA330 › The analyst
BOEING 737-8SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.
31
timed facts
8
precedents
17
passages to ask
Ask the docket
passages, not paraphrasesTry
Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.
One timeline
31 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report- 14:13:04 CSTFDRTakeoff rollp.6Groundspeed began to rapidly increase from 8 knots (kts), consistent with the aircraft beginning takeoff roll. The aircraft was on runway 11 at Louis Armstrong New Orleans International Airport (KMSY).see the traces at this moment ↗
- 14:13:39 CSTFDRTakeoffp.6The air/ground relay switch changed from ground to air.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 14:13:44 CSTFDRTakeoff/Climbp.6All three gear green lights were off, consistent with the gear no longer down and locked.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 14:14:01 CSTFDRClimbp.6While passing through 687 feet (ft) radio altitude and 170 kts computed airspeed, engine 1 N1 began to rollback from 83.0 percent revolutions per minute (%RPM).see the traces at this moment ↗
- 14:14:02 CSTFDRClimbp.6While passing through 747 ft radio altitude and 167 kts computed airspeed, engine 1 channel B airborne vibration monitor (AVM) increased from 0.1406 to 0.1797.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 14:14:04 CSTFDRClimbp.6The aircraft passed through 810 ft radio altitude and the computed airspeed was 164 kts. Engine 1 Fail status changed from normal to fail.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 14:14:05 CSTFDRClimbp.6Engine 1 N1 was 16.5 %RPM and continued to reduce to a minimum value of 6.1 %RPM, 46 seconds later (14:14:51 CST).see the traces at this moment ↗
- 14:14:09 CSTFDRClimbp.6Engine 1 channel A and B AVM began to rapidly increase.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 14:14:12 CSTFDRClimbp.7Engine 1 channel B AVM reached a maximum recorded value of 5. One second later, engine 1 channel A reached a maximum recorded value of 5. Note, Engine 1 channel A and B AVM operational range is limited at a maximum scalar value of 5.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 14:14:14 CSTFDRClimbp.7The aircraft passed through 900 ft radio altitude and the computed airspeed was 167 kts. The master caution activated and remained active for the next 11 seconds. Engine 1 N2 was 57.9 %RPM and continued to reduce to a minimum value of 0.0 %RPM, 76 seconds later (14:15:30 CST).see the traces at this moment ↗
- 14:14:16 QAR CSTFDRClimbp.7The left pressure regulating and shutoff valve (PRSOV) command changed from commanded open to commanded close. The left PRSOV remained closed the remainder of the flight.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 14:14:17 QAR CSTFDRClimbp.7The left environmental control system (ECS) pack changed from on to off. The left ECS pack remained off for the remainder of the flight. The right ECS pack remained on.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 14:14:31 CSTFDRClimbp.7The master caution activated and remained active for the next 2 minutes and 41 seconds.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 14:16:07 CSTFDRClimb/Emergency responsep.7The autothrottle (AT) disconnect switch was pressed. Subsequently, the AT was disengaged.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 14:16:14 CSTFDREmergency responsep.7Engine 1 throttle resolver angle (TRA) began to reduce from 66.45 degrees. Four seconds later, it reached 36.04 degrees.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 14:16:25 CSTFDREmergency responsep.7Engine 1 start lever was changed from run to cutoff.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 14:16:56 QAR CSTFDREmergency responsep.7Engine 1 fire handle was pulled.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 14:19:00 CSTFDREmergency responsep.7The auxiliary power unit (APU) changed from off to on. The APU remained on for the remainder of the flight.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 14:19:59 CSTFDREmergency responsep.7The master caution activated and remained active for the next 5 seconds.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 14:20:08 QAR CSTFDREmergency responsep.7The ECS isolation valve changed from closed to open. The ECS isolation valve was open the remainder of the flight.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 14:23:32 CSTFDRApproach preparationp.7The master caution activated and remained active for the next 9 seconds.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 14:24:12 CSTFDRApproach preparationp.7The speedbrake was armed.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 14:24:16 CSTFDRApproach preparationp.7Gear Lever Up transitioned from UP to NOT UP and Gear Lever Down transitioned from NOT DN to DOWN.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 14:24:28 CSTFDRApproachp.7All three gear green lights were on, consistent with the main and nose gears down and locked.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 14:24:42 CSTFDRApproachp.7The flap handle began to increase. One second later, the flap handle was at 15 degrees.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 14:26:05 CSTFDRLandingp.8The air/ground relay switch changed from air to ground, consistent with the aircraft landing. The aircraft landed on runway 11 at KMSY.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 14:26:06 CSTFDRLandingp.8The master caution activated and remained active for the next 2 seconds.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 14:26:10 CSTFDRLanding rolloutp.8Engine 2 thrust reverser was deployed. Engine 1 thrust reverser was not deployed and remained stowed.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 14:26:57 CSTFDRPost-landingp.8The groundspeed recorded was 1 kt. The aircraft position remained constant on runway 11, slightly past taxiway delta.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 14:33:00 CSTFDRPost-landingp.8End of valid recorded FDR data.
- 14:33:45 QAR CSTFDRPost-landingp.8End of valid recorded QAR data. The aircraft position was in spot bravo 8 at the terminal at KMSY.
FLIGHT DATA RECORDER'S - SPECIALIST'S FACTUAL REPORT · 31 events extracted by claude-sonnet-5
How the Board coded the sequence
- Takeoff: Birdstrike
Precedents
8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded- BOEING 737 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES COSt. Louis, MO
- ●Environmental issues › Physical environment › Object/animal/substance
Birdstrike - BOEING 757-222 · UNITED AIRlNES INCDenver, CO
- ●Environmental issues › Physical environment › Object/animal/substance
Birdstrike - BOEING 737 3H4 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES COSt. Louis, MO
- ●Environmental issues › Physical environment › Object/animal/substance
Birdstrike - BOEING 737-924ER · UNITED AIR LINES INCDenver, CO
- ●Environmental issues › Physical environment › Object/animal/substance
Birdstrike - BOEING 737 · Southwest Airlines, Co.Baltimore, MD
- ●Environmental issues › Physical environment › Object/animal/substance
Birdstrike - BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON CANADA 407 · AIR METHODS CORPStuttgart, AR
- ●Environmental issues › Physical environment › Object/animal/substance
Birdstrike - DE HAVILLAND DHC8 - 102 · Piedmont AirlinesPhiladelphia, PA
- ●Environmental issues › Physical environment › Object/animal/substance
Birdstrike - AIRBUS INDUSTRIE A320 211 · DELTA AIR LINES INCMinneapolis, MN
- ●Environmental issues › Physical environment › Object/animal/substance
Birdstrike
What the record says
a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable causeFindings the Board cited in those cases
- 8 of 8Environmental issues › Physical environment › Object/animal/substancecited here too
Occurrences it coded
- 8 of 8Birdstrike
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
- Physical environment › Object/animal/substance
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
- Aircraft power plant › Power plant
Common in the precedents, not cited here
- —
A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.
In the Board’s words — the closest cases
- DCA24LA0512023-12-19 · BOEING 737 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
A bird strike during climbout.
- ENG11IA0512011-09-26 · BOEING 757-222 · UNITED AIRlNES INC
**This probable cause was modified on 4/5/2012. Please see the public docket for this accident to view the original probable cause.** The initial damage to the fan blades was caused by the ingestion of a Red-Tailed Hawk that caused one or more fan blades to fracture, striking the fan case and causing it to bulge. The initial fan blade fragment release impacted and damaged other passing fan blades generating various sized blades fragments. Some of these blade fragments were propelled forward of the fan case by…
- ENG14IA0052013-12-23 · BOEING 737 3H4 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
The initial damage to the fan blades was caused by the ingestion of two mallard ducks that caused one or more fan blades to fracture, striking the fan shroud, as well as other passing fan blades, producing various sized blades fragments that created a cascading effect of collateral impact damage to the other fan blades, the fan case, and the inlet cowl. One large blade fragment was deflected out of the fan containment plane, which pierced and exited the inlet cowl in a benign direction. The engine and airplane m…
- CEN12IA5022012-07-31 · BOEING 737-924ER · UNITED AIR LINES INC
An in-flight collision with a bird during descent to land, which resulted in damage to the left pitot tube and loss of airspeed information to the left and right primary flight displays (PFD). The reason for the total loss of indications on the left PFD could not be determined based on available evidence.
- DCA15CA0372014-12-13 · BOEING 737 · Southwest Airlines, Co.
an inadvertent encounter with birds during approach to land that resulted in substantial damage.
This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).