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Cases › DCA24LA095 › The analyst

BOEING 737-823AMERICAN AIRLINES INC

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

0
timed facts
8
precedents
27
passages to ask

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passages, not paraphrases
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Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.

One timeline

0 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report

No timed facts: this docket has no extracted recorder sequence and no transcript.

Recorder events without a clock time
  • 1621 CSTAircraft took off from DCA (1721 EST)
  • 1941:33Aircraft touched down at DFW at an airspeed of 141 kts and a ground speed of 150 kts; spoilers appeared to deploy normally
  • ~1941:41 (about 8 sec after touchdown)Thrust reverser parameters transitioned from stowed to deployed
  • during rolloutThrust reversers remained deployed for about 12 seconds, were stowed for about 6 seconds, then re-deployed for the remainder of the rollout
  • during rolloutAircraft experienced a maximum longitudinal deceleration of -0.27 g; brake pressures reached maximum values of approximately 3,000 psi, consistent with maximum normal (manual) braking
  • 1942:28Aircraft experienced numerous acceleration excursions, consistent with departing the end of the runway surface
  • 1942:33Aircraft came to a stop
FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - SPECIALISTA��S FACTUAL REPORT · 7 events extracted by claude-sonnet-5
How the Board coded the sequence
  1. Landing-landing roll: Runway excursion

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • DCA12IA0962012-06-17no fatalitiesmatch 58
    AIRBUS A320 · JETBLUE AIRWAYS CORPORATION
    Las Vegas, NV
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Hydraulic power system
  • CHI08IA0652008-01-08no fatalitiesmatch 56
    Boeing 737-2H4 · Ameristar Air Cargo, Inc.
    Lincoln, NE
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Hydraulic power system
  • DCA21LA2292021-09-01no fatalitiesmatch 52
    BOEING 767-332 · DELTA AIR LINES INC
    Seattle, WA
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Hydraulic power system
  • DCA20MA0022019-10-181 fatalmatch 51
    Saab 2000 · Peninsula AviationServices Inc.,
    Unalaska, AK
    Runway excursion
  • DCA24FA0022023-10-05substantialmatch 51
    BOEING 757-236 · FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP
    Chattanooga, TN
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Hydraulic power system
  • DCA25LA2752025-07-26substantialmatch 51
    BOEING 737-8 · American Airlines, Inc.
    Denver, CO
    matched on what happened, as the Board wrote it · same aircraft family
  • DCA20LA0132019-11-11substantialmatch 50
    Embraer EMB145 · Envoy Air Inc.
    Chicago, IL
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    Runway excursion
  • DCA20LA0472019-12-23substantialmatch 49
    BOEING 737-824 · United Airlines
    Denver, CO
    matched on what happened, as the Board wrote it · same aircraft family

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Occurrences it coded
  • 3 of 8Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
  • 2 of 8Runway excursion
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
  • Aircraft systems › Hydraulic power system
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
  • —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
  • Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
  • Action/decision › Action
  • Action/decision › Info processing/decision

A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.

In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • DCA12IA0962012-06-17 · AIRBUS A320 · JETBLUE AIRWAYS CORPORATION
    the failure of the right main landing gear door retraction flexible hydraulic line in the Green hydraulic system, which led to prolonged operation of the power transfer unit and subsequent overheating and loss of pressure in the Yellow hydraulic system, resulting in the airplane's operation with only one hydraulic system. Contributing to the incident was the lack of incorporation of aircraft manufacturer service bulletins that describe procedures for aircraft modifications intended to prevent this occurrence.
  • CHI08IA0652008-01-08 · Boeing 737-2H4 · Ameristar Air Cargo, Inc.
    The improper installation of the swivel valve fittings by the operator's mechanic leading to the total loss of both hydraulic systems. Contributing to the incident were the swivel valves leaking and the total failure of the hydraulic system.
  • DCA21LA2292021-09-01 · BOEING 767-332 · DELTA AIR LINES INC
    The flightcrew’s failure to set the hydraulic panel correctly during the execution of the pushback checklist, and when the hydraulic panel setting was corrected, that resulted in the airplane coming to a sudden stop and a flight attendant receiving a serious injury.
  • DCA20MA0022019-10-18 · Saab 2000 · Peninsula AviationServices Inc.,
    The landing gear manufacturer’s incorrect wiring of the wheel speed transducer harnesses on the left main landing gear during overhaul. The incorrect wiring caused the antiskid system not to function as intended, resulting in the failure of the left outboard tire and a significant loss of the airplane’s braking ability, which led to the runway overrun. Contributing to the accident were (1) Saab’s design of the wheel speed transducer wire harnesses, which did not consider and protect against human error during maint…
  • DCA24FA0022023-10-05 · BOEING 757-236 · FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP
    The failure of the alternate gear extension system, which prevented the landing gear from being lowered. The cause of the system failure was a broken wire, due to tensile overload, between the alternate gear extend switch and the alternate extension power pack (AEPP), preventing the AEPP from energizing and supplying hydraulic fluid to the door lock release actuators for the nose landing gear and main landing gear. Contributing to the accident was the loss of the left hydraulic system due to a ruptured left main ge…
What it recommended after them
  • A-21-046TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Identify all currently certificated transport-category airplanes for which system safety assessments for landing gear systems did not consider human error that could lead to cross-wiring of antiskid b… · DCA20MA002Open - Acceptable Response
  • A-21-047TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require the submission and consideration of system safety assessments addressing the landing gear antiskid system for the certification of future transport-category airplane designs. The certification… · DCA20MA002Closed - Unacceptable Action
  • A-21-048TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require organizations that design, manufacture, and maintain aircraft to establish a safety management system. · DCA20MA002Open - Unacceptable Response
  • A-21-049TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Notify principal operations inspectors and frontline managers about the circumstances of this accident and emphasize the importance of existing Federal Aviation Administration guidance for detecting a… · DCA20MA002Closed - Unacceptable Action
  • A-21-050TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Revise Order 8900.1, Flight Standards Information Management System, to include a formalized transition procedure to be used during a changeover of certificate management team personnel responsible fo… · DCA20MA002Closed - Unacceptable Action
  • A-21-051TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Include the runway design code for runways of intended use among the criteria assessed when authorizing a scheduled air carrier to operate its airplanes on a regular basis at an airport certificated u… · DCA20MA002Open - Acceptable Response
  • A-21-052TO EUROPEAN UNION AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY: Identify all currently certificated transport-category airplanes for which system safety assessments for landing gear systems did not consider human error that could lead to cross-wiring of antiskid… · DCA20MA002Open - Acceptable Response
  • A-21-053TO THE EUROPEAN UNION AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY: Require the submission and consideration of system safety assessments addressing the landing gear antiskid system for the certification of future transport-category airplane designs. The certifi… · DCA20MA002Open - Acceptable Response

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).