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BOEING 717Hawaiian Airlines

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

11
timed facts
8
precedents
13
passages to ask

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passages, not paraphrases
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Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.

One timeline

11 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report
  1. 16:09:42 UTCFDRpre-eventp.5
    FDR started recording (97,861 SRN)
  2. 16:09:56 UTCFDRpre-eventp.5
    FDR stopped recording, 14 seconds after starting
  3. 16:14:19 UTCFDRpre-eventp.5
    FDR started recording again, 4 minutes 23 seconds after stopping
  4. 16:14:28 UTCFDReventp.5
    Groundspeed increased from 0 kts to a maximum of 8 kts at 16:14:34 UTC
  5. 16:14:35 UTCFDReventp.5
    Longitudinal acceleration decreased from 0.05 g to -0.56 g, increased to 0.04 g, and settled at 0.04 g for the rest of the data; vertical acceleration oscillated from 1 g with a maximum of 1.29 g and minimum of 0.68 g until 16:14:41 UTC before settling back to 1 g
  6. 16:14:44 UTCFDReventp.5
    Ground speed decreased to 0 kts and remained 0 kts for the rest of the data
  7. 16:14:59 UTCFDRpost-eventp.5
    FDR stopped recording, 15 seconds after the airplane came to a complete stop
  8. 16:18:54 UTCFDRpost-eventp.5
    FDR started recording again, 3 minutes 55 seconds after stopping
  9. 16:19:01 UTCFDRpost-eventp.5
    FDR stopped recording, 7 seconds later
  10. 16:31:49 UTCFDRpost-eventp.5
    FDR started recording again, 12 minutes 48 seconds after stopping
  11. 16:31:55 UTCFDRpost-eventp.5
    Data ended, 6 seconds later
FLIGHT DATA RECORDER SPECIALIST'S FACTUAL REPORT · 11 events extracted by claude-sonnet-5
How the Board coded the sequence
  1. Taxi: Ground collision

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • WPR10FA1992010-04-10substantialmatch 75
    BOEING 737-3H4 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
    Los Angeles, CA
    • ●Environmental issues › Physical environment › Object/animal/substance
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    • ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info
  • DCA25LA1202025-02-02substantialmatch 68
    BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2B19 · AIR WISCONSIN AIRLINES LLC
    Chicago, IL
    • ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info
    Ground collision
  • SEA08LA0612008-01-14substantialmatch 65
    Bombardier, Inc. CL-600-2C10 · United Express
    San Francisco, CA
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    Ground collision
  • CEN11IA1982011-02-21no fatalitiesmatch 64
    BOEING 737-823 · American Airlines, Inc.
    Southlake, TX
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    Ground collision
  • DCA18IA0262017-11-29no fatalitiesmatch 61
    BOEING 737-932ER · Delta Air Lines
    Atlanta, GA
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    • ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info
  • WPR09FA0682008-12-28substantialmatch 60
    BOEING 757-351 · NORTHWEST AIRLINES INC
    Seattle, WA
    • ●Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Light condition
    Ground collision
  • WPR10IA1352010-02-16no fatalitiesmatch 55
    EMBRAER EMB-120ER · SKYWEST AIRLINES INC
    Los Angeles, CA
    Ground collision
  • DCA16CA1132016-03-05substantialmatch 55
    BOEING 767 34AF · UNITED PARCEL SERVICE CO
    Albuquerque, NM
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    • ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Occurrences it coded
  • 5 of 8Ground collision
  • 2 of 8Ground handling event
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
  • Action/decision › Action
  • Task performance › Use of equip/info
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
  • —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
  • Action/decision › Info processing/decision
  • Psychological › Attention/monitoring
  • Task performance › Communication (personnel)

A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.

In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • WPR10FA1992010-04-10 · BOEING 737-3H4 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
    The tug operator’s failure to comply with company procedures when parking an unoccupied baggage tug, and the failure of the tug’s seat switch to disengage the electric motor when weight was removed from the driver’s seat.
  • DCA25LA1202025-02-02 · BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2B19 · AIR WISCONSIN AIRLINES LLC
    The tug driver’s failure to ensure the taxiway was clear of aircraft prior to crossing, resulting in a collision with the left wing of the taxiing aircraft. Contributing to the accident was the limited visibility of the aircraft due to ambient lighting conditions and the absence of the aircraft’s nose-gear light, which reduced the tug driver’s ability to detect the aircraft’s presence in time to avoid the collision.
  • SEA08LA0612008-01-14 · Bombardier, Inc. CL-600-2C10 · United Express
    The company tug operator's failure to maintain clearance with another aircraft during the pushback process. Also causal was the ground controller's failure to alert the pilot of the other aircraft and tug operator of this airplane of the simultaneous pushback occurring from adjacent gates. Contributing to the accident was the company's pushback operation without the use of wing/tail walkers.
  • CEN11IA1982011-02-21 · BOEING 737-823 · American Airlines, Inc.
    The tractor driver’s failure to confirm that the tow bar head/handle was secured correctly to the airplane.
  • DCA18IA0262017-11-29 · BOEING 737-932ER · Delta Air Lines
    The flight crewmembers’ failure to properly monitor the airplane’s flightpath, which caused the approach to become unstabilized and resulted in the airplane’s descent below the decision altitude while misaligned with the localizer course. Contributing to the incident were the first officer’s delay in setting go-around thrust after the captain called for the go-around and the captain’s failure to take control of the airplane after go-around thrust was not immediately set, both of which caused the airplane to come wi…

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).