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Cases › DCA24FA120 › The analyst

BOEING 737-8UNITED AIRLINES INC

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

95
timed facts
8
precedents
209
passages to ask

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passages, not paraphrases
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Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.

One timeline

95 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report
  1. 05:56:20.1CVR STARTp.9
    “OF ACCIDENT FLIGHT RECORDING”
    read in context ↗
  2. 06:37:23 CSTFDRDeparturep.6
    The aircraft departed on runway 18R from Memphis International Airport (KMEM), Memphis, Tennessee. The takeoff, climb, cruise, and approach were uneventful.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  3. 06:57:00.8CVR CAMwarningp.13
    “[sound similar to altitude alert tone]”
    read in context ↗
  4. 07:04:20.7CVR CAMwarningp.13
    “[sound similar to altitude alert tone]”
    read in context ↗
  5. 07:10:20.8CVR CAMwarningp.14
    “[sound similar to altitude alert tone]”
    read in context ↗
  6. 07:49:34.7CVR CAMwarningp.30
    “[sound similar to altitude alert tone]”
    read in context ↗
  7. 07:51:34.3CVR CAMwarningp.32
    “[sound similar to altitude alert tone]”
    read in context ↗
  8. 07:51:55.4CVR RDO-2p.33
    “cleared I-L-S two seven United twenty four seventy seven.”
    read in context ↗
  9. 07:51:56 CSTFDRApproachp.6
    AP Glideslope Arm was ARMED.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  10. 07:51:58.3CVR HOT-1p.33
    “approached is armed.”
    read in context ↗
  11. 07:52:05.6CVR GPWSwarningp.33
    “twenty five hundred [electronic voice].”
    read in context ↗
  12. 07:52:07.2CVR HOT-1p.33
    “two nine seven zero.”
    read in context ↗
  13. 07:52:08 CSTFDRApproachp.6
    AP Localizer Engaged was ENGAGED.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  14. 07:52:08.3CVR HOT-2p.33
    “seven zero.”
    read in context ↗
  15. 07:52:53.5CVR HOT-1p.34
    “flaps one.”
    read in context ↗
  16. 07:52:54 CSTFDRApproachp.6
    Radio altitude was 2017 ft, computed airspeed was 230 kts, magnetic heading was 263 deg. The flap handle was moved to 1 deg.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  17. 07:52:54.2CVR HOT-2p.34
    “one.”
    read in context ↗
  18. 07:54:20.1CVR HOT-1p.35
    “and let's go flaps five.”
    read in context ↗
  19. 07:54:22 CSTFDRApproachp.6
    Computed airspeed was 210 kts. The flap handle was moved from 1 deg to 5 deg.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  20. 07:54:22.0CVR HOT-2p.35
    “roger five.”
    read in context ↗
  21. 07:54:26.2CVR HOT-1p.35
    “flaps ten.”
    read in context ↗
  22. 07:54:27 CSTFDRApproachp.6
    Computed airspeed was 206 kts. The flap handle was moved from 5 deg to 10 deg.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  23. 07:54:27.3CVR HOT-2p.35
    “ten.”
    read in context ↗
  24. 07:54:38 CSTFDRApproachp.6
    The Speedbrake Lever was moved to the ARMED position.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  25. 07:54:47.7CVR HOT-1p.35
    “if you don't mind short final ask tower if we can go to the end.”
    read in context ↗
  26. 07:55:04.7CVR RDO-2p.36
    “how's our spacing looking? can we roll it all the way to the end?”
    read in context ↗
  27. 07:55:09 CSTFDRApproachp.6
    AP Glideslope Engaged was ENGAGED.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  28. 07:55:11.3CVR HOT-1p.36
    “touchdown zone elevation.”
    read in context ↗
  29. 07:55:16 CSTFDRApproachp.6
    Auto brake switch-2 changed from ACTIVE to NOT ACTIVE. Auto brake switch-1 changed from NOT ACTIVE to ACTIVE. The aircraft radio altitude began to descend from 2000 ft.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  30. 07:55:16.6CVR HOT-1p.36
    “one.”
    read in context ↗
  31. 07:55:17.6CVR HOT-2p.36
    “roger that. I like it.”
    read in context ↗
  32. 07:55:31.2CVR HOT-1p.36
    “gear down. COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER DCA24FA120”
    read in context ↗
  33. 07:55:31.8CVR HOT-2p.37
    “roger.”
    read in context ↗
  34. 07:55:32 CSTFDRApproachp.6
    The Gear Lever Up and Gear Lever Down parameters changed from UP to NOT UP and the Gear Lever Down changed from NOT DN to DOWN.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  35. 07:55:36.1CVR HOT-1p.37
    “flaps fifteen.”
    read in context ↗
  36. 07:55:36.6CVR HOT-2p.37
    “fifteen.”
    read in context ↗
  37. 07:55:37 CSTFDRApproachp.6
    Computed airspeed was 174 kts. The flap handle was moved from 10 deg to 15 deg.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  38. 07:55:50 CSTFDRApproachp.7
    Radio altitude was 1477 ft, computed airspeed was 171 kts, magnetic heading was 262 deg. The flap handle was moved from 15 deg to 25 deg.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  39. 07:55:50.8CVR HOT-2p.37
    “sounds good. there's twenty five for ya.”
    read in context ↗
  40. 07:55:50.9CVR HOT-1p.37
    “* *”
    read in context ↗
  41. 07:55:53.1CVR HOT-1p.37
    “fifty three is final. COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER DCA24FA120”
    read in context ↗
  42. 07:55:54.5CVR HOT-2p.38
    “copy that and here comes thirty. landing checklist. start switches. continuous. speed brake is armed. gear down. flaps...thirty. green light. landing checklist complete.”
    read in context ↗
  43. 07:55:55 CSTFDRApproachp.7
    Computed airspeed was 169 kts. The flap handle was moved from 25 deg to 30 deg. The glideslope and localizer deviation were both -0.02 dots.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  44. 07:56:22.4CVR GPWSwarningp.38
    “one thousand. [electronic voice]”
    read in context ↗
  45. 07:56:48.1CVR HOT-1p.39
    “this is me.”
    read in context ↗
  46. 07:56:48.6CVR HOT-2p.39
    “copy.”
    read in context ↗
  47. 07:56:49 CSTFDRApproachp.7
    Radio altitude was 620 ft, and computed airspeed was 153 kts. The autopilot was disengaged.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  48. 07:56:49.1CVR CAMwarningp.39
    “[sound similar to autopilot disconnect tone]”
    read in context ↗
  49. 07:56:56.9CVR GPWSwarningp.39
    “five hundred. [electronic voice]”
    read in context ↗
  50. 07:57:11.6CVR GPWSwarningp.39
    “approaching minimums. [electronic voice]”
    read in context ↗
  51. 07:57:16.9CVR GPWSwarningp.40
    “minimums. [electronic voice]”
    read in context ↗
  52. 07:57:27.7CVR GPWSwarningp.40
    “fifty. forty. thirty. twenty. ten. [electronic voice]”
    read in context ↗
  53. 07:57:34.4 CSTFDRLandingp.7
    The left outer wheel speed was TRUE (that is, greater than 60 kts).
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  54. 07:57:34.7 CSTFDRLandingp.7
    Both the left inner and outer wheel speeds were TRUE. The Auto Spd Brk Extend Cmd transitioned from "NOT EXTEND" to "EXTEND." The Speedbrake Handle began to transition from the ARMED condition.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  55. 07:57:35.7 CSTFDRLandingp.7
    The Speedbrake Handle was in the FULL UP position. The air/ground relay switch changed from AIR to GND. Groundspeed was 157 kts (153 kts computed airspeed).
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  56. 07:57:36.7 CSTFDRLandingp.7
    Auto Brakes Applied were ON.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  57. 07:57:39.6 CSTFDRLandingp.7
    Engine 1 thrust reverser was FULLY DEPLOYED.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  58. 07:57:40.0 CSTFDRLandingp.7
    Engine 2 thrust reverser was FULLY DEPLOYED.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  59. 07:57:40.7 CSTFDRLandingp.7
    The Speedbrake Handle began to transition from the FULL UP to DWN+LCKED position. Groundspeed was 140 kts and decreasing.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  60. 07:57:41.7 CSTFDRLandingp.7
    Auto Brakes Applied changed from ON to OFF. The Speedbrake Handle was in the DWN+LCKED position. Groundspeed was 137 kts.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  61. 07:57:42.0CVR HOT-1p.40
    “I’m gonna roll it to the end.”
    read in context ↗
  62. 07:57:42.8CVR HOT-2p.40
    “yeah sounds good to me.”
    read in context ↗
  63. 07:57:53.7 CSTFDRLanding rolloutp.7
    Main brake pressure began to increase on both gears.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  64. 07:58:02.2CVR RAASp.40
    “two thousand feet remaining. [electronic voice]”
    read in context ↗
  65. 07:58:05.2CVR HOT-2p.40
    “all right eighty knots.”
    read in context ↗
  66. 07:58:06.3CVR HOT-1p.40
    “rog.”
    read in context ↗
  67. 07:58:06.4 CSTFDRLanding rolloutp.7
    Engine 2 thrust reverser was NOT DEPLOYED.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  68. 07:58:07.1 CSTFDRLanding rolloutp.7
    Engine 1 thrust reverser was NOT DEPLOYED. Groundspeed was 84 kts.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  69. 07:58:07.7CVR GROUPp.40
    “CHAIR'S FACTUAL REPORT PG 40 OF 80 Time and Intra-Aircraft Communication Time and Over-the-Air Communication Source Source (radio and phone call)”
    read in context ↗
  70. 07:58:17.3CVR RDO-2p.41
    “sierra charlie ramp. United twenty four seventy seven. great weekend.”
    read in context ↗
  71. 07:58:18.2 CSTFDRLanding rolloutp.7
    The left main brake pressure reached a maximum value of 2318 psi. The groundspeed was 48 kts and decreasing.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  72. 07:58:18.3 CSTFDRLanding rolloutp.7
    Groundspeed was 47 kts and decreasing. Magnetic heading began to increase from 267 deg.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  73. 07:58:20.4CVR RAASp.41
    “one hundred feet remaining. [electronic voice]”
    read in context ↗
  74. 07:58:21.6 CSTFDRLanding rolloutp.8
    Groundspeed was 34 kts and decreasing. Magnetic heading was 272 deg and increasing.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  75. 07:58:23.9CVR HOT-1p.41
    “oh #.”
    read in context ↗
  76. 07:58:25.0 CSTFDRLanding rolloutp.8
    Main brake pressure on both gears spiked to approximately 1500 psi. The groundspeed was 26 kts and magnetic heading was 292 deg.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  77. 07:58:25.6CVR HOT-1p.41
    “oh #.”
    read in context ↗
  78. 07:58:35.2CVR HOT-1p.42
    “oh my god.”
    read in context ↗
  79. 07:58:35.8 CSTFDRLanding rolloutp.8
    Groundspeed was 0 kts. Magnetic heading was 338 deg.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  80. 07:58:36.4CVR HOT-1p.42
    “I can't believe this happened.”
    read in context ↗
  81. 07:58:46.8CVR HOT-1p.42
    “god darnit. I am so sorry. TWR-C United twenty four seventy seven I see you in the grass. rolling the uh- trucks in route.”
    read in context ↗
  82. 07:58:48 CSTFDRPost-landingp.8
    The master caution was activated and was active for 1 second, inactive for a half second, and then active again for a half second.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  83. 08:00:21 CSTFDRPost-landingp.8
    The APU was powered ON.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  84. 08:01:14 CSTFDRPost-landingp.8
    Engine 1 fuel was CUTOFF.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  85. 08:01:21 CSTFDRPost-landingp.8
    Engine 2 fuel was CUTOFF.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  86. 08:21:09 CSTFDRPost-landingp.8
    End of valid recorded data.
  87. 08:29:23.0CVR CAMwarningp.77
    “[sound similar to engine fire handle movement]”
    read in context ↗
  88. 08:30:44.8CVR HOT-1final secondsp.79
    “yeah the only thing- the only thing is that I really don't want to board the bus with the passengers so I gotta figure out a way how to get to the terminal. COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER DCA24FA120”
    read in context ↗
  89. 08:30:44.8CVR GROUPfinal secondsp.79
    “CHAIR'S FACTUAL REPORT PG 79 OF 80 Time and Intra-Aircraft Communication Time and Over-the-Air Communication Source Source (radio and phone call)”
    read in context ↗
  90. 08:30:56.4CVR HOT-1final secondsp.80
    “uh huh.”
    read in context ↗
  91. 08:31:07.0CVR HOT-1final secondsp.80
    “terminal.”
    read in context ↗
  92. 08:31:08.1CVR HOT-1final secondsp.80
    “yeah.”
    read in context ↗
  93. 08:31:10.1CVR HOT-1final secondsp.80
    “so call maintenance.”
    read in context ↗
  94. 08:31:12.5CVR ENDfinal secondsp.80
    “OF ACCIDENT FLIGHT RECORDING COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER DCA24FA120”
    read in context ↗
  95. 08:31:12.5CVR GROUPfinal secondsp.80
    “CHAIR'S FACTUAL REPORT PG 80 OF 80”
    read in context ↗
FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - SPECIALIST'S FACTUAL REPORT · 35 events extracted by claude-sonnet-5COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER - GROUP CHAIR'S FACTUAL REPORT · 60 of 651 lines shown
How the Board coded the sequence
  1. Taxi-from runway: Landing gear collapse→
  2. Taxi-from runway: Loss of control on ground

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • DCA25LA2302025-06-08no fatalitiesmatch 75
    BOEING 737 · United Airlines
    Phoenix, AZ
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
  • DCA11FA0502011-01-03substantialmatch 64
    BOEING 737-823 · American Airlines
    Los Angeles, CA
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
  • DCA23LA3842023-07-29substantialmatch 64
    BOEING 767-322 · UNITED AIRLINES INC
    Houston, TX
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
  • CEN11IA1982011-02-21no fatalitiesmatch 63
    BOEING 737-823 · American Airlines, Inc.
    Southlake, TX
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
  • DCA25LA0252024-10-24substantialmatch 59
    BOEING 737-9 · United Airlines
    Houston, TX
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
  • CEN09IA2942009-05-13no fatalitiesmatch 57
    BOEING 737 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
    Houston, TX
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
  • DCA14MA0812014-03-13substantialmatch 57
    AIRBUS A320 - 214 · US AIRWAYS INC
    Philadelphia, PA
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    Landing gear collapse
  • DCA18IA0262017-11-29no fatalitiesmatch 57
    BOEING 737-932ER · Delta Air Lines
    Atlanta, GA
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
  • Action/decision › Action
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
  • —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
  • Action/decision › Info processing/decision

A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.

In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • DCA25LA2302025-06-08 · BOEING 737 · United Airlines
    The abrupt application of brakes during taxi, which resulted in a sudden stop and caused a flight attendant to sustain a serious injury.
  • DCA11FA0502011-01-03 · BOEING 737-823 · American Airlines
    the early rotation of the airplane to an angle at which the fuselage contacted the runway. Contributing to early rotation was the Captain’s reaction to the erroneous V1 automated callout, likely assuming that the airplane was at or close to the correct Vr at the same time. The erroneous automated callout was likely due to a keystroke entry error by the FO when manually entering takeoff data for a newly assigned departure runway.
  • DCA23LA3842023-07-29 · BOEING 767-322 · UNITED AIRLINES INC
    The first officer’s improper control inputs after the airplane touched down. Contributing to the severity of the damage was the flight crew’s lack of recognition that the speedbrakes were not armed, which led to their delayed deployment.
  • CEN11IA1982011-02-21 · BOEING 737-823 · American Airlines, Inc.
    The tractor driver’s failure to confirm that the tow bar head/handle was secured correctly to the airplane.
  • DCA25LA0252024-10-24 · BOEING 737-9 · United Airlines
    Brake application before all three landing gears were on the ground, which caused the failure of the right main landing gear tires and resulted in tire fragments impacting the fuselage.

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).