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EMBRAER S A ERJ 170-200 LREnvoy Air Inc.

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

8
timed facts
8
precedents
16
passages to ask

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passages, not paraphrases
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Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.

One timeline

8 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report
  1. 15:38:36 CSTFDRpost-landing, on groundp.5
    The inboard and outboard parking brake pressure statuses changed from not applied to applied. At this time, the statuses for both engine 1 and engine 2 control modes were Idle gas generator speed (Idle NG).
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  2. 15:38:45 CSTFDRpost-landing, on groundp.5
    The engine 2 control mode changed to shutdown while the engine 1 control mode remained Idle NG.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  3. 15:39:12 CSTFDRpost-landing, on groundp.5
    The forward baggage door locked sensor changed from locked to not locked.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  4. 15:39:15 CSTFDRpost-landing, on groundp.5
    The forward baggage door closed sensor and the forward baggage door latched sensor 1 transitioned from closed to not closed and latched to not latched, respectively.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  5. 15:39:15.7 CSTFDRpost-landing, on groundp.5
    The master warning forward cargo door open enabled transitioned from false to true and the master warning forward cargo door open displayed changed from not for all to active/display.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  6. 15:39:17.7 CSTFDRpost-landing, on groundp.5
    The master warning forward cargo door open displayed transitioned to active/acknowledge/displayed (Active/Ack/Display).
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  7. 15:39:52.7 CSTFDRpost-landing, on groundp.5
    The master warning forward cargo door open enabled transitioned back to false and the master warning forward cargo door open displayed changed to not for all.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  8. 15:39:54 CSTFDRpost-landing, on groundp.5
    The engine 1 control mode changed to shutdown.
    see the traces at this moment ↗
FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - SPECIALISTA��S FACTUAL REPORT · 8 events extracted by claude-sonnet-5
How the Board coded the sequence
  1. Standing-engine(s) operating: Prop/jet/rotor blast/suction→
  2. Standing-engine(s) operating: Ground handling event

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • WPR15MA2432015-08-165 fatalmatch 43
    CESSNA 172M
    San Diego, CA
    • ●Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring
  • DCA13MA1332013-08-142 fatalmatch 42
    AIRBUS A300 - F4 622R · UNITED PARCEL SERVICE CO
    Birmingham, AL
    • ●Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring
    • ●Personnel issues › Task performance › (general)
  • DCA16CA1332016-04-14no fatalitiesmatch 42
    BOEING 737 76Q · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
    San Diego, CA
    Ground handling event
  • DCA11CA0142010-12-18substantialmatch 41
    BOEING 737-7H4 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
    Philadelphia, PA
    • ●Personnel issues › Task performance › (general)
    Ground handling event
  • DCA18CA0012017-10-02substantialmatch 41
    BOEING 737 7H4 · Southwest Airlines
    Chicago, IL
    Ground handling event
  • ANC12FA0062011-10-301 fatalmatch 40
    EUROCOPTER AS 350 B2 · ERA HELICOPTERS LLC
    Iliamna, AK
    • ●Personnel issues › Physical › Impairment/incapacitation
  • DCA12IA1412012-09-05no fatalitiesmatch 40
    DE HAVILLAND DHC8 · ERA AVIATION INC
    Soldotna, AK
    • ●Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring
  • DCA23LA1252023-01-14no fatalitiesmatch 40
    BOEING 737-900ER · Delta Air Lines
    Queens, NY
    • ●Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Occurrences it coded
  • 3 of 8Ground handling event
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
  • Psychological › Attention/monitoring
  • Task performance › (general)
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
  • —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
  • Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters
  • Action/decision › Action
  • Task performance › Communication (personnel)
  • Task performance › Use of equip/info

A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.

In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • WPR15MA2432015-08-16 · CESSNA 172M
    The local controller's (LC) failure to properly identify the aircraft in the pattern and to ensure control instructions provided to the intended Cessna on downwind were being performed before turning Eagle1 into its path for landing. Contributing to the LC's actions was his incomplete situational awareness when he took over communications from the LC trainee due to the high workload at the time of the accident. Contributing to the accident were the inherent limitations of the see-and-avoid concept, resulting in the…
  • DCA13MA1332013-08-14 · AIRBUS A300 - F4 622R · UNITED PARCEL SERVICE CO
    the flight crew's continuation of an unstabilized approach and their failure to monitor the aircraft's altitude during the approach, which led to an inadvertent descent below the minimum approach altitude and subsequently into terrain. Contributing to the accident were (1) the flight crew's failure to properly configure and verify the flight management computer for the profile approach; (2) the captain's failure to communicate his intentions to the first officer once it became apparent the vertical profile was not…
  • DCA16CA1332016-04-14 · BOEING 737 76Q · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
    the ramp agents failure to keep his right hand at a safe distance from the underside of the moving belt.
  • DCA11CA0142010-12-18 · BOEING 737-7H4 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
    the failure of the ground operations personnel to maintain awareness of the relative position of the two airplanes.
  • DCA18CA0012017-10-02 · BOEING 737 7H4 · Southwest Airlines
    the mechanical failure of the tugs fuel governor, which made it difficult for the ramp agent to stop the tug. Contributing to the accident was the lack of guidance on how ground personnel were to handle vehicle malfunctions.
What it recommended after them
  • A-14-072TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require principal operations inspectors to ensure that operators with flight crews performing 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91 subpart K overnight operations brief the threat of fa… · DCA13MA133Closed - Unacceptable Action
  • A-14-073TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require operators to develop an annual recurrent dispatcher resource management module for dispatchers that includes participation of pilots to reinforce the need for open communication. · DCA13MA133Closed - Unacceptable Action
  • A-14-074TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require principal operations inspectors to work with operators to ensure that their operating procedures explicitly state that any changes to an approach after the completion of the approach briefing… · DCA13MA133Closed - Acceptable Action
  • A-14-075TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require principal operations inspectors to ensure consistency among their operators’ training documents, their operators’ Federal Aviation Administration-approved and -accepted documents, such as the… · DCA13MA133Closed - Acceptable Action
  • A-14-076TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require principal operations inspectors of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91 subpart K operators to ensure that Federal Aviation Administration-approved nonprecision instrument appr… · DCA13MA133Closed - Unacceptable Action
  • A-14-077TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require that the remarks section of meteorological aerodrome reports be provided to all dispatchers and pilots in flight dispatcher papers and through the aircraft communication addressing and reporti… · DCA13MA133Closed - Acceptable Action
  • A-14-078TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Expand the current guidance available in Federal Aviation Administration Order 7110.65, “Air Traffic Control,” to further define meteorological aerodrome report pertinent remarks. · DCA13MA133Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action
  • A-14-079TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Issue a safety advisory bulletin to air traffic controllers providing examples of the types of meteorological aerodrome report remarks information considered pertinent and reminding them of the requir… · DCA13MA133Closed - Acceptable Action

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).