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Cases › DCA19LA134 › The analyst

Airbus A321American Airlines

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

18
timed facts
8
precedents
43
passages to ask

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passages, not paraphrases
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Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.

One timeline

18 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report
  1. 19:40:08.6CVR STARTp.7
    “OF RECORDING”
    read in context ↗
  2. 19:40:08.6CVR TWRcalloutp.11
    “runway three one left intersection kilo echo cleared for takeoff. DCA19LA134 Time and Intra-Aircraft Communication Time and Over-the-Air Communication Source Source 20:39:55.0 American three hundred cleared for takeoff runway three one”
    read in context ↗
  3. 20:39:50FDRTakeoff rollp.2
    Figure 2 begins, showing 90 seconds of basic parameters during the takeoff roll on runway 31L at KJFK
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  4. 20:40:25FDRTakeoff rollp.2
    Figure 3 begins, showing 20 seconds of basic parameters during the takeoff roll at KJFK
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  5. 20:40:36FDRTakeoffp.2
    Aircraft departed runway 31L at KJFK
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  6. 20:41:48.3CVR HOT-1calloutp.15
    “know to keep it, to keep it centerline? DCA19LA134 Time and Intra-Aircraft Communication Time and Over-the-Air Communication Source Source 20:43:17.5 * you got zero? HOT-2 20:43:21.4 oh. HOT-2 20:43:22.7 # airplane, I swear to @. HOT-2 20:43:25.1 * * *. HOT-2 20:43:25.5 # hate flyin' this thing with any kinda crosswind. HOT-1 20:43:27.7 * * *. HOT-? 20:43:35.3 after takeoff's complete. HOT-2 20:44:49.9 # me I'm gonna take some time off after that #. HOT-1 20:44:52.3 tell me about it. HOT-2 20:44:54.5 holy # I'm not workin' tomorrow. HOT-2 20:44:59.9 it's like a weird electron had the rudder stuck or some”
    read in context ↗
  7. 20:41:48.3CVR CTRwarningp.22
    “emergency? DCA19LA134 Time and Intra-Aircraft Communication Time and Over-the-Air Communication Source Source 20:50:20.1 you wanna declare an emergency? HOT-2 20:50:21.8 * let, let, let's not declare an emergency, as long as”
    read in context ↗
  8. 20:41:48.3CVR RDO-2calloutp.23
    “zero. 20:50:41.9 autopilot one is on. HOT-1 20:50:42.9 two zero zero okay, I'm gonna hit divert on this just so”
    read in context ↗
  9. 20:41:48.3CVR CTRwarningp.26
    “injuries? 20:53:24.4 American three hundred ah negative there's no injuries. RDO-2 20:53:27.2 roger. CTR DCA19LA134 Time and Intra-Aircraft Communication Time and Over-the-Air Communication Source Source 20:53:36.4 okay I put Kennedy as our new destination. HOT-2 20:53:45.6 so what are they landing? HOT-2 20:53:47.8 ah fours I believe, or you could just pull up an ATIS. HOT-1 20:53:50.6 American three hundred descend and maintain one seven”
    read in context ↗
  10. 20:41:48.3CVR PA-1final secondsp.29
    “can have your attention please, ah we've got an issue with the airplane involving our ah flight control computers and ah we are ah made the decision to return to ah JFK airport and land the airplane and ah let the maintenance folks ah take it over. should be ah touching down in Kennedy in about fifteen minutes or so, no cause for alarm the aircraft has been ah secured with the faulty system isolated and ah she's handling very nicely at this point but ah no sense in ah continuing on to LA ah with with an aircraft ah in this particular condition so we're gonna just for safety' ah purposes ah return to JFK and land. and ahm once we get on the ground safely back at the gate we'll start working the issue of getting a new airplane or ah figuring out how to get you all on your way. appreciate your patience as ah we keep the operation as safe as ah as possible. thanks again, again landing in about fifteen minutes. 20:56:11.9 [call for descent check]. 20:56:34.8 [flight attendant giving passenger briefing]. 20:59:00.9 [2nd call for descent check]. 21:00:05.5 [flight requests RWY 4L]. 21:00:27.9 [sound of interphone ring]. CAM DCA19LA134 Time and Intra-Aircraft Communication Time and Over-the-Air Communication Source Source 21:00:33.0 hey it's @. INT-1 21:00:33.8 hey @ ahm so actually we're the more we look at it”
    read in context ↗
  11. 20:41:48.3CVR FA-1final secondsp.30
    “the wing actually does a little a little damage I don't know if you wanna @ to come out and look at it, just so you guys know. 21:00:42.7 well if the airplanes flying okay and I don't know what,”
    read in context ↗
  12. 20:41:48.3CVR INT-1final secondsp.30
    “what we can see out there but we, we're going to ah. 21:00:48.7 all we can do is land it. FA-1 21:00:50.0 we're gonna land. INT-1 21:00:50.7 okay, alright. thanks. FA-1 21:00:51.8 and ah right now looks like a normal landing but you”
    read in context ↗
  13. 20:41:48.3CVR INT-1final secondsp.30
    “guys just be prepared for the worst case scenario. 21:00:54.5 okay, okay. thank you. FA-1 21:00:57.5 [3rd call for descent checklist] 21:02:25.3 [CAPT informs FO he's going off the radio for a moment]. 21:02:29.1 ah JFK operations American three hundred. RDO-1 DCA19LA134 Time and Intra-Aircraft Communication Time and Over-the-Air Communication Source Source 21:02:32.3 three hundred heard you're coming back go. OPS 21:02:34.5 yeah we're coming back, ah we had some kind of a flight”
    read in context ↗
  14. 20:41:48.3CVR RDO-1final secondsp.31
    “control malfunction I don't know but we're not gonna take this thing to LA until somebody looks at it but any way you got, you got a gate for us? 21:02:41.0 flaps1. HOT-2 21:02:46.1 forty six, give me a call when you're on the ground. OPS 21:02:48.1 okay gate forty six we'll do it thanks. RDO-1 21:03:01.7 [CAPT informs FO of a passenger reporting damage to left wing]. 21:03:45.2 [flaps 2]. 21:03:54.2 [flight cleared ILS 4L]. 21:04:19.9 [sounds consistent with gear down]. 21:04:42.1 [4th call for descent checklist]. 21:05:21.0 [flaps 3]. DCA19LA134 Time and Intra-Aircraft Communication Time and Over-the-Air Communication Source Source 21:05:41.8 [call for landing checklist]. 21:06:08.7 [flaps full]. 21:06:32.0 [flight switched to tower]. 21:06:50.5 [flight given reported winds of 010 / 17G23 and cleared to land 4L]. 21:07:59.7 [autopilot disconnect]. 21:08:36.2 [sounds consistent with landing]. 21:09:06.3 [sounds consistent with normal taxi to the gate]. 21:18:07.1 [discussion of error messages related to liquid level transmitter and AOA probe three]. 21:18:36.6 [call for shutdown checklist]. 21:19:37.0 dude there's extensive damage on that leading edge on that”
    read in context ↗
  15. 20:41:48.3CVR RAMPfinal secondsp.32
    “left hand side. bad damage. 21:19:41.7 what did you hit? RAMP 21:19:45.9 did we hit something? CAM-2 DCA19LA134 Time and Intra-Aircraft Communication Time and Over-the-Air Communication Source Source 21:19:48.6 I'm glad you guys made it * * * *. RAMP 21:19:51.2 yeah we hit something, because felt it, we felt it, we”
    read in context ↗
  16. 20:41:48.3CVR CAM-2final secondsp.33
    “we don't know but we rolled hard left. 21:19:52.7 yes. * * *. RAMP 21:19:55.9 I'm glad you guys are okay guys. RAMP 21:19:56.5 on ah on rotation, the airplane just rolled. CAM-1 21:19:57.7 yes. CAM-2 21:20:01.8 holy #. good thing we came back. CAM-2 21:20:28.8 flying great after that incident though, you know?”
    read in context ↗
  17. 20:41:48.3CVR CAM-2final secondsp.33
    “which is really weird. 21:22:58.9 [sound consistent with electrical power transition]. 21:23:46.2 [discussion with ground crew]. 21:25:25.7 [sounds consistent with cell phone calls discussing the event]. 21:43:41.9 [discussion of pulling the CVR circuit breaker]. DCA19LA134 Time and Intra-Aircraft Communication Time and Over-the-Air Communication Source Source”
    read in context ↗
  18. 21:08:31FDRLandingp.2
    Aircraft landed on runway 04L
    see the traces at this moment ↗
Recorder events without a clock time
  • unknown (during climb)Aircraft climbed to a pressure altitude of 20,000 feet
  • unknown (post-climb)Aircraft vectored back to KJFK
FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - SPECIALISTA��S FACTUAL REPORT · 6 events extracted by claude-sonnet-5COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER · 14 of 93 lines shown
How the Board coded the sequence
  1. Takeoff: Abnormal runway contact→
  2. Takeoff: Runway excursion

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • CEN09IA2942009-05-13no fatalitiesmatch 68
    BOEING 737 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
    Houston, TX
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
  • DCA18CA2832018-08-13substantialmatch 62
    AIRBUS A321-271N · Hawaiian Airlines Inc
    Los Angeles, CA
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    Abnormal runway contact
  • DCA13FA1312013-07-22substantialmatch 60
    BOEING 737 7H4 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
    Flushing, NY
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
  • CEN19MA1902019-06-3010 fatalmatch 56
    Textron Aviation B-300 · S&H Aircraft
    Addison, TX
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
  • DCA16LA1002016-02-24substantialmatch 56
    EMBRAER EMB145 · TRANS STATES AIRLINES INC
    St Louis, MO
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    Abnormal runway contact
  • DCA14MA0812014-03-13substantialmatch 54
    AIRBUS A320 - 214 · US AIRWAYS INC
    Philadelphia, PA
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    Abnormal runway contact
  • ERA22FA0042021-10-052 fatalmatch 54
    DASSAULT Falcon 20 · Pak West Airlines Inc.
    Thomson, GA
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
  • DCA09FA0482009-05-06substantialmatch 54
    BOEING DC-10 · World Airways
    Baltimore, MD
    • ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
    Abnormal runway contact

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Occurrences it coded
  • 4 of 8Abnormal runway contact
  • 2 of 8Fire/smoke (post-impact)
  • 2 of 8Miscellaneous/other
  • 2 of 8Landing gear collapse
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
  • Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters
  • Action/decision › Action
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
  • —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
  • Task performance › Use of equip/info

A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.

In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • CEN09IA2942009-05-13 · BOEING 737 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
    The pilot's inadvertent application of excessive braking after touchdown, which caused the right wheels to lock and several tires to blow and resulted in a subsequent brake fire.
  • DCA18CA2832018-08-13 · AIRBUS A321-271N · Hawaiian Airlines Inc
    a tailstrike caused by inappropriate recovery technique after a bounced landing. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the radio altimeter, caused by the approach being over calm/flat water, that was not recognized by the flight crew.
  • DCA13FA1312013-07-22 · BOEING 737 7H4 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
    The captain's attempt to recover from an unstabilized approach by transferring airplane control at low altitude instead of performing a go-around. Contributing to the accident was the captain's failure to comply with standard operating procedures.
  • CEN19MA1902019-06-30 · Textron Aviation B-300 · S&H Aircraft
    The pilot’s failure to maintain airplane control following a reduction of thrust in the left engine during takeoff. The reason for the reduction in thrust could not be determined. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s failure to conduct the airplane manufacturer’s emergency procedure following a loss of power in one engine and to follow the manufacturer’s checklists during all phases of operation.
  • DCA16LA1002016-02-24 · EMBRAER EMB145 · TRANS STATES AIRLINES INC
    the flight crews' failure to consider all available runways for landing to minimize the gusty crosswind component. Contributing to the accident was the captain's reduction of the engine thrust for about 1 second at low altitude immediately after the first officer applied maximum thrust to conduct a go-around.

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).