BOEING 737ALASKA AIRLINES INC
What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.
Ask the docket
passages, not paraphrasesEvery answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.
One timeline
0 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each reportNo timed facts: this docket has no extracted recorder sequence and no transcript.
- 0824:50 PSTThe aircraft turned towards the airport
- 0829:09 PSTThe aircraft made a slight course change and lined up with taxiway "T" at SEA
- 0831 PSTThe airplane landed on taxiway "T" instead of the intended runway 16C
- Landing-flare/touchdown: Wrong surface or wrong airport
Precedents
8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded- BOEING 737-8H4 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES COOrlando, FL
- ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
Wrong surface or wrong airport - EMBRAER ERJ190 · Air CanadaDenver, CO
- ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
- BOMBARDIER INC DHC 8 402 · HORIZON AIR INDUSTRIES INCPullman, WA
- ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
Wrong surface or wrong airport - BOMBARDIER INC CL 600 2B19 · SKYWEST AIRLINES INCSan Francisco, CA
- ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
- EMBRAER EMB 145LR · CHAUTAUQUA AIRLINES INCJamaica, NY
- ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
- BEECH 1900C · ALASKA CENTRAL EXPRESS INCAleknagik, AK
- ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
- BOEING 757-236 · Federal Express CorporationTulsa, OK
- ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
Wrong surface or wrong airport - BOEING 737-823 · American AirlinesLos Angeles, CA
- ●Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
What the record says
a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause- 8 of 8Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decisioncited here too
- 2 of 8Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
- 3 of 8Wrong surface or wrong airport
- 2 of 8Runway incursion veh/AC/person
- Action/decision › Info processing/decision
- —
- Action/decision › Action
A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.
- DCA25LA1632025-03-20 · BOEING 737-8H4 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
The captain’s failure to recognize that the airplane’s location did not agree with the assigned departure runway as required per the Southwest Airlines Airplane Operating Manual, and the captain’s plan continuation error when he missed several cues that would have informed him that he was not on the assigned departure runway when he initiated takeoff.
- OPS11IA2732010-12-31 · EMBRAER ERJ190 · Air Canada
The driver of the operation vehicle's misidentification of the runway for an adjacent taxiway, resulting in a runway incursion with an aircraft in position for takeoff.
- DCA18IA0812017-12-30 · BOMBARDIER INC DHC 8 402 · HORIZON AIR INDUSTRIES INC
the flight crew's misidentification of the taxiway as the landing runway due to the failure of the runway lighting that caused only the taxiway lights to be illuminated.
- OPS17IA0082016-12-15 · BOMBARDIER INC CL 600 2B19 · SKYWEST AIRLINES INC
The captain’s inadvertent turn onto the incorrect taxiway and subsequent entry onto an active runway without a clearance, which resulted in the runway incursion.
- DCA15FA0042014-10-05 · EMBRAER EMB 145LR · CHAUTAUQUA AIRLINES INC
The A340 captain's failure to maintain adequate clearance between his wing and the tail of the EMB-145.
This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).