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AIRBUS A320JETBLUE AIRWAYS CORPORATION

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

12
timed facts
8
precedents
8
passages to ask

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passages, not paraphrases
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Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.

One timeline

12 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report
  1. 16:05:49 PDTFDRtakeoffp.4
    Takeoff on a magnetic heading of 255 degrees with flaps at 10 degrees and slats at 18 degrees; landing gear selected up within 2 seconds
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  2. 16:06:43 PDTFDRclimbp.4
    Green hydraulic system (sampled every other second) recorded a low pressure warning, passing through 3,900 ft (1,760 ft AGL); five seconds later an ELAC2 pitch fault, followed shortly by a flaps fault; master warning and pitch law discretes changed state
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  3. 16:06:49 PDTFDRclimbp.4
    Green hydraulic pressure switched to not low, then back to low on the next sample, and continued to toggle for the next few minutes
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  4. about 16:08:09 PDTFDRclimbp.4
    Autopilot and autothrust changed from engaged to not engaged; master caution began toggling at 16:08:11
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  5. 16:08:16 PDTFDRclimbp.4
    Slats started retracting to 0 degrees; flaps stayed at 10 degrees for the rest of the flight
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  6. 16:09:23 PDTFDRclimbp.5
    Yellow hydraulic system indicated low pressure while green remained low; at 16:09:27 pitch law normal changed to not engaged and pitch law alternate 1 engaged (direct and alternate 2 never engaged)
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  7. about 16:13 PDTFDRholdingp.5
    Leveled at about 13,000 ft pressure altitude heading east; from about 16:15:20 a series of right turns at approximately 12,000 ft
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  8. 16:23:15-16:23:43 PDTFDRholdingp.5
    Green hydraulic pressure showed not low, then low again and remained low for the rest of the flight; pitch law normal briefly engaged then reverted to alternate 1; master warning for 2 seconds at 16:23:44
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  9. 16:29:36 PDTFDRholdingp.5
    Succession of VHF-2 keying, usually indicating communication with the company
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  10. 16:41:53 PDTFDRholdingp.5
    Yellow hydraulic pressure recorded not low and remained so; at 16:41:55 pitch law normal engaged again and alternate 1 disengaged until after touchdown
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  11. about 19:24:15 PDTFDRdescentp.6
    Descent began with left turns to a westerly heading; slats extended to 18 then 22 degrees; flaps remained at 10 degrees
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  12. about 19:37 PDTFDRlandingp.6
    Touchdown on runway 25 at an airspeed of 161 knots; only the right engine thrust reverser deployed during rollout
    see the traces at this moment ↗
Flight Data Recorder 10 - Factual Report of Specialist · 12 events extracted by claude-fable-5-1 (in-session)
How the Board coded the sequence
  1. Initial climb: Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • DCA08IA0442008-02-26no fatalitiesmatch 60
    Airbus Industrie A320 · United Air Lines
    Jackson, WY
    Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
  • CHI08IA0652008-01-08no fatalitiesmatch 59
    Boeing 737-2H4 · Ameristar Air Cargo, Inc.
    Lincoln, NE
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Hydraulic power system
    Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
  • DCA24LA0952024-02-11no fatalitiesmatch 58
    BOEING 737-823 · AMERICAN AIRLINES INC
    Dallas, TX
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Hydraulic power system
  • CEN11IA3792011-06-07no fatalitiesmatch 55
    BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2B19 · SKYWEST AIRLINES INC
    Milwaukee, WI
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Hydraulic power system
    Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
  • CHI08LA0712008-01-09substantialmatch 55
    Airbus Industrie A319-114 · Northwest Airlines
    Detroit, MI
    Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
  • DCA10IA0212010-01-10no fatalitiesmatch 53
    AIRBUS INDUSTRIE A319-131 · UNITED AIR LINES INC
    Newark, NJ
    Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
  • CEN11IA3412011-05-17no fatalitiesmatch 51
    BEECH 1900D · Great Lakes Aviation
    Denver, CO
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft handling/service › Maintenance/inspections
  • CEN15MA2902015-07-031 fatalmatch 50
    AIRBUS HELICOPTERS INC AS350B3E · AIR METHODS CORP
    Frisco, CO
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Hydraulic power system

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Occurrences it coded
  • 5 of 8Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
  • 2 of 8Collision with terr/obj (non-CFIT)
  • 2 of 8Landing gear not configured
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
  • Aircraft systems › Hydraulic power system
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
  • —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
  • Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
  • Action/decision › Action

A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.

In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • DCA08IA0442008-02-26 · Airbus Industrie A320 · United Air Lines
    the loss of braking action on the left main landing gear due to the cross connection of the wheel speed tachometer wires that was caused by inadequate maintenance performed on the airplane during the installation of the main landing gear.
  • CHI08IA0652008-01-08 · Boeing 737-2H4 · Ameristar Air Cargo, Inc.
    The improper installation of the swivel valve fittings by the operator's mechanic leading to the total loss of both hydraulic systems. Contributing to the incident were the swivel valves leaking and the total failure of the hydraulic system.
  • DCA24LA0952024-02-11 · BOEING 737-823 · AMERICAN AIRLINES INC
    Improper maintenance due to human error during a braking system modification diminished braking performance. Contributing to the diminished braking performance was the lack of a functional check to verify the flexible hydraulic hoses and transducer wiring were connected correctly after the braking system modification.
  • CEN11IA3792011-06-07 · BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2B19 · SKYWEST AIRLINES INC
    The failure of the right main landing gear (MLG) to extend normally, which resulted from the combination of a slightly worn uplock pin, the operation of the hydraulic pumps below their specified operating pressures, and contamination within the landing gear hydraulic system. Also causal to the accident was the failure of the right MLG to extend manually using the alternate gear selector handle due to the improper use of lubricant within the alternate release handle assembly, which prevented the handle from remainin…
  • CHI08LA0712008-01-09 · Airbus Industrie A319-114 · Northwest Airlines
    The separation of the engine cowling which resulted from maintenance personnel failing to follow maintenance procedures in that they did not latch the engine cowling following the maintenance inspection. A factor associated with the accident was their attention was divereted from the task when another mechanic asked for assistance.
What it recommended after them
  • A-13-004TO THE HAWKER BEECHCRAFT CORPORATION: Determine the fatigue life (life limit) of the Beechcraft 1900D nose landing gear (NLG) end cap with the longitudinal grain direction both aligned and not aligned with the longitudinal axis of the NLG. · CEN11IA341Open - Acceptable Response
  • A-13-005TO THE HAWKER BEECHCRAFT CORPORATION: Develop and implement a replacement program for all Beechcraft 1900D nose landing gear end caps based on the fatigue life determined in Safety Recommendation A-13-04. · CEN11IA341Open - Acceptable Response
  • A-13-006TO THE HAWKER BEECHCRAFT CORPORATION: Revise the Beechcraft 1900D nose landing gear end cap repetitive inspection procedure and time interval to ensure that fatigue cracks are detected prior to failure and issue updated guidance to operator… · CEN11IA341Open - Acceptable Response
  • A-17-008TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require that existing Airbus Helicopters dual-hydraulic AS350-series helicopters be equipped with a visual and an aural alert for the loss of hydraulic boost to the pedal controls, which would result… · CEN15MA290Closed - Unacceptable Action
  • A-17-009TO AIRBUS HELICOPTERS: For newly manufactured dual-hydraulic AS350-series helicopters, assess and implement changes to the dual hydraulic system that would both ensure pedal control hydraulic assistance and mitigate the possibility of pilot… · CEN15MA290Closed - Acceptable Action
  • A-17-010TO AIRBUS HELICOPTERS: For existing dual-hydraulic AS350-series helicopters, assess and implement changes to the dual hydraulic system that would both ensure pedal control hydraulic assistance and mitigate the possibility of pilot error dur… · CEN15MA290Closed - Acceptable Action
  • A-17-011TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION AND THE EUROPEAN AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY: After the actions requested in Safety Recommendation A-17-10 are completed, require operators of Airbus Helicopters dual-hydraulic AS350-series helicopters to i… · CEN15MA290Open - Unacceptable Response
  • A-17-012TO THE ASSOCIATION OF CRITICAL CARE TRANSPORT: In collaboration with the Association of Air Medical Services and the Air Medical Operators Association, establish a working group to develop and distribute guidelines, for those who purchase,… · CEN15MA290Open - Acceptable Response

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).