Cases › DCA10IA022 › The analyst
BOMBARDIER CL600PSA AIRLINES INC
What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.
26
timed facts
8
precedents
45
passages to ask
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passages, not paraphrasesTry
Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.
One timeline
26 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report- 14:32:14CVR STARTp.7“OF RECORDING”read in context ↗
- 16:09:02CVR HOT-2calloutp.16“takeoff data forty four thousand pounds. flaps eight twenty seven twenty eight thirty four seventy three eighty seven point eight set.”read in context ↗
- 16:11:47CVR HOT-1calloutp.19“before takeoff checklist.”read in context ↗
- 16:12:01CVR HOT-2calloutp.19“takeoff config checks. takeoff fuel quantity balance four seven six oh.”read in context ↗
- 16:12:05CVR TWRcalloutp.20“Blue Streak four ninety five turn left direct Holston Mountain runway two three cleared for takeoff. wind calm. traffic a Cessna on a five mile final for runway two three.”read in context ↗
- 16:12:14CVR RDO-2calloutp.20“left turn direct Holston Mountain cleared for takeoff Blue Streak four ninety five.”read in context ↗
- 16:12:27CVR HOT-1p.20“checked.”read in context ↗
- 16:12:35-16:14:00 ESTFDRrejected takeoffp.5Plots cover the entire event including taxi before the takeoff roll, the rejected takeoff and the overrun into the EMAS (basic, braking, engine, surface configuration, spoiler and miscellaneous parameters)see the traces at this moment ↗
- 16:12:41CVR RDO-1p.20“hey just to let you know too uh you've got like a big flock of almost looks like crows down here to the right of uh two three.”read in context ↗
- 16:13:23CVR HOTwarningp.21“[sound of master warning]”read in context ↗
- 16:13:27CVR HOTwarningp.21“[sound of master warning]”read in context ↗
- 16:13:36CVR RDO-2calloutp.22“rejecting it off the end of the runway two three.”read in context ↗
- 16:13:38CVR CAMwarningp.22“[sound of impact]”read in context ↗
- 16:16:51CVR PA-1calloutp.24“and ladies and gentlemen from the flight deck once again. I do apologize. I'm sure you all got a bit of a fright there. uh however when we were uh going down the runway we hit a excess of speed but then we got some warnings up front here which we uh rejected the aircraft um obviously we ran out of a little bit of uh runway so we are stuck now in the uh overflight area here. they are sending some uh buses out. they will be deplaning the airplane here shortly. just again as for now please remain seated with your seatbelts fastened until we open the doors and let you all out. thank you. DCA10IA022”read in context ↗
- 16:17:53CVR CAM-1calloutp.25“well we got config flaps config spoilers. we tried to reject. right?”read in context ↗
- 16:20:16CVR INT-1calloutp.27“we got all this config warning stuff and all that so we rejected and uh just pretty much ran out of runway.”read in context ↗
- 16:21:12CVR CAM-1calloutp.28“@...hey it's Tom @. I'm #...um well we're going down the runway here in uh Charleston, West Virginia, and we got a config flap config uh spoiler and I rejected and uh well long story short um past the runway I'm into that over thing you know where the airplane sinks into the— into it. uh so now I don't know what the hell I'm supposed to do cause I've never obviously had anything like this you know...yeah I'm sitting in the airplane right now...yeah pretty— yeah yeah...yeah who do I call on that? do I call chief pilot?”read in context ↗
- 16:33:57CVR CAM-1calloutp.33“* Tom @. uh...yeah and we are in the runoff area at the end of two three...um well we got a— what's it called uh config warnings and stuff and um we just aborted um but everybody's fine onboard. they're actually deplaning. nobody's injured um—. DCA10IA022”read in context ↗
- 16:35:53CVR CAM-2final secondsp.35“**.”read in context ↗
- 16:35:55CVR CAM-2final secondsp.35“@ [phone number] **”read in context ↗
- 16:36:00CVR CAM-1final secondsp.35“** securing **.”read in context ↗
- 16:36:05CVR CAM-1final secondsp.35“chocks brakes thrust reversers. standby attitude emergency lights. cargo fan packs bleeds. hydraulic quantity hydraulic pump...A-P-U generators off.”read in context ↗
- 16:36:06CVR CAM-2final secondsp.35“I'm on my cell phone...okay uh we just went off the end of the runway in Charleston, West Virginia.”read in context ↗
- 16:36:22CVR CAM-1final secondsp.35“oh wait a minute.”read in context ↗
- 16:36:29CVR CAM-1final secondsp.35“four D seven. where's four D seven?”read in context ↗
- 16:36:34CVR CAM-1final secondsp.35“* down there.”read in context ↗
Flight Data Recorder 10 - Specialist's Factual Report · 1 events extracted by claude-fable-5-1 (in-session)Cockpit Voice Recorder 12 - Factual Report of Group Chairman · 25 of 350 lines shown
How the Board coded the sequence
- Takeoff-rejected takeoff: Miscellaneous/other
Precedents
8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded- DEHAVILLAND DHC6 · WIGGINS AIRWAYS INCHyannis, MA
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system
- ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info
- BOMBARDIER CL600 2D24 - 900 · MESA AIRLINES INCSan Antonio, TX
- ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel)
- ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info
- AIRBUS A320-232 · Spirit Airlines Inc.Orlando, FL
- ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel)
- ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info
- BOMBARDIER INC CL600 2D24 · Endeavor AirDetroit, MI
- ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel)
- ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info
- BOEING 737-7Q8 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES COChicago, IL
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system
- ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info
- Raytheon Aircraft Company 1900D · Great Lakes AviationPage, AZ
- ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info
Miscellaneous/other - BOEING 777 · UNITED AIRLINES INCKahului, HI
- ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info
- BOEING 737-932ER · Delta Air LinesAtlanta, GA
- ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info
What the record says
a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable causeFindings the Board cited in those cases
- 7 of 8Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/infocited here too
- 4 of 8Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision
- 3 of 8Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel)cited here too
- 2 of 8Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control systemcited here too
- 2 of 8Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
- Aircraft systems › Flight control system
- Task performance › Communication (personnel)
- Task performance › Use of equip/info
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
- —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
- Action/decision › Action
- Action/decision › Info processing/decision
A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.
In the Board’s words — the closest cases
- NYC08FA2182008-06-18 · DEHAVILLAND DHC6 · WIGGINS AIRWAYS INC
The pilot's failure to remove the flight control lock prior to takeoff. Contributing to the accident was the Federal Aviation Administration's failure to issue an airworthiness directive making the manufacturer's previously-issued flight control lock service bulletins mandatory.
- CEN14LA4302014-08-09 · BOMBARDIER CL600 2D24 - 900 · MESA AIRLINES INC
Failure of the tow bar shear pin, which resulted in the tug operator’s loss of control of the airplane during pushback operations. Contributing to the accident was the tug operator’s inability to communicate to the flight crew to apply the airplane’s brakes.
- DCA24LA2412024-07-17 · AIRBUS A320-232 · Spirit Airlines Inc.
The captain’s inadvertent aggressive application of the brakes during taxi which resulted in a sudden stop. Contributing to the accident was the flight attendants’ failure to notify the flight crew of the unsecure cabin.
- OPS16IA0022016-01-27 · BOMBARDIER INC CL600 2D24 · Endeavor Air
The local controller's failure to visually scan and ensure that the runway surface was not occupied by a vehicle or other aircraft before issuing a takeoff clearance to the pilot. Contributing to this incident was the relieved controller's failure to monitor and review the position, after completing the relief briefing, to ensure that nothing had been overlooked.
- DCA11IA0472011-04-26 · BOEING 737-7Q8 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
The flight crew's delayed deployment of the speedbrakes and thrust reversers, resulting in insufficient runway remaining to bring the airplane to a stop. Contributing to the delay in deployment of these stopping devices was the flight crew's inadequate monitoring of the airplane's configuration after touchdown, likely as a result of being distracted by a perceived lack of wheel braking effectiveness. Contributing to the incident was the flight crew's omission of the Before Landing checklist, which includes an…
This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).