BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2B19Pinnacle Airlines, Inc
What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.
Ask the docket
passages, not paraphrasesEvery answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.
One timeline
0 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each reportNo timed facts: this docket has no extracted recorder sequence and no transcript.
- about 70 seconds after landingStart of the plot; aircraft moving on the ground at less than five knots
- onset of eventJostling consistent with the aircraft striking the ground tug; maximum acceleration less than 0.4 g; the event lasted approximately four seconds; brakes applied just before, during and after
- about 8 seconds after onsetAircraft came to a halt
- Taxi: Ground collision
Precedents
8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded- EMBRAER EMB-120ER · SKYWEST AIRLINES INCLos Angeles, CA
- ●Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring
Ground collision - BOEING 737-700 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES COSalt Lake City, UT
- ●Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring
Ground collision - BOEING 737-7H4 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CODallas, TX
- ●Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring
Ground collision - BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2B19 · AIR WISCONSIN AIRLINES LLCChicago, ILGround collision
- BOEING 757-351 · NORTHWEST AIRLINES INCSeattle, WA
- ●Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring
Ground collision - BOEING 737 · Southwest AirlinesDenver, CO
- ●Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring
Ground collision - Bombardier, Inc. CL-600-2C10 · PSA Airlines Inc.Charlotte, NC
- ●Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring
- ROBINSON HELICOPTER CO R66 · Atlanta Helicopters LLCMonticello, GA
- ●Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Ceiling/visibility/precip
- ●Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Light condition
What the record says
a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause- 6 of 8Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoringcited here too
- 3 of 8Personnel issues › Psychological › Perception/orientation/illusion
- 2 of 8Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel)
- 6 of 8Ground collision
- Psychological › Attention/monitoring
- —
- Psychological › Perception/orientation/illusion
- Task performance › Communication (personnel)
A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.
- WPR10IA1352010-02-16 · EMBRAER EMB-120ER · SKYWEST AIRLINES INC
The flight crew’s failure to maintain clearance from the jet bridge during taxi. Contributing to the incident was the ramp marshaller's diverted attention and failure to signal the flight crew to stop at the correct position.
- WPR09IA0332008-11-07 · BOEING 737-700 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
The tug driver's failure to maintain situational awareness during the push back operation.
- DFW08IA0742008-03-01 · BOEING 737-7H4 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
The failure of the taxiing flight crew to maintain an adequate clearance from the stationary airplane.
- DCA25LA1202025-02-02 · BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2B19 · AIR WISCONSIN AIRLINES LLC
The tug driver’s failure to ensure the taxiway was clear of aircraft prior to crossing, resulting in a collision with the left wing of the taxiing aircraft. Contributing to the accident was the limited visibility of the aircraft due to ambient lighting conditions and the absence of the aircraft’s nose-gear light, which reduced the tug driver’s ability to detect the aircraft’s presence in time to avoid the collision.
- WPR09FA0682008-12-28 · BOEING 757-351 · NORTHWEST AIRLINES INC
The failure of the tug operator and wing walker of the other airplane to maintain clearance with this aircraft during the pushback process in dark night. Also causal was the ramp controller's misinterpretation of the other airplane's gate location and her improper clearance for both airplanes to simultaneously push back from nearly opposing gates.
This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).