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Cases › DCA08IA033 › The analyst

Airbus A320United Airlines Inc

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

0
timed facts
8
precedents
6
passages to ask

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passages, not paraphrases
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Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.

One timeline

0 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report

No timed facts: this docket has no extracted recorder sequence and no transcript.

Recorder events without a clock time
  • takeoffAircraft took off at an indicated airspeed of approximately 170 knots and began to climb
  • about 10 seconds after liftoffDC Bus ESS, AC Bus ESS and AC Bus 1 parameters turned from on to off; autopilot parameters began recording non-computed data
  • about 2 minutes laterAltitude and airspeed parameters began recording non-computed data
  • 13 minutes 15 seconds after takeoffAircraft landed at Newark
  • about 7 minutes after landingDC Bus ESS and AC Bus ESS turned on; altitude and autopilot parameters resumed recording valid data
Flight Data Recorder 10 - Factual Report of Group Chairman · 5 events extracted by claude-fable-5-1 (in-session)
How the Board coded the sequence
  1. Initial climb: Electrical system malf/failure

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • ENG20LA0162020-02-15no fatalitiesmatch 94
    Airbus A319 · Spirit Airlines Inc
    Sacramento, CA
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Electrical power system
    Electrical system malf/failure
  • ENG23LA0332023-08-03no fatalitiesmatch 92
    AIRBUS A320 · JETBLUE AIRWAYS CORP
    Jacksonville, FL
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Electrical power system
    Electrical system malf/failure
  • DCA09IA0182008-12-11no fatalitiesmatch 67
    MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD88 · DELTA AIR LINES INC
    Greer, SC
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Electrical power system
  • DCA09FA0332009-02-28substantialmatch 66
    BOMBARDIER CRJ · Atlantic Southeast Airlines, Inc.
    Tallahassee, FL
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Electrical power system
  • DCA23LA1912023-02-25no fatalitiesmatch 65
    EMBRAER ERJ 190-100 IGW · JETBLUE AIRWAYS CORP
    New York, NY
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Electrical power system
  • WPR16FA1532016-07-294 fatalmatch 64
    PIPER PA-31T · Cal-Ore Life Flight
    McKinleyville, CA
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Electrical power system
  • DCA11FA0722011-04-02substantialmatch 63
    BOMBARDIER CL600 2B19 · US Airways Express
    Phoenix, AZ
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Electrical power system
  • ENG10IA0412010-07-18no fatalitiesmatch 59
    MCDONNELL DOUGLAS AIRCRAFT CO MD-88 · DELTA AIRLINES INC
    Atlanta, GA
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Electrical power system

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Occurrences it coded
  • 5 of 8Fire/smoke (non-impact)
  • 2 of 8Electrical system malf/failure
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
  • Aircraft systems › Electrical power system
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
  • —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
  • —

A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.

In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • ENG20LA0162020-02-15 · Airbus A319 · Spirit Airlines Inc
    A worn component within each engine integrated drive generator (IDG) resulted in the loss of electrical power supplied to several flight deck displays and systems while on approach to landing. The component, a fixed cylinder block, had significant wearing of its reworked brass liners resulting in the IDGs producing a frequency output outside of their specified design limit.
  • ENG23LA0332023-08-03 · AIRBUS A320 · JETBLUE AIRWAYS CORP
    The loss of both Integrated Drive Generators (IDG) due to worn fixed cylinder block bores, which caused the IDGs to be tripped offline and caused the airplane to enter an emergency electrical configuration.
  • DCA09IA0182008-12-11 · MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD88 · DELTA AIR LINES INC
    The overheating and arcing of the DC Ground Service Relay and Block Diodes component for undetermined reasons.
  • DCA09FA0332009-02-28 · BOMBARDIER CRJ · Atlantic Southeast Airlines, Inc.
    An electrical anomaly in the top portion of the JB-1 junction box resulting in ignition of adjacent combustible materials, including insulation blankets, and a flexible oxygen line.
  • DCA23LA1912023-02-25 · EMBRAER ERJ 190-100 IGW · JETBLUE AIRWAYS CORP
    Electrical sparking caused by a faulty connection between the aircraft and ground power unit resulting in a serious injury to a ground service agent.
What it recommended after them
  • A-17-001TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Issue an emergency airworthiness directive (AD) that requires owners and operators of Piper PA-31T-series airplanes to take the actions recommended in Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin CE-17-… · WPR16FA153Closed - Acceptable Action

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).