Cases › DCA06MA064 › The analyst
Bombardier, Inc. CRJ-100COMAIR INC
What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.
51
timed facts
8
precedents
91
passages to ask
Ask the docket
passages, not paraphrasesTry
Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.
One timeline
51 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report- 05:36:07.7CVR STARTp.8“of RECORDING”read in context ↗
- 05:41:04.6CVR CAM-4warningp.12“glideslope whoop whoop, pull up, wind shear, wind shear, wind shear, terrain, terrain, whoop whoop, pull up. [sound of chime]”read in context ↗
- 05:56:34.1CVR CAM-2calloutp.25“right seat flex takeoff procedures off of um.... he said what run- way? one of 'em. * two four.”read in context ↗
- 05:56:49.9CVR CAM-2calloutp.25“two two up to six, white data * FMS, flaps twenty. * smokes or breaks come back here. come into four or two two. on two two the ILS is out. or the glideslope is, the REILS are out. the uh, came in the other night it was like [sound similar to audible ex- hale] lights are out all over the place.”read in context ↗
- 05:57:40.0CVR CAM-2calloutp.26“takeoff brief.”read in context ↗
- 05:58:17.1CVR CAM-2calloutp.28“takeoff brief”read in context ↗
- 05:58:35.1CVR CAM-2calloutp.29“V speeds, takeoff data fifty temp. V one, V r is thirty-seven forty- two * forty-five ********. [spoken at a very fast speed] you got normal thrust ** point two.”read in context ↗
- 05:59:37-06:00:48 EDTFDRtaxip.5Left turn from about 130 degrees magnetic heading to 46.3 (left) / 48.9 (right) degreessee the traces at this moment ↗
- 05:59:42.0CVR HOT-1p.30“he said it's okay to turn one at your leisure.”read in context ↗
- 05:59:43.6CVR GNDp.30“Eagle flight eight eighty two taxi to runway two two. altimeter three zero zero zero and the wind's two zero zero seven.”read in context ↗
- 06:00:14-06:01:26 EDTFDRtaxip.5Engine 1 N1 increased from 0% to 26% (06:00:44); Engine 2 N1 from 0% to 25% (06:01:26) - engine startsee the traces at this moment ↗
- 06:00:16.1CVR HOT-2p.31“really.”read in context ↗
- 06:00:16.6CVR HOT-1p.31“huh, oh gosh.”read in context ↗
- 06:00:32.2CVR GNDcalloutp.32“** sixteen ninety two thanks, turn right heading two seven zero runway two two, cleared for takeoff.”read in context ↗
- 06:02:12.6CVR GNDcalloutp.35“Eagle flight runway two two, cleared for takeoff.”read in context ↗
- 06:02:15-06:04:20 EDTFDRtaxip.5Several heading changes, finally reaching 40.3 (left) and 41.6 (right) degrees; left MFD range 40 nm to 80 nm at 06:04:34see the traces at this moment ↗
- 06:02:15.1CVR HOT-1p.35“clear left.”read in context ↗
- 06:02:17.3CVR HOT-2p.35“on the right.”read in context ↗
- 06:02:17.9CVR GNDp.35“Skywest six eight nineteen radar contact, say altitude leaving.”read in context ↗
- 06:02:18 EDTFDRtaxip.5Control checks began, ending about 31 seconds later; right MFD range changed 10 nm to 40 nm at 06:02:24 and radar overlay became active four seconds latersee the traces at this moment ↗
- 06:04:32.6CVR TWRp.39“Eagle flight eight eighty two, turn right heading two seven zero, join Victor one seventy-one. resume navigation.”read in context ↗
- 06:04:36-06:05:22 EDTFDRtaxip.5Longitudinal acceleration indicates the airplane was not moving (holding short)see the traces at this moment ↗
- 06:04:38.2CVR PA-2p.39“and folks one * time from the flight deck, we'd like to welcome you aboard. we're going to be underway momentarily.... sit back relax enjoy the flight. Kelly, when you have a chance, please prepare the cabin.”read in context ↗
- 06:04:49.3CVR HOT-2calloutp.39“pre-takeoff * complete cabin report received CAS.”read in context ↗
- 06:05:17.7CVR TWRcalloutp.40“Comair one ninety one, Lexington uh, tower, fly runway heading, cleared for takeoff.”read in context ↗
- 06:05:21.0CVR RDO-1calloutp.40“runway heading, cleared for takeoff, one ninety one.”read in context ↗
- 06:05:36.3CVR TWRp.41“Eagle flight eight eighty two, contact Indy center one two six point three seven. good day.”read in context ↗
- 06:05:39-06:06:00 EDTFDRline-upp.5Left turn to 266.5 (left) / 265.8 (right) degrees - lined up on runway 26 rather than runway 22; both autopilot lateral takeoff modes engaged as of 06:05:50see the traces at this moment ↗
- 06:05:41.3CVR HOT-2p.41“transponder's on, packs on, bleeds closed, cleared for takeoff, runway heading. six grand.”read in context ↗
- 06:05:57.6CVR HOT-1p.41“all yours Jim.”read in context ↗
- 06:05:58.9CVR HOT-2p.41“my brakes, my controls.”read in context ↗
- 06:06:00-06:06:13 EDTFDRtakeoff rollp.5Engine 1 and 2 N1 increased, reaching 91% at 06:06:12 and 06:06:13; computed airspeed began increasing at 06:06:05see the traces at this moment ↗
- 06:06:16.3CVR HOT-2calloutp.42“dat is weird with no lights.”read in context ↗
- 06:06:30 EDTFDRrotationp.6At 127 knots right computed airspeed the control columns began moving aft; elevators trailing edge up the following second; maximum aft column 10.9 degrees (right) at 06:06:33 at 135 knots; maximum elevator 22.6 degrees TEU (right) at 06:06:32see the traces at this moment ↗
- 06:06:31.2CVR HOT-1p.42“V one, rotate.”read in context ↗
- 06:06:31.8CVR HOT-1p.42“whoa.”read in context ↗
- 06:06:32 EDTFDRrotation/impactp.6Right pitch reached 4.7 deg ANU, dropped to 0 the following second, then left pitch 6.7 deg ANU rising to a maximum 15.9 deg ANU (right) over the next two seconds; vertical acceleration 1.199 g, 0.766 g, then 2.742 g; gear WOW indicated air (left briefly ground then air); radio altitudes began increasing; engine N1 began decreasingsee the traces at this moment ↗
- 06:06:32.2CVR CAMp.42“[unknown ambient noise]”read in context ↗
- 06:06:32.6CVR HOT-1p.42“#.”read in context ↗
- 06:06:33-06:06:34 EDTFDRimpact sequencep.6Right stick shaker active at 06:06:33, then left stick shaker and both stick pushers active; left aileron to 24.9 deg right wing down, left flight spoiler to 42 deg; roll to 17.4 deg left wing down (06:06:35); right rudder pedal 5.7 deg and rudder 10.1 deg TER; nose gear WOW air at 06:06:33see the traces at this moment ↗
- 06:06:33.0CVR CAMwarningp.42“[sound of impact]”read in context ↗
- 06:06:33.3CVR HOT-?final secondsp.43“[unintelligible exclamation]”read in context ↗
- 06:06:33.8CVR CAMfinal secondsp.43“[sound similar to stick shaker]”read in context ↗
- 06:06:34.7CVR CAMfinal secondsp.43“[sound of chime]”read in context ↗
- 06:06:34.7CVR CAMfinal secondsp.43“[sound similar to stall warning starts and continues to end of re- cording]”read in context ↗
- 06:06:35 EDTFDRimpact sequencep.6Left computed airspeed 136.75 knots; left angle of attack 13.3 deg (maximum); final vertical acceleration 3.113 g; longitudinal acceleration 0.736 g; final pitch 12.7 deg ANU; Engine N1 final values 80% (06:06:35) and 74% (06:06:34); lateral acceleration 0.135 g then -0.096 gsee the traces at this moment ↗
- 06:06:35.1CVR HOT-?final secondsp.43“#.”read in context ↗
- 06:06:35.7CVR HOT-1final secondsp.43“[unintelligible exclamation]”read in context ↗
- 06:06:36 EDTFDRimpactp.6Nose and right gear WOW returned to ground; end of valid datasee the traces at this moment ↗
- 06:06:36.2CVR ENDfinal secondsp.43“of RECORDING”read in context ↗
- 06:06:36.2CVR ENDfinal secondsp.43“of TRANSCRIPT”read in context ↗
Flight Data Recorder 10 - Factual Report of Group Chairman · 12 events extracted by claude-fable-5-1 (in-session)Cockpit Voice Recorder 12 - Factual Report of Group Chairman (Transcript) · 39 of 356 lines shown
Precedents
8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded- Embraer ERJ-170 · Delta ConnectionCleveland, OHmatched on what happened, as the Board wrote it
- Embraer EMB145 · Envoy Air Inc.Chicago, ILmatched on what happened, as the Board wrote it
- Beech 1900DDenver, COmatched on what happened, as the Board wrote it
- BOMBARDIER CL600 2D24 · ATLANTIC SOUTHEAST AIRLINES INCBoston, MAmatched on what happened, as the Board wrote it · same aircraft family
- Mitsubishi MU-2B-60Ferndale, MDmatched on what happened, as the Board wrote it · same aircraft family
- Boeing 737-200Seattle, WAmatched on what happened, as the Board wrote it
- McDonnell Douglas MD-10-10FMemphis, TNmatched on what happened, as the Board wrote it
- Boeing 737-300Amarillo, TXmatched on what happened, as the Board wrote it
What the record says
a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 2 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable causeFindings the Board cited in those cases
- 2 of 8Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action
In the Board’s words — the closest cases
- DCA07MA0722007-02-18 · Embraer ERJ-170 · Delta Connection
the failure of the flight crew to execute a missed approach when visual cues for the runway were not distinct and identifiable. Contributing to the accident were (1) the crew's decision to descend to the ILS decision height instead of the localizer (glideslope out) minimum descent altitude; (2) the first officer's long landing on a short contaminated runway and the crew's failure to use reverse thrust and braking to their maximum effectiveness; (3) the captain's fatigue, which affected his ability to effectively pl…
- DCA20LA0132019-11-11 · Embraer EMB145 · Envoy Air Inc.
The flight crew’s inability to maintain the airplane on the runway centerline after touchdown due to the reduced braking action resulting from the deteriorating weather conditions, which caused the airplane’s departure from the runway surface. Contributing to the accident were the delay in performing the runway assessment for undetermined reasons and failure to close the runway. Also contributing to the accident was the controller’s failure to advise the accident flight crew that braking action was no longer cons…
- DEN04IA0242003-11-10 · Beech 1900D
the ground personnel’s failure to maintain aircraft clearance, resulting in the collision. Contributing factors include ground communications not coordinated by the ground personnel, the flight crew's inadequate visual outlook and the parked airplane.
- DCA11CA0842011-07-14 · BOMBARDIER CL600 2D24 · ATLANTIC SOUTHEAST AIRLINES INC
the B767 Captain's failure to maintain a safe clearance between his wing and the tail of the CRJ900 that was stopped on a taxiway.
- IAD04FA0212004-05-14 · Mitsubishi MU-2B-60
The pilot's failure to maintain airspeed during a sharp turn, which resulted in an inadvertent stall and subsequent impact with terrain. Factors included the pilot's failure to fly to the intended point of landing, and his abrupt course reversal back towards it.
What it recommended after them
- A-08-016TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and Part 91 subpart K operators to include, in their initial, upgrade, transition, and recurrent simulator training for turbojet airplanes, (1) de… · DCA07MA072Closed - Unacceptable Action
- A-08-017TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and Part 91 subpart K operators to include, in their initial, upgrade, transition, and recurrent simulator training for turbojet airplanes, pract… · DCA07MA072Closed - Unacceptable Action
- A-08-018TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and Part 91 subpart K operators to have a written policy emphasizing that either pilot can make a go-around callout and that the response to the… · DCA07MA072Closed - Acceptable Action
- A-08-019TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: In cooperation with pilot unions, the Regional Airline Association, and the Air Transport Association, develop a specific, standardized policy for 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and Pa… · DCA07MA072Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action
- A-08-020TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Once the fatigue policy described in Safety Recommendation A-08-19 has been developed, require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and Part 91 subpart K operators to adopt this policy and p… · DCA07MA072Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action
- A-05-014TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 air carrier operators to establish programs for flight crewmembers who have demonstrated performance deficiencies or experienced failures in the tr… · DCA04MA011Closed - Acceptable Action
- A-05-015TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Amend the emergency exit training information contained in the flight crew and cabin crew sections in Federal Aviation Administration Order 8400.10, Air Transportation Aviation Inspectors Handbook,… · DCA04MA011Closed - Acceptable Action
- A-05-016TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Verify that all 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 operators emergency door/slide trainers are configured to accurately represent the actual airplane exit door/slide and that their flight… · DCA04MA011Closed - Acceptable Action
This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).