Cases › DCA06FA058 › The analyst
BOEING MD-10-10FFEDERAL EXPRESS CORP
What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.
32
timed facts
8
precedents
78
passages to ask
Ask the docket
passages, not paraphrasesTry
Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.
One timeline
32 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report- 09:24:57.3CVR STARTp.7“OF RECORDING”read in context ↗
- 10:59:08.3CVR CAWSwarningp.8“"altitude".”read in context ↗
- 11:02:51.4CVR HOT-2calloutp.11“min safe twenty one hundred to the east twenty one hundred to the west twenty five hundred to the east twenty one hundred to the west we got uh BLEWS at four verti at eighteen hundred down to the minimums of uh five hundred baro cat one mins.”read in context ↗
- 11:12:21.7CVR CAWSwarningp.19“"altitude"”read in context ↗
- 11:17:20.9CVR HOT-1calloutp.21“minimums are five hundred baro.”read in context ↗
- 11:17:39.6CVR CAWSwarningp.22“"Altitude".”read in context ↗
- 11:19:56.1CVR CAWSwarningp.24“"Altitude"”read in context ↗
- 11:21:03.5CVR TWRcalloutp.24“FedEx six thirty heavy Memphis tower runway one eight right cleared to land wind two seven zero at one two.”read in context ↗
- 11:21:08.2CVR RDO-1calloutp.24“cleared to land runway one eight right FedEx six thirty heavy.”read in context ↗
- 11:21:35.6CVR HOT-2calloutp.24“gear down before landing checklist.”read in context ↗
- 11:22:15.8CVR CAWSwarningp.25“[sound of horn] "stabilizer motion" DCA06FA058”read in context ↗
- 11:23:01.8CVR CAWSwarningp.26“"one thousand"”read in context ↗
- 11:23:45.6CVR CAWSwarningp.27““five hundred””read in context ↗
- 11:23:46.7CVR HOT-2calloutp.27“cleared to land runway one eight right.”read in context ↗
- 11:23:55.5CVR CAWSwarningp.27“[sound of tone] "autopilot"”read in context ↗
- 11:24:14.8CVR CAWSwarningp.27“"one hundred"”read in context ↗
- 11:24:17.9CVR CAWSwarningp.27“"fifty"”read in context ↗
- 11:24:18.8CVR CAWSwarningp.27“"forty"”read in context ↗
- 11:24:19.6CVR CAWSwarningp.27“"thirty"”read in context ↗
- 11:24:20.5CVR CAWSwarningp.27“"twenty"”read in context ↗
- 11:24:23.1CVR CAWSwarningp.27“"ten" DCA06FA058”read in context ↗
- 11:24:45.5CVR CAWSwarningp.29“[sound of tri-tonal alert]”read in context ↗
- 11:24:52.1CVR CAWSwarningp.29“[sound of horn] "landing gear" [repeats every three seconds until end of recording]”read in context ↗
- 11:25:22.7CVR TWRwarningp.30“we have the crash crew out now sir can you give me any information before you leave the airplane.”read in context ↗
- 11:25:59.7CVR CAMfinal secondsp.32“sound of whoosh.”read in context ↗
- 11:26:00.9CVR HOT-2final secondsp.32“we gotta get.”read in context ↗
- 11:26:02.4CVR HOT-1final secondsp.32“depressurization.”read in context ↗
- 11:26:03.9CVR HOT-2final secondsp.32“we gotta get off the airplane now.”read in context ↗
- 11:26:04.1CVR HOT-1final secondsp.32“thanks.”read in context ↗
- 11:26:04.9CVR HOT-1final secondsp.32“all right yep.”read in context ↗
- 11:26:07.0CVR HOT-2final secondsp.32“now.”read in context ↗
- 11:26:09.7CVR HOT-1final secondsp.32“leave every-.”read in context ↗
Recorder events without a clock time
- last 10 minutes of flight, from about 7,000 ft pressure altitudeApproach overview plotted (plot 2): accelerations, wind, heading, pressure altitude, roll, pitch and computed airspeed; wind data invalid once on the ground (clipped above 50 kts)
- 60 s before to 40 s after touchdownDetail plots 3-7 of the landing: radio altitudes 1-3, elevators and control column with AOA 1/2 and pitch; ailerons and control wheels with roll; upper/lower rudder, rudder pedal and drift angle; autopilot 1/2, radio keying and engine 1-3 N1
- landing rollPlot 8: spoiler positions L3/R3/L5/R5 and armed status, nose gear WOW, gear lever, gear unsafe and down-and-locked indications, engine 1-3 thrust reverser status, left and right brake pedal positions
Flight Data Recorder 10 - Specialist's Factual Report · 3 events extracted by claude-fable-5-1 (in-session)Cockpit Voice Recorder 12 - Factual Report of Group Chairman · 32 of 302 lines shown
Precedents
8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded- BOEING 737 · US AIRWAYS INCPhoenix (PHX), AZmatched on what happened, as the Board wrote it · same aircraft family
- BOEING 737-890 · Alaska AirlinesSanta Ana, CAmatched on what happened, as the Board wrote it · same aircraft family
- BOEING 737-3B7 · US AIRWAYS INCCharlotte (CLT), NCmatched on what happened, as the Board wrote it · same aircraft family
- McDonnell Douglas DC-9-32Minneapolis, MNmatched on what happened, as the Board wrote it · same aircraft family
- BOEING 737-824 · United AirlinesDenver, COmatched on what happened, as the Board wrote it · same aircraft family
- BOEING 767 · Continental AirlinesNewark, NJmatched on what happened, as the Board wrote it · same aircraft family
- DOUGLAS DC8 · ASTAR AIR CARGO INCCincinnati (CVG), OHmatched on what happened, as the Board wrote it · same aircraft family
- MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD 10-10F · FedEx ExpressFort Lauderdale, FLmatched on what happened, as the Board wrote it · same aircraft family
What the record says
a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 7 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable causeFindings the Board cited in those cases
- 7 of 8Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
Occurrences it coded
- 4 of 8Landing gear collapse
- 3 of 8Aircraft structural failure
- 2 of 8Aircraft inspection event
In the Board’s words — the closest cases
- ENG08IA0512008-06-27 · BOEING 737 · US AIRWAYS INC
The failure of the MLG was due to cracking in the cylinder wall resulting from a fatigue mechanism which initiated at, and near the inner diameter (ID) surface, with propagation through the wall toward the outer diameter(OD) surface. Crack initiation was due to base metal damage which took the form of over tempered martensite (OTM) and chemical attack/pitting of the base metal.
- DCA23FA4172023-08-21 · BOEING 737-890 · Alaska Airlines
Maintenance personnel’s excessive grinding of the left main landing gear’s aft trunnion pin during machining, which imparted heat damage to the base metal and led to the fatigue cracking that caused the pin to fracture during landing.
- ENG09IA0092009-07-15 · BOEING 737-3B7 · US AIRWAYS INC
The failure of the left hand main landing gear was caused by heat induced cracks resulting from abusive grinding/polishing of the chrome plate that was applied during the last overhaul.
- CHI02FA2892002-09-22 · McDonnell Douglas DC-9-32
The fatigue failure of the main landing gear strut due to inclusions in the material, residual stresses, and dissolved hydrogen content.
- DCA20LA0472019-12-23 · BOEING 737-824 · United Airlines
Maintenance personnel’s excessive grinding of the left main landing gear’s aft trunnion pin during its initial overhaul, which caused heat damage to the base metal and led to the fatigue crack that caused the pin to fail during the accident flight. Contributing to the accident was the failure of maintenance personnel to detect the excessive grinding during the initial overhaul and the fatigue crack during the subsequent overhaul.
This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).