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Cases › CEN11IA234 › The analyst

EMBRAER EMB-145XRExpress Jet

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

42
timed facts
8
precedents
37
passages to ask

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passages, not paraphrases
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Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.

One timeline

42 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report
  1. 00:07:39.7CVR STARTp.8
    “OF TRANSCRIPT”
    read in context ↗
  2. 00:08 EDTFDRapproachp.2
    Descending through 1,700 ft pressure altitude on a magnetic heading of about 233 deg (runway 23)
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  3. 00:08:01.2CVR HOT-2p.8
    “yeh. you're gettin' into the layer where it's kind of...”
    read in context ↗
  4. 00:08:04.0CVR HOT-1p.8
    “yeah. ‡ The recording began on March 17, 2012 EDT and transitioned through midnight. CEN11IA234”
    read in context ↗
  5. 00:08:13.9CVR AWUcalloutp.9
    “approaching minimums.”
    read in context ↗
  6. 00:08:17.7CVR AWUcalloutp.9
    “minimums minimums”
    read in context ↗
  7. 00:08:43.2CVR HOT-1p.10
    “oohhh”
    read in context ↗
  8. 00:08:45 EDTFDRtouchdownp.2
    Air/ground switch to ground (touchdown), followed by symmetric spoiler and thrust reverser deployment; pilot brake pedal activity began
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  9. 00:08:46.3CVR HOTwarningp.10
    “[sound of chime, similar to master caution]”
    read in context ↗
  10. 00:08:46.9CVR AWUp.10
    “trim”
    read in context ↗
  11. 00:08:48.3CVR HOT-2p.10
    “I got tops--”
    read in context ↗
  12. 00:08:48.5CVR HOT-1p.10
    “that was a little firmer than I like.”
    read in context ↗
  13. 00:08:49 EDTFDRlanding rollp.3
    Copilot's right brake pedal began to show activity
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  14. 00:08:51.0CVR HOT-2p.10
    “whup. whup. # # #. CEN11IA234”
    read in context ↗
  15. 00:08:51.4CVR HOT-1p.11
    “whoa. whoa whoa whoa.”
    read in context ↗
  16. 00:08:52 EDTFDRlanding rollp.3
    Magnetic heading began to swing left as indicated airspeed fell below 100 kts
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  17. 00:08:53 EDTFDRlanding rollp.3
    Rudder reached its maximum deflection of 12.7 deg right (correcting the left swing)
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  18. 00:08:54.2CVR HOT-1p.11
    “whoa #...what was that dude.”
    read in context ↗
  19. 00:08:55 EDTFDRrunway excursionp.3
    Left and right ailerons at maximum deflection, 16.5 deg TED and 24.4 deg TEU (full right wheel)
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  20. 00:08:57.6CVR HOT-1p.11
    “whoa whoa.”
    read in context ↗
  21. 00:08:59.9CVR HOTwarningp.11
    “[sound of single chime, similar to master caution]”
    read in context ↗
  22. 00:09:03.1CVR HOT-1p.12
    “holy #.”
    read in context ↗
  23. about 00:09:04 EDTFDRstoppedp.3
    Aircraft came to rest on a magnetic heading of 199 deg (34 deg left of runway heading)
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  24. 00:09:04.7CVR HOT-1p.12
    “what the # was that.”
    read in context ↗
  25. 00:09:05.4CVR HOTwarningp.12
    “[sound of single chime, similar to master caution]”
    read in context ↗
  26. 00:09:10.8CVR HOTwarningp.12
    “[sound of single chime, similar to master caution]”
    read in context ↗
  27. 00:09:19.6CVR HOTwarningp.13
    “[sound of single chime, similar to master caution]”
    read in context ↗
  28. 00:09:25.1CVR HOTwarningp.13
    “[sound of single chime, similar to master caution]”
    read in context ↗
  29. 00:10:16.5CVR TWRwarningp.15
    “* sixteen when you say assistance just like a tug or are you stuck in the grass or *** like crash and fire rescue?”
    read in context ↗
  30. 00:12:45.0CVR TWRwarningp.21
    “uh. Rescue eleven. we're * just callin' a code green and trying to get you guys out here. but uh. they did request ah crash and fire so. uhm as far as the ah everyone on the aircraft. I * just assume they do need assistance.”
    read in context ↗
  31. 00:13:23.2CVR HOTwarningp.22
    “[sound of single chime, similar to master caution]”
    read in context ↗
  32. 00:13:28.7CVR HOTwarningp.22
    “[sound of single chime, similar to master caution]”
    read in context ↗
  33. 00:14:02.9CVR HOT-2calloutp.23
    “aborted take-off?”
    read in context ↗
  34. 00:14:14.6CVR HOTwarningp.23
    “[sound of single chime, similar to master caution]”
    read in context ↗
  35. 00:14:14.6CVR HOT-2final secondsp.23
    “and so.”
    read in context ↗
  36. 00:14:17.0CVR CAM-1final secondsp.23
    “oh #. CEN11IA234”
    read in context ↗
  37. 00:14:17.5CVR HOT-2final secondsp.24
    “I say we. I'm just kind'a gonna look over the after landing checklist.”
    read in context ↗
  38. 00:14:21.8CVR HOTfinal secondsp.24
    “[sound of single chime, similar to master caution]”
    read in context ↗
  39. 00:14:21.9CVR HOT-2final secondsp.24
    “I got the gust lock set.”
    read in context ↗
  40. 00:14:23.9CVR TWRfinal secondsp.24
    “Rescue eleven tower.”
    read in context ↗
  41. 00:14:35.3CVR HOT-2final secondsp.24
    “ah gust lock. the flaps I'm gonna leave there.”
    read in context ↗
  42. 00:14:50.0CVR HOT-2final secondsp.24
    “parking brake.”
    read in context ↗
Flight Data Recorder 10 - Factual Report of Group Chairman (with 8 embedded figures) · 7 events extracted by claude-fable-5-1 (in-session)Cockpit Voice Recorder 12 - Factual Report of Group Chairman · 35 of 163 lines shown
How the Board coded the sequence
  1. Landing-landing roll: Loss of control on ground→
  2. Landing-flare/touchdown: Runway excursion

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • CEN10MA0882010-01-052 fatalmatch 64
    GATES LEARJET CORP. 35A · ROYAL AIR FREIGHT INC
    Prospect Heights, IL
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters
    • ●Not determined › Not determined › (general)
  • ANC10FA0142010-01-222 fatalmatch 62
    BEECH 1900C · Alaska Central Express, Inc.
    Sand Point, AK
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters
    • ●Not determined › Not determined › (general)
  • ENG11IA0472011-08-29no fatalitiesmatch 58
    EMBRAER EMB145 · EXPRESSJET AIRLINES INC
    Moline, IL
    Loss of control on groundRunway excursion
  • DCA22LA1822022-05-11no fatalitiesmatch 55
    MITSUBISHI CL-600-2B19 · SKYWEST AIRLINES INC
    Houston, TX
    Runway excursion
  • DCA19LA1342019-04-11substantialmatch 50
    Airbus A321 · American Airlines
    New York, NY
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters
    Runway excursion
  • CEN20LA2152020-06-071 fatalmatch 49
    Mitsubishi MU2B · McNeely Charter Service, Inc.
    Sioux Falls, SD
    • ●Not determined › Not determined › (general)
  • ERA14LA0072013-10-061 fatalmatch 48
    BRITTEN-NORMAN BN-2A-8 · AIR CHARTER INC DBA
    Culebra, PR
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters
    • ●Not determined › Not determined › (general)
  • SEA08FA1352008-05-231 fatalmatch 47
    BEECH 1900C · ALPINE AVIATION INC
    Billings, MT
    • ●Not determined › Not determined › (general)

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Occurrences it coded
  • 4 of 8Collision with terr/obj (non-CFIT)
  • 4 of 8Loss of control in flight
  • 3 of 8Runway excursion
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
  • Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters
  • Not determined › (general)
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
  • —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
  • —

A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.

In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • CEN10MA0882010-01-05 · GATES LEARJET CORP. 35A · ROYAL AIR FREIGHT INC
    A loss of control for undetermined reasons.
  • ANC10FA0142010-01-22 · BEECH 1900C · Alaska Central Express, Inc.
    An in-flight loss of control for an undetermined reason, which resulted in an uncontrolled descent.
  • ENG11IA0472011-08-29 · EMBRAER EMB145 · EXPRESSJET AIRLINES INC
    The uncommanded left deflection of the airplane's nose wheel likely due to seal deterioration and subsequent contamination within the Electrohydraulic Servo Valve (EHSV). Contributing to the incident was the undersized condition of the filter plugs within the EHSV which likely caused the C2 orifice filter seal to extrude and deteriorate.
  • DCA22LA1822022-05-11 · MITSUBISHI CL-600-2B19 · SKYWEST AIRLINES INC
    A lateral runway excursion during landing for reasons that could not be determined based on the available evidence.
  • DCA19LA1342019-04-11 · Airbus A321 · American Airlines
    The captain’s excessive left rudder pedal input during the takeoff ground roll, which caused a large heading deviation and a left roll upon rotation that resulted in the left wingtip striking the ground.  

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).