FlarePathAir-accident investigation intelligence
Investigation brief · generated 2026-10-09 · source: NTSB public docket and accident database

BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2C10 — Washington, DC, USA, 2025-01-30

NTSB number
DCA25MA108
Operator
PSA Airlines
Registration
N709PS
Highest injury
Fatal · 67 fatal
Regulation
Part 121
Damage
Destroyed
Cohort
Major investigation
Recorder data
Tier 1 — decoded recorder tables
Every sentence below is taken directly from NTSB records — the accident database, the docket's recorder reports and the Board's findings — with its source noted. Nothing is paraphrased or inferred.

NTSB summary

On January 29, 2025, about 2048 eastern standard time, a Sikorsky UH 60L, operated by the US Army under the callsign PAT25 (Priority Air Transport Flight 25), and an MHI (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries) RJ Aviation (formerly Bombardier) CL-600-2C10 (CRJ700), N709PS, operated by PSA Airlines as American Airlines flight 5342, collided in flight about 0.5 miles southeast of Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA), Arlington, Virginia, and impacted the Potomac River in southwest Washington, DC. The 2 pilots, 2 flight attendants, and 60 passengers on board the airplane and all 3 crewmembers on board the helicopter died. Both aircraft were destroyed as a result of the accident. Flight 5342 was operating under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 as a scheduled domestic passenger flight from Wichita Dwight D. Eisenhower National Airport, Wichita, Kansas, to DCA. PAT25 originated from Davison Army Airfield, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, for the purpose of the pilot’s annual standardization evaluation flight with the use of night vision goggles. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed in the area of DCA at the time of the accident.
Verbatim, NTSB aviation accident database (narratives.narr_accf).

Probable cause

The Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) placement of a helicopter route in close proximity to a runway approach path; their failure to regularly review and evaluate helicopter routes and available data, and their failure to act on recommendations to mitigate the risk of a midair collision near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA); as well as the air traffic system’s overreliance on visual separation in order to promote efficient traffic flow without consideration for the limitations of the see-and-avoid concept. Also causal was the lack of effective pilot-applied visual separation by the helicopter crew, which resulted in a midair collision. Additional causal factors were the tower team’s loss of situation awareness and degraded performance due to the high workload of the combined helicopter and local control positions and the absence of a risk assessment process to identify and mitigate real-time operational risk factors, which resulted in misprioritization of duties, inadequate traffic advisories, and the lack of safety alerts to both flight crews. Also causal was the Army’s failure to ensure pilots were aware of the effects of error tolerances on barometric altimeters in their helicopters, which resulted in the crew flying above the maximum published helicopter route altitude. Contributing factors include: · the limitations of the traffic awareness and collision alerting systems on both aircraft, which precluded effective alerting of the impending collision to the flight crews; · an unsustainable airport arrival rate, increasing traffic volume with a changing fleet mix, and airline scheduling practices at DCA, which regularly strained the DCA air traffic control tower workforce and degraded safety over time; · the Army’s lack of a fully implemented safety management system, which should have identified and addressed hazards associated with altitude exceedances on the Washington, DC, helicopter routes; · the FAA’s failure across multiple organizations to implement previous NTSB recommendations, including Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast In, and to follow and fully integrate its established safety management system, which should have led to several organizational and operational changes based on previously identified risks that were known to management; and · the absence of effective data sharing and analysis among the FAA, aircraft operators, and other relevant organizations.
Verbatim, NTSB determination.

Flight data recorder

Sikorsky UH-60L · 00-26860 — 1,717,716 samples, 29 parameters, 18:30:21.4 to 20:47:59.5.

ParameterMaxatMinatFinalat
Vertical acceleration g1.319:40:52.00.719:41:00.10.820:47:59.5
Computed from the docket's tabular attachment; times as recorded (local or SRN as published).

Sequence of events (FDR factual report)

TimeEventPage
Overnight between March 26 and March 27, 2025Observation flight conducted using a sister ship to the accident UH-60L, flying near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, Arlington, Virginia, in support of a cockpit visibility study for the human performance and operations groups4
Elapsed time, approximately 1 hour, 55 minutes, 53 seconds durationFlight recorded on the aircraft's Integrated Vehicle Health Management System (IVHMS) for further analysis4
Extracted by claude-sonnet-5; 2 of 2 stated events verified against the raw recorder data.

Cockpit voice recorder

1498 transcribed utterances from 18:44:19.6 to 20:48:00.1, 20 sources. Final entries:

20:47:55.4INT-2oh-kay. fine.
20:47:56.4INT-1...out towards the middle.
20:47:57.7INT-2[sound similar to mumbling]
20:47:59.2RDO[sound similar to ELT signal]
20:48:00.1FPS[sound of rapid beeping similar to stabilator auto mode fail master caution, continues to end of recording]
The NTSB cautions that a CVR transcript is not a precise science and should not be used as the sole source of information.

Recorder documents in the docket

GroupTitlePagesType
performance2-AIR-G AIRPLANE OPERATIONS AND HUMAN PERFORMANCE GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT ATTACHMENT 6 - MIT-LL TCAS-ACAS SIMULATION STUDY60pdf
performance2-AIR-V TCAS-ACAS SIMULATION STUDY4pdf
fdr10-AIR-A FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - AIRPLANE - GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT25pdf
fdr10-AIR-B FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - AIRPLANE - ATTACHMENT 1 (FDR TABULAR DATA FOR EVENT FLIGHT)csv
fdr10-AIR-C FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - AIRPLANE - GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT ADDENDUM - OBSERVATION FLIGHT6pdf
fdr10-AIR-D FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - AIRPLANE - GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT ADDENDUM - ATTACHMENT 1 (QAR TABULAR DATA FOR OBSERVATION FLIGHT)csv
fdr10-HELO-A FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - HELICOPTER - GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT32pdf
fdr10-HELO-B FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - HELICOPTER - ATTACHMENT 1 (FDR TABULAR DATA FOR EVENT FLIGHT)csv
fdr10-HELO-C FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - HELICOPTER - GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT ADDENDUM 1 - OBSERVATION FLIGHT6pdf
fdr10-HELO-D FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - HELICOPTER - GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT ADDENDUM 1 - ATTACHMENT 1 (HUMS TABULAR DATA FOR OBSERVATION FLIGHT)csv
fdr10-HELO-E FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - HELICOPTER - GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT ADDENDUM 2 - ALTIMETER TEST FLIGHTS6pdf
fdr10-HELO-F FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - HELICOPTER - GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT ADDENDUM 2 - ATTACHMENT 1 (HUMS TABULAR DATA FOR ALTIMETER TEST FLIGHT - SHIP 06-27093)csv
fdr10-HELO-G FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - HELICOPTER - GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT ADDENDUM 2 - ATTACHMENT 2 (HUMS TABULAR DATA FOR ALTIMETER TEST FLIGHT - SHIP 90-26259)csv
fdr10-HELO-H FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - HELICOPTER - GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT ADDENDUM 2 - ATTACHMENT 3 (HUMS TABULAR DATA FOR ALTIMETER TEST FLIGHT - SHIP 99-26829)csv
fdr10-HELO-I FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - HELICOPTER - GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT ADDENDUM 3 - PITOT-STATIC SYSTEM OPERATIONAL CHECK6pdf
fdr10-HELO-J FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - HELICOPTER - GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT ADDENDUM 3 - ATTACHMENT 1 (HUMS TABULAR DATA FOR PITOT-STATIC SYSTEM OPERATIONAL CHECK - SHIP 06-27093)csv
fdr10-HELO-K FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - HELICOPTER - GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT ADDENDUM 3 - ATTACHMENT 2 (HUMS TABULAR DATA FOR PITOT-STATIC SYSTEM OPERATIONAL CHECK - SHIP 90-26259)csv
fdr10-HELO-L FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - HELICOPTER - GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT ADDENDUM 3 - ATTACHMENT 3 (HUMS TABULAR DATA FOR PITOT-STATIC SYSTEM OPERATIONAL CHECK - SHIP 99-26829)csv
cvr12-AIR-A COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER - AIRPLANE - GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT61pdf
cvr12-HELO-A COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER - HELICOPTER - GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT116pdf
performance13-A AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE STUDY - HISTORY OF FLIGHT39pdf
performanceAIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE ALTIMETER TESTING REPORT - ERRATA2pdf
performanceAIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE STUDY ALTITUDE ADDENDUM45pdf
performanceAIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE & COCKPIT VISIBILITY STUDY179pdf

Docket: data.ntsb.gov/Docket/?NTSBNumber=DCA25MA108. This brief is an analytical aid assembled from public records; it is not an investigative finding.