FlarePathAir-accident investigation intelligence
Investigation brief · generated 2026-10-09 · source: NTSB public docket and accident database

Saab 2000 — Unalaska, AK, USA, 2019-10-18

NTSB number
DCA20MA002
Operator
Peninsula AviationServices Inc.,
Registration
N686PA
Highest injury
Fatal · 1 fatal
Regulation
Part 121
Damage
Substantial
Cohort
Major investigation
Recorder data
Tier 1 — decoded recorder tables
Every sentence below is taken directly from NTSB records — the accident database, the docket's recorder reports and the Board's findings — with its source noted. Nothing is paraphrased or inferred.

NTSB summary

On October 17, 2019, about 1740 Alaska daylight time, PenAir flight 3296, a Saab 2000, N686PA, overran the runway while landing at the Thomas Madsen Airport (PADU), Unalaska, Alaska. The airplane passed through the airport perimeter fence, crossed a road, and came to rest on shoreline rocks. Of the 42 passengers and crewmembers on board, 1 passenger was fatally injured, and several other passengers sustained serious or minor injuries. The airplane received substantial damage. The regularly scheduled domestic passenger flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 from Ted Stevens International Airport (KANC), Anchorage, Alaska, to PADU.
Verbatim, NTSB aviation accident database (narratives.narr_accf).

Probable cause

The landing gear manufacturer’s incorrect wiring of the wheel speed transducer harnesses on the left main landing gear during overhaul. The incorrect wiring caused the antiskid system not to function as intended, resulting in the failure of the left outboard tire and a significant loss of the airplane’s braking ability, which led to the runway overrun. Contributing to the accident were (1) Saab’s design of the wheel speed transducer wire harnesses, which did not consider and protect against human error during maintenance; (2) the Federal Aviation Administration’s lack of consideration of the runway safety area dimensions at Unalaska Airport during the authorization process that allowed the Saab 2000 to operate at the airport; and (3) the flight crewmembers’ inappropriate decision, due to their plan continuation bias, to land on a runway with a reported tailwind that exceeded the airplane manufacturer’s limit. The safety margin was further reduced because of PenAir’s failure to correctly apply its company-designated pilot-in-command airport qualification policy, which allowed the accident captain to operate at one of the most challenging airports in PenAir’s route system with limited experience at the airport and in the Saab 2000 airplane.
Verbatim, NTSB determination.

Flight data recorder

Saab 2000 · N686PA — 649,125 samples, 106 parameters, 15:16:44.7 to 17:40:31.0.

ParameterMaxatMinatFinalat
Pressure altitude ft30,194.017:09:26.9343.017:39:56.9399.017:40:30.9
Radio altitude ft2,596.015:25:23.4-4.015:18:14.4-3.017:40:30.4
Pitch attitude deg10.415:24:09.2-20.017:40:29.21.117:40:30.9
Roll attitude deg25.915:24:46.7-35.817:35:58.7-5.917:40:30.7
Vertical acceleration g1.817:40:20.0-0.217:40:29.20.917:40:30.9
Magnetic heading deg358.917:36:32.11.017:36:31.1182.717:40:30.1
Computed from the docket's tabular attachment; times as recorded (local or SRN as published).

Sequence of events (FDR factual report)

TimeEventPage
1523Flight departed from ANC4
N/AAircraft climbed to a pressure altitude of 30,000 ft and cruised on a southwesterly heading for about 1 hour and 26 minutes4
N/AAircraft descended steadily for about 21 minutes4
1733:00Autopilot was disconnected and remained disconnected for remainder of flight4
1733:30Aircraft began a descent from 950 ft AGL4
N/AAt 425 ft AGL the aircraft rolled 30 degrees left, rolling out at 172 ft AGL on a heading of 117 degrees, consistent with final approach to the runway4
1735:30Maneuvers consistent with a go around were performed4
N/AFollowing the go around, aircraft climbed to 1150 ft AGL and began to descend again while performing a 300 degree left turn4
N/AWhile descending through about 350 ft AGL, the aircraft rolled 30 degrees left, rolling out on the runway heading at about 100 ft AGL4
N/AAs the aircraft rolled out from 100 ft to 50 ft AGL, a Sink Rate warning was recorded from the GPWS4
N/AVertical speed recorded a peak of -1292 fpm during final descent4
N/AAircraft roll angle oscillated +/- 5 degrees as it pitched up consistent with a landing flare4
1739:54Accelerations consistent with main gear touchdown occurred5
1739:55Nose gear touchdown5
1739:561 Hz Gear Weight on Wheels signal became true5
N/ARate of deceleration increased over three seconds following main gear touchdown to a peak of -0.48 g; flaps retracted by 5 degrees and both propellers transitioned to beta mode5
1739:59Longitudinal deceleration changed from smooth to slightly oscillatory profile; Anti-Skid Inboard Fault Caution became active5
1740:03Engines transitioned from ground idle beta to max reverse power5
1740:10Longitudinal deceleration profile became smooth for 5.5 seconds; Anti-Skid Inboard Fault Caution transitioned to inactive5
1740:16Oscillations in longitudinal acceleration resumed and Anti-Skid Inboard Fault Caution reactivated5
1740:18Engine PLA began to increase from about 1 degree to about 35 degrees, consistent with idle power, over 3 seconds; engines and propellers transitioned to idle power and beta mode5
1740:19Changes in pitch, roll, and vertical and longitudinal accelerations were consistent with a departure of the runway surface5
N/AOne second after runway departure, the weight on wheels and left main gear down and locked signals became false, consistent with damage to the left main gear5
N/AAbout one second after that the left engine gas generator speed dropped to 0%, consistent with damage to the left engine5
1740:31The recording stopped, consistent with a sudden power interruption to the recorder5
Extracted by claude-sonnet-5; 11 of 25 stated events verified against the raw recorder data.

Cockpit voice recorder

674 transcribed utterances from 15:36:30.0 to 17:41:36.9, 17 sources. Final entries:

17:41:28.6RDO-1and Dutch Harbor Radio we need uh - crash fire rescue...uh...crash fire rescue.
17:41:29.4HOT[sound similar to Master Warning]
17:41:30.9HOT[sound similar to Config Warning] Time and Intra-Aircraft Communication Time and Over-the-Air Communication Source Source
17:41:34.4HOT[sound similar to Master Warning]
17:41:36.9HOT[sound of switch actuating]
The NTSB cautions that a CVR transcript is not a precise science and should not be used as the sole source of information.

Recorder documents in the docket

GroupTitlePagesType
cvrCOCKPIT VOICE RECORDER - GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT72pdf
fdrFLIGHT DATA RECORDER SPECIALIST'S FACTUAL REPORT21pdf
fdrFLIGHT DATA RECORDER SPECIALIST'S FACTUAL REPORT - ATTACHMENT 11csv
fdrFLIGHT DATA RECORDER SPECIALIST'S FACTUAL REPORT - ATTACHMENT 2csv
fdrFLIGHT DATA RECORDER SPECIALIST'S FACTUAL REPORT - ATTACHMENT 31csv
fdrFLIGHT DATA RECORDER SPECIALIST'S FACTUAL REPORT - ATTACHMENT 41csv
performanceAIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE CRASH SITE FACTUAL (TEXT)13pdf
performanceAIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE CRASH SITE FACTUAL (ATTACHMENTS)1725pdf
performanceAIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE GROUP STUDY (ATTACHMENTS)36pdf
performanceAIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE GROUP STUDY (TEXT)27pdf

Docket: data.ntsb.gov/Docket/?NTSBNumber=DCA20MA002. This brief is an analytical aid assembled from public records; it is not an investigative finding.