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Investigation brief · generated 2026-10-09 · source: NTSB public docket and accident database

AIRBUS A300 - F4 622R — Birmingham, AL, USA, 2013-08-14

NTSB number
DCA13MA133
Operator
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE CO
Registration
N155UP
Highest injury
Fatal · 2 fatal
Regulation
Part 121
Damage
Destroyed
Cohort
Major investigation
Recorder data
Tier 1 — decoded recorder tables
Every sentence below is taken directly from NTSB records — the accident database, the docket's recorder reports and the Board's findings — with its source noted. Nothing is paraphrased or inferred.

NTSB summary

The Safety Board's full report is available at http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/aviation.aspx. The Aircraft Accident Report number is NTSB/AAR-14/02. On August 14, 2013, about 0447 central daylight time (CDT), United Parcel Service (UPS) flight 1354, an Airbus A300-600, N155UP, crashed short of runway 18 during a localizer nonprecision approach to runway 18 at Birmingham-Shuttlesworth International Airport (BHM), Birmingham, Alabama. The captain and first officer were fatally injured, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and postcrash fire. The nonscheduled cargo flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan, and dark night visual flight rules conditions prevailed at the airport; variable instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) with a variable ceiling were present north of the airport on the approach course at the time of the accident. The flight originated from Louisville International Airport-Standiford Field (SDF), Louisville, Kentucky, about 0503 eastern daylight time (EDT).
Verbatim, NTSB aviation accident database (narratives.narr_accf).

Probable cause

the flight crew's continuation of an unstabilized approach and their failure to monitor the aircraft's altitude during the approach, which led to an inadvertent descent below the minimum approach altitude and subsequently into terrain. Contributing to the accident were (1) the flight crew's failure to properly configure and verify the flight management computer for the profile approach; (2) the captain's failure to communicate his intentions to the first officer once it became apparent the vertical profile was not captured; (3) the flight crew's expectation that they would break out of the clouds at 1,000 feet above ground level due to incomplete weather information; (4) the first officer's failure to make the required minimums callouts; (5) the captain's performance deficiencies likely due to factors including, but not limited to, fatigue, distraction, or confusion, consistent with performance deficiencies exhibited during training; and (6) the first officer's fatigue due to acute sleep loss resulting from her ineffective off-duty time management and circadian factors.
Verbatim, NTSB determination.

Sequence of events (FDR factual report)

TimeEventPage
04:42:35 CDTAbout 5 minutes before the end of the recording: pressure altitude about 10,000 ft, DME 20.6 NM, computed airspeed about 248 knots, speed brake handle fully extended11
04:42:55 CDTLanding gear discretes indicated all three gear down and locked11
04:44:22 CDTLateral AFCS mode changed to localizer track mode11
04:44:41 CDTSpeed brake handle retracted, then moved periodically between retracted and full extension over the next 60 seconds; slats/flaps lever moved from detent 1 (slats/flaps up) to detent 2 (slats 15/flaps 0)11
04:45:12 CDTLongitudinal AFCS mode changed to altitude mode; pressure altitude about 2,500 ft, DME about 9 NM, computed airspeed about 213 knots; selected airspeed changed from 170 to 160 knots11
04:45:15 CDTSlats/flaps lever moved to detent 3 (slats 15/flaps 15)11
04:45:32 CDTLateral AFCS mode changed to NAV, to heading at 04:45:34, to localizer capture at 04:45:38, and about 9 seconds later back to localizer track where it remained11
04:45:42 CDTSlats/flaps lever moved to detent 4 (slats 15/flaps 20)11
04:45:45 CDTSpeed brake handle returned to 0 and remained there; ground spoilers armed at 04:45:4712
04:45:48 CDTSelected airspeed changed to 137 knots and remained there12
04:45:56 CDTSlats/flaps lever moved to detent 5 (slats 30/flaps 40)12
04:46:01 CDTLongitudinal AFCS mode changed to vertical speed mode; selected vertical speed set to about -700 fpm at 04:46:0812
04:46:15 CDTComputed airspeed converged to the selected 137 knots; pressure altitude decreased below 2,500 ft marking the start of the final descent, DME about 5.75 NM (79 seconds before end of recording)12
04:46:20 CDTSelected vertical speed changed to about -1000 fpm, then to about -1500 fpm at 04:46:3412
04:46:38 CDTSelected altitude changed from about 2,500 ft to about 3,775 ft; no significant change in aircraft state over the next 45 seconds12
04:47:25 CDTThree-second EGPWS sink rate warning recorded; vertical speed -1536 fpm, radio altitude 235 ft12
04:47:26 CDTSelected vertical speed changed to about -640 fpm, then -448 fpm 3 seconds later; control column began increasing to a final value of about 5 degrees nose up with pitch increasing similarly12
04:47:30 CDTSlight increase in thrust indicated by engine parameters12
04:47:32 CDTThrottle resolver angle indicated an additional request for increased thrust; N1, N2, EGT and fuel flow show the engines responded12
04:47:33 CDTLast second of recording: left autopilot command changed to disengaged, autopilot off warning indicated, autothrottle changed from speed mode to retard mode; last recorded pitch about 7 degrees nose up, airspeed about 138 knots, radio altitude 14 ft13
04:47:34 CDTFDR recording ended13
Extracted by claude-fable-5-1 (in-session); 0 of 1 stated events verified against the raw recorder data.

Cockpit voice recorder

443 transcribed utterances from 03:13:39.5 to 04:47:41.6, 17 sources. Final entries:

04:47:38.8CAM[sound of rustling, similar to impact, continues at higher volume until end of recording]
04:47:39.9HOT-?[grunting].
04:47:41.1HOT[static].
04:47:41.3CAM[end of loudest noise]
04:47:41.6HOT[end of recording]
The NTSB cautions that a CVR transcript is not a precise science and should not be used as the sole source of information.

Recorder documents in the docket

GroupTitlePagesType
fdrFlight Data Recorder 10 - Exhibit A -Group Chairman's Factual Report36pdf
fdrFlight Data Recorder 10 - Exhibit B - Factual Report - Attachment 1: FDR Tabular Data (Compressed CSV File)zip
cvrCockpit Voice Recorder 12 - Factual Report of Group Chairman54pdf
performanceAircraft Performance 13 - Exhibit 13-A Group Chairman's Study Report75pdf

Docket: data.ntsb.gov/Docket/?NTSBNumber=DCA13MA133. This brief is an analytical aid assembled from public records; it is not an investigative finding.