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Cases › WPR10LA134 › The analyst

BOEING 737-7H4SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

5
timed facts
8
precedents
11
passages to ask

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passages, not paraphrases
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Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.

One timeline

5 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report
  1. 20:45:40 GMTFDRApproach (initial approach to Bob Hope Airport, Burbank, CA)p.3
    TCAS Down Advisory set "On" followed by a pitch up then a pitch down motion
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  2. 20:45:49 GMTFDRApproach (TCAS event)p.3
    TCAS Down Advisory set "Off" and TCAS Up Advisory set "On", accompanied by a pitch up motion
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  3. 20:45:51 GMTFDRApproach (TCAS event)p.3
    Minimum recorded vertical acceleration of 0.09 g's
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  4. 20:45:52 GMTFDRApproach (TCAS event)p.3
    Maximum recorded vertical acceleration of 2.93 g's
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  5. 20:46:10 GMTFDRApproach (TCAS event)p.3
    TCAS Up Advisory set "Off"
    see the traces at this moment ↗
Flight Data Recorder 10 - Specialist's Factual Report · 5 events extracted by claude-sonnet-5
How the Board coded the sequence
  1. Approach-IFR initial approach: Collision avoidance alert→
  2. Approach-IFR initial approach: Abrupt maneuver

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • ANC19LA0452019-08-01substantialmatch 64
    DOUGLAS C 118A · Tatonduk Outfitters Limited
    Buckland, AK
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters
    • ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info
  • DCA18LA2852018-09-06no fatalitiesmatch 63
    Boeing 757 · American Airlines
    New York, NY
    • ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info
    Abrupt maneuver
  • ANC13FA0542013-06-041 fatalmatch 62
    DEHAVILLAND BEAVER DHC-2 MK.1 · Pacific Wings LLC
    Petersburg, AK
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters
    • ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info
    Abrupt maneuver
  • CEN15FA0482014-11-181 fatalmatch 62
    AERO COMMANDER 500 B · Central Air Southwest Inc.
    Chicago, IL
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters
    • ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info
  • CEN22FA0312021-11-134 fatalmatch 62
    BRITTEN-NORMAN BN-2A · MCPHILLIPS FLYING SERVICE INC
    Beaver Island, MI
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters
    • ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info
  • CEN19MA3122019-09-112 fatalmatch 61
    Convair 440 · Ferreteria E Implementos San Francisco
    Monclova, OH
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters
    • ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info
  • DCA13FA1312013-07-22substantialmatch 61
    BOEING 737 7H4 · SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO
    Flushing, NY
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters
    • ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info
  • OPS11IA2462011-01-21no fatalitiesmatch 61
    BOEING 777
    80 SE of JFK (Atlantic Ocean), NY
    Abrupt maneuverCollision avoidance alert

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Occurrences it coded
  • 3 of 8Abrupt maneuver
  • 3 of 8Collision with terr/obj (non-CFIT)
  • 2 of 8Landing gear collapse
  • 2 of 8Loss of control in flight
  • 2 of 8Aerodynamic stall/spin
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
  • Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters
  • Task performance › Use of equip/info
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
  • Operating environment › Air traffic/operating proc
Common in the precedents, not cited here
  • Action/decision › Action

A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.

In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • ANC19LA0452019-08-01 · DOUGLAS C 118A · Tatonduk Outfitters Limited
    The pilot's failure to maintain an adequate glidepath during the approach, which resulted in the airplane impacting rocks and dirt at the runway threshold, a separation of the right main landing gear, and a loss of directional control.
  • DCA18LA2852018-09-06 · Boeing 757 · American Airlines
    The flight crew’s failure to adequately monitor the airplane’s airspeed, which led to the captain’s aggressive control inputs to increase airspeed; these aggressive inputs resulted in injuries to three cabin crewmembers.
  • ANC13FA0542013-06-04 · DEHAVILLAND BEAVER DHC-2 MK.1 · Pacific Wings LLC
    The pilot’s failure to maintain adequate altitude above the trees, and his subsequent failure to maintain adequate airspeed while maneuvering to avoid the trees, which resulted in an inadvertent aerodynamic stall/spin and an uncontrolled descent.
  • CEN15FA0482014-11-18 · AERO COMMANDER 500 B · Central Air Southwest Inc.
    The pilot's failure to maintain airspeed while attempting to return to the airport after a reported engine problem, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall/spin.
  • CEN22FA0312021-11-13 · BRITTEN-NORMAN BN-2A · MCPHILLIPS FLYING SERVICE INC
    The pilot's exceedance of the airplane's critical angle of attack during final approach, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall and loss of control at an altitude too low to recover.

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).