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Cases › ERA09IA056 › The analyst

DeHavilland DHC-8-311Piedmont Airlines

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

0
timed facts
8
precedents
14
passages to ask

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passages, not paraphrases
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Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.

One timeline

0 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report

No timed facts: this docket has no extracted recorder sequence and no transcript.

Recorder events without a clock time
  • 550,530 sec (SRN)The aircraft departed
  • 551,517 sec (SRN)The aircraft began an initial descent to PHL
  • 551,670 sec (SRN)Power was applied to both engines and a climb was initiated to go around
  • 553,080 sec (SRN)The aircraft begins a second descent to PHL
  • 553,460 sec (SRN)Power was applied to both engines and a climb is initiated to go around
  • 554,910 sec (SRN)The aircraft began its final descent to PHL
  • 555,835 to 555,876 sec (SRN)The aircraft landed and decelerated at PHL; a precise time of landing could not be determined based on available FDR parameters
  • 555,880 sec (SRN)The engine shutdown process began
Flight Data Recorder 10 - Specialist's Factual Report · 8 events extracted by claude-sonnet-5
How the Board coded the sequence
  1. Landing: Abnormal runway contact→
  2. Approach: Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • DCA15IA0892015-03-14no fatalitiesmatch 92
    BOMBARDIER INC CL 600 2C10 · GOJET AIRLINES LLC
    Chicago, IL
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
    Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
  • DCA24FA0022023-10-05substantialmatch 81
    BOEING 757-236 · FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP
    Chattanooga, TN
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
    Abnormal runway contact
  • DCA25LA2752025-07-26substantialmatch 77
    BOEING 737-8 · American Airlines, Inc.
    Denver, CO
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
    Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
  • DCA20LA1382020-08-19substantialmatch 75
    Boeing 767 · Federal Express
    Los Angeles, CA
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
    Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
  • ENG08IA0422008-10-01no fatalitiesmatch 75
    BOEING 737 · Southwest Airlines, Co.
    Chicago, IL
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
  • DCA10IA0212010-01-10no fatalitiesmatch 75
    AIRBUS INDUSTRIE A319-131 · UNITED AIR LINES INC
    Newark, NJ
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
    Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
  • ENG10IA0552010-09-28no fatalitiesmatch 75
    BOMBARDIER CL600 2B19 · SKYWEST AIRLINES, Inc.
    Milwaukee, WI
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
  • ENG17IA0052016-12-04no fatalitiesmatch 74
    EMBRAER ERJ170 200LR · SKYWEST AIRLINES INC
    San Antonio, TX
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Occurrences it coded
  • 4 of 8Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
  • 3 of 8Landing gear collapse
  • 2 of 8Landing gear not configured
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
  • Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
  • —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
  • —

A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.

In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • DCA15IA0892015-03-14 · BOMBARDIER INC CL 600 2C10 · GOJET AIRLINES LLC
    The nose landing gear’s failure to fully extend due to missing and damaged fastening hardware on the drive arm assembly.
  • DCA24FA0022023-10-05 · BOEING 757-236 · FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP
    The failure of the alternate gear extension system, which prevented the landing gear from being lowered. The cause of the system failure was a broken wire, due to tensile overload, between the alternate gear extend switch and the alternate extension power pack (AEPP), preventing the AEPP from energizing and supplying hydraulic fluid to the door lock release actuators for the nose landing gear and main landing gear. Contributing to the accident was the loss of the left hydraulic system due to a ruptured left main ge…
  • DCA25LA2752025-07-26 · BOEING 737-8 · American Airlines, Inc.
    The failure of the airplane’s left main landing gear tires and wheels during the takeoff roll due to the thermal relief plugs melting and releasing tire pressure, which resulted in abnormal airplane handling characteristics and led the flight crew to reject the takeoff at high speed.
  • DCA20LA1382020-08-19 · Boeing 767 · Federal Express
    The left main landing gear’s failure to extend due to the separation of the brake rod retaining hardware from the aft inboard wheel for reasons that could not be determined based on the available evidence.
  • ENG08IA0422008-10-01 · BOEING 737 · Southwest Airlines, Co.
    The right nose landing gear axle's failure from intergranular and fatigue cracking due to an earlier bearing failure.
What it recommended after them
  • A-25-003TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all Boeing 757 operators to inspect the bannis latches on Boeing 757-200, -200CB, and -300 series airplane doors and, if necessary, modify or replace them so they comply with the correct confi… · DCA24FA002Open - Initial Response Received
  • A-25-004TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all operators of Boeing 727 and 737 airplane models that use the same bannis latch design as Boeing 757 airplanes (757-200, -200CB, and 300 series) to inspect and, if necessary, modify or rep… · DCA24FA002Open - Initial Response Received
  • A-25-005TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all Boeing 757 operators to update their Boeing 757 200, 200CB, and -300 series airplane aircraft maintenance manuals (AMM) in accordance with the revised Boeing AMM and illustrated parts cat… · DCA24FA002Open - Initial Response Received
  • A-25-006TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all operators of Boeing 727 and 737 airplane models that use the same bannis latch design as Boeing 757 airplanes (757-200, -200CB, and 300 series) to update their aircraft maintenance manual… · DCA24FA002Open - Initial Response Received
  • A-25-007TO BOEING: Once the Boeing 757 aircraft maintenance manual and illustrated parts catalog are updated to provide a consistent and accurate depiction of the bannis latch assembly, issue a service bulletin advising Boeing 757 operators to insp… · DCA24FA002Open - Initial Response Received
  • A-25-008TO BOEING: Issue a service bulletin advising operators of Boeing 727 and 737 airplanes that use the same bannis latch design as Boeing 757 airplanes (757 200, 200CB, and -300 series) to inspect those airplanes and, if necessary, modify or… · DCA24FA002Open - Initial Response Received
  • A-25-009TO BOEING: Review all pertinent aircraft maintenance manuals and illustrated parts catalogs for Boeing 727 and 737 model airplanes that use the same bannis latch design as Boeing 757 airplanes (757-200, -200CB, and -300 series) to ensure th… · DCA24FA002Open - Initial Response Received

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).