Cases › ENG24LA014 › The analyst
BOEING 787United Airlines
What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.
0
timed facts
8
precedents
14
passages to ask
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passages, not paraphrasesTry
Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.
One timeline
0 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each reportNo timed facts: this docket has no extracted recorder sequence and no transcript.
Recorder events without a clock time
- 1336 UTCAircraft departed Singapore and climbed uneventfully to 31,000 ft (FL310)
- 1408:48 UTCWith the aircraft stable at FL310 and 312 kts computed airspeed, engine 1 (the left engine) N1, N2, and fuel flow all abruptly decreased
- 1408:55 UTCThe left engine fire warning became active
- 1409:24 UTCThe engine 1 fuel cutoff switch was moved from the run position to the cutoff position
- 1409:28 UTCThe engine 1 fire switch was pulled
- 1409:40 UTCThe left engine fire bottle was discharged
- 1409:55 UTCThe left engine fire warning cleared
- 1504 UTCThe aircraft returned to Singapore and made an uneventful single-engine landing
FDR-RECORDERS REPORT_ENG24LA014_FINAL · 8 events extracted by claude-sonnet-5
How the Board coded the sequence
- Initial climb: Uncontained engine failure
Precedents
8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded- BOEING MD-88 · DELTA AIR LINES INCAtlanta, GAUncontained engine failure
- BOEING 747-451 · DELTA AIR LINES INCDetroit, MI
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Power plant
Uncontained engine failure - Boeing 757 · Delta Air LinesAtlanta, GAUncontained engine failure
- BOMBARDIER INC CL 600 2C10 · GoJet Airlines, LLC.Kansas, ILUncontained engine failure
- Boeing 737 · UNITED AIR LINES INCOrlando, FLmatched on what happened, as the Board wrote it · same aircraft family
- BOEING 757 · DELTA AIR LINES INCLas Vegas, NVmatched on what happened, as the Board wrote it · same aircraft family
- BOEING 747 451 · Delta Air LinesTokyo, JPmatched on what happened, as the Board wrote it · same aircraft family
- BOEING 747-209B · KALITTA FLYING SERVICE INCBogota, CO
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Power plant
What the record says
a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable causeFindings the Board cited in those cases
- 7 of 8Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop)
Occurrences it coded
- 4 of 8Uncontained engine failure
- 3 of 8Engine shutdown
- 3 of 8Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail
- 2 of 8Loss of engine power (partial)
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
- —
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
- —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
- Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop)
A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.
In the Board’s words — the closest cases
- ENG13IA0052012-11-07 · BOEING MD-88 · DELTA AIR LINES INC
The 4th stage turbine blade separation that resulted in an uncontained release of low pressure turbine blade material was Delta Air Lines' repair process for the turbine blades' tip shrouds. It was not possible to identify the part of the repair process that led to the premature wear of the blade's tip shoud and subsequent separation.
- ENG12IA0032011-10-23 · BOEING 747-451 · DELTA AIR LINES INC
The penetration of turbine blade fragments through the rear turbine case, which punctured the No. 4 bearing oil pressure supply tube, allowing misted oil to contact the hot engine case and ignite the undercowl fire. Contributing to the incident was the installation of approved (but not preferred) stage 3 low pressure turbine outer transition duct segments with the riveted rear seal configuration and the failure of the engine design to comply with the engine debris containment requirements of 14 Code of Federal R…
- ENG18IA0362018-09-06 · Boeing 757 · Delta Air Lines
A right engine turbine uncontainment resulting from failure of the high pressure turbine (HPT) lenticular seal due to a fatigue crack originating from an overheated region at a knife edge tip. Contributing to the failure was Pratt & Whitney’s decision to introduce the temperature-resistant knife-edge coating as a new-part number lenticular seal on an attrition basis without the option to recoat existing lenticular seals, which delayed implementation of the more durable seal material into the fleet.
- ENG17IA0062016-11-29 · BOMBARDIER INC CL 600 2C10 · GoJet Airlines, LLC.
The probable cause of the uncontained No. 1 (left) engine failure was a separated high pressure turbine 2nd stage blade that failed due to a fatigue crack that originated below the blade platform from an area of corrosion.
- ENG19IA0132019-02-21 · Boeing 737 · UNITED AIR LINES INC
A No. 1 (left) engine high pressure compressor stage 2 blade separation. The blade separated due to a mixed-mode fatigue crack that originated on a blade disk post and was initiated by a misaligned (out-of-schedule) high pressure compressor stage 1 variable stator vane that was missing a washer and retaining nut on the vane trunnion stem.
What it recommended after them
- A-08-085TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require that Pratt & Whitney PW2037 engines be removed from service for inspection of the 2nd stage turbine hubs when they have accumulated significantly fewer hours and/or cycles than the incident en… · ENG08IA038Closed - Unacceptable Action
- A-08-086TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require that Pratt & Whitney PW2037 2nd stage turbine hubs undergo recurring inspections when they have accumulated significantly fewer hours and/or cycles than the incident engine (10,880 hours and/o… · ENG08IA038Closed - Acceptable Action
This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).