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Cases › ENG24FA003 › The analyst

BOEING 767-300FFEDERAL EXPRESS CORP

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

8
timed facts
8
precedents
18
passages to ask

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passages, not paraphrases
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Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.

One timeline

8 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report
  1. 15:36:10FDRAfter departure from MEMp.5
    Recorded fuel pressure values from the left engine started to decrease, with no corresponding change in throttle resolver angle
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  2. 15:37:49FDRIn flightp.5
    The left engine had a fire indication, and simultaneously a master warning occurred
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  3. 15:38:25FDRIn flightp.4
    Flight data recorder lost synchronization, likely due to a momentary power loss, for less than one second
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  4. 15:39:09FDRIn flightp.5
    Data indicated that fuel had been cut off from the left engine
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  5. 15:39:26FDRIn flightp.5
    FIRE EXT SWITCH L indicated PULLED
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  6. 15:42:00FDRIn flightp.5
    Left engine no longer had a fire indication
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  7. 15:43:09FDRIn flightp.4
    Flight data recorder lost synchronization, likely due to a momentary power loss, for less than one second
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  8. 15:49:00FDRLandingp.5
    The airplane landed at MEM without further incident
    see the traces at this moment ↗
FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - SPECIALIST'S FACTUAL REPORT · 8 events extracted by claude-sonnet-5
How the Board coded the sequence
  1. Initial climb: Fire/smoke (non-impact)→
  2. Initial climb: Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • ENG17IA0362017-09-06no fatalitiesmatch 66
    BOEING 757 232 · Delta Air Lines
    Las Vegas, NV
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control
    Fire/smoke (non-impact)Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail
  • ENG11IA0352011-06-21no fatalitiesmatch 62
    BOEING 757-232 · DELTA AIR LINES INC
    Atlanta, GA
    Fire/smoke (non-impact)Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail
  • ENG11IA0112010-12-25no fatalitiesmatch 58
    BOEING 737 · Southwest Airlines
    San Francisco, CA
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control
    Fire/smoke (non-impact)Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail
  • ENG23LA0312023-06-28no fatalitiesmatch 56
    BOEING 737-9 · United Airlines
    Newark, NJ
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control
    Fire/smoke (non-impact)
  • ENG12IA0102012-02-08no fatalitiesmatch 56
    BOEING 767 · American Airlines
    Jamaica, NY
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control
    Fire/smoke (non-impact)
  • ENG11IA0162011-02-09no fatalitiesmatch 55
    BOEING 757-2Q8 · DELTA AIR LINES INC
    Minneapolis, MN
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control
    Fire/smoke (non-impact)
  • ENG10IA0102010-01-12no fatalitiesmatch 54
    ATR ATR72 · American Airlines
    St. Croix, USA
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control
    Fire/smoke (non-impact)
  • ENG17IA0032016-10-26no fatalitiesmatch 53
    AIRBUS A330 223 · DELTA AIR LINES INC
    Seattle, WA
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control
    Fire/smoke (non-impact)Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Occurrences it coded
  • 8 of 8Fire/smoke (non-impact)
  • 4 of 8Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
  • Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
  • Development › Manufacture/production
  • Support/oversight/monitoring › Documentation/record keeping
Common in the precedents, not cited here
  • Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop)

A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.

In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • ENG17IA0362017-09-06 · BOEING 757 232 · Delta Air Lines
    A No. 1 (left) engine undercowl fire caused by a fuel nozzle installation error during engine overhaul at Delta TechOps. A fuel nozzle b-nut was cross threaded, which allowed fuel to leak on hot engine case surfaces and subsequently ignite.
  • ENG11IA0352011-06-21 · BOEING 757-232 · DELTA AIR LINES INC
    Fuel leaking from the fuel flow transmitter that ignited on contact with the engine’s hot cases which resulted in an engine undercowl fire. The fuel leak resulted from the fuel flow transmitter end housing backing off from the main housing, creating a gap that allowed high pressure fuel to escape. Under certain assembly variances and operational load and temperature variations, the end housing joint may not be able to maintain the preload without eventually yielding, which results in the loosening of the joint and…
  • ENG11IA0112010-12-25 · BOEING 737 · Southwest Airlines
    The probable cause of the undercowl in-flight engine fire was the insufficient installation torque of the bolts that secure the fuel manifold cover to the fuel manifold. Engine vibrations and fuel pressure cycles caused the bolts to gradually loosen further until one bolt lost all its tightening torque and fell out. The internal fuel pressure then forced open the fuel manifold cover at the location of the missing bolt, causing a gap between the two mating surfaces which allowed fuel to push past the integral packi…
  • ENG23LA0312023-06-28 · BOEING 737-9 · United Airlines
    A No. 1 (left) engine fire due a fuel leak that originated from the fuel nozzle 17 b-nut connection that was not properly torqued in accordance with the aircraft maintenance manual procedure.
  • ENG12IA0102012-02-08 · BOEING 767 · American Airlines
    The failure of the American Airlines aviation maintenance technicians to properly reassemble the two-piece bracket and spray shield on the integrated drive generator fuel-oil heat exchanger that caused a fuel leak that sprayed out and ignited on hot engine cases. Contributing to the cause of the fire was the 767 Aircraft Maintenance Manual’s lack of any graphical or pictorial displays of the correct assembly of the two-piece bracket and spray shield.
What it recommended after them
  • A-12-047TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Issue an airworthiness directive to require the incorporation of General Electric Aircraft Engines Service Bulletin 73-0242, “Fuel and Control – (73-00-00) – Spray Shields and Support Bracket – Improv… · ENG12IA010Closed - Acceptable Action

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).