Cases › ENG22FA009 › The analyst
BOEING 737-8K2Sun Country Airlines, Inc.
What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.
19
timed facts
8
precedents
13
passages to ask
Ask the docket
passages, not paraphrasesTry
Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.
One timeline
19 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report- 00:40:28FDRDeparturep.4The airplane departed Harry Reid International Airport (KLAS), Las Vegas, Nevada.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 00:40:31FDRDeparturep.4Nose and main landing gear warning parameters indicated "Warn", consistent with the crew moving the landing gear lever to the 'Up' position.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 00:40:32FDRDeparturep.4The nose and left main 'Gear Down' parameters simultaneously indicated 'Up'. The right main 'Gear Down' parameter remained in 'Down' status.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 00:40:38FDRDeparturep.4The right main 'Gear Down' parameter indicated 'Up'.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 00:40:39FDRClimbp.5The nose and left main 'Gear Warn' parameters transitioned from 'Warn' to 'No Warn'. The right 'Gear Warn' parameter remained in 'Warn' status. The airplane continued to climb.see the traces at this moment ↗
- About 00:43:30FDRClimb/Level-offp.5The airplane leveled off at about 9,500 feet MSL.see the traces at this moment ↗
- About 00:53:00FDRDescent/Level-offp.5The airplane descended and leveled off at 7,500 feet MSL.see the traces at this moment ↗
- About 01:10:40FDRApproachp.5The airplane started to descend and maneuver back for an approach at KLAS.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 01:14:37FDRApproachp.5The airplane was on approach for KLAS at an altitude of about 5,300 feet MSL. The right main 'Gear Warn' parameter continued to indicate 'Warn'. The nose and left main 'Gear Warn' parameters transitioned to 'Warn', consistent with the crew moving the landing gear lever to the 'Down' position. The airplane continued to descend.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 01:14:44FDRApproachp.5The nose 'Gear Down' parameter transitioned from 'Up' to 'Down'. Simultaneously, the 'Gear Warn-N' parameter transitioned to 'No Warn'.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 01:14:47FDRApproachp.5The left main 'Gear Down' parameter transitioned to 'Down' and simultaneously, the 'Gear Warn-L' parameter transitioned to 'No Warn'.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 01:14:48FDRApproachp.5The right main 'Gear Down' parameter transitioned to 'Down' and simultaneously, the 'Gear Warn-R' parameter transitioned to 'No Warn'. The airplane continued to descend.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 01:18:59FDRLandingp.5The nose, left main, and right main landing gear WOW all indicated 'Grnd (Ground)'.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 01:19:00FDRLanding rollp.5The right main 'Gear Down' and right main 'Gear Warn' parameters transitioned to 'Up' and 'Warn', respectively. The recorded roll angle began to increase (right wing down).see the traces at this moment ↗
- 01:19:04FDRLanding rollp.5Both engine's thrust reversers indicated full deployment. Air and ground speed continued to decrease.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 01:19:19FDRLanding rollp.5The 'Eng2 Fire' parameter briefly indicated 'Fire'. One second later, the parameter transitioned back to 'No Fire' for about 26 seconds.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 01:19:22FDRLanding rollp.5Both engine thrust reversers indicated they were no longer deployed. The recorded groundspeed was about 17 knots.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 01:19:27FDRLanding rollp.5The recorded groundspeed was 0 knots.see the traces at this moment ↗
- 01:19:47FDRPost-landingp.5The 'Eng2 Fire' parameter indicated 'Fire'. This indication persisted for the duration of the recording.see the traces at this moment ↗
FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - SPECIALIST'S FACTUAL REPORT · 19 events extracted by claude-sonnet-5
How the Board coded the sequence
- Landing-landing roll: Landing gear collapse
Precedents
8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded- BOEING 767 · Continental AirlinesNewark, NJ
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
Landing gear collapse - BOEING MD-11 · FedEx EcpressSingapore, SG
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
- ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance
- BOEING 737-824 · United AirlinesDenver, CO
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
Landing gear collapse - BOEING 737-890 · Alaska AirlinesSanta Ana, CA
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
Landing gear collapse - Airbus Industrie A320 · United Air LinesJackson, WY
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
- ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance
- BOMBARDIER CL-600-2B19 · AIR WISCONSIN AIRLINES CORPORATIONPhiladelphia, PA
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
- ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance
- EMBRAER ERJ 190 100 IGW · US AIRWAYS INCHouston, TX
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
- ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance
- BOEING 717-200 · Delta Air Lines IncCharlotte, NC
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
- ●Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance
What the record says
a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable causeFindings the Board cited in those cases
- 8 of 8Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear systemcited here too
- 5 of 8Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenancecited here too
Occurrences it coded
- 5 of 8Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
- 3 of 8Landing gear collapse
- 2 of 8Landing gear not configured
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
- Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
- Task performance › Maintenance
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
- —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
- —
A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.
In the Board’s words — the closest cases
- ENG09IA0182009-09-18 · BOEING 767 · Continental Airlines
Failure of Main Landing Gear (MLG) truck beam was due to contamination of the inner surface corrosion protective layers from hydraulic fluid and deice fluid that resulted in corrosion and intergranular stress corrosion cracking.
- ENG08IA0252008-04-27 · BOEING MD-11 · FedEx Ecpress
The Center Landing gear (CLG) strut failed due to intergranular (IG) cracking resulted from a contamination of the surface from the chemical used to clean that area prior to painting.
- DCA20LA0472019-12-23 · BOEING 737-824 · United Airlines
Maintenance personnel’s excessive grinding of the left main landing gear’s aft trunnion pin during its initial overhaul, which caused heat damage to the base metal and led to the fatigue crack that caused the pin to fail during the accident flight. Contributing to the accident was the failure of maintenance personnel to detect the excessive grinding during the initial overhaul and the fatigue crack during the subsequent overhaul.
- DCA23FA4172023-08-21 · BOEING 737-890 · Alaska Airlines
Maintenance personnel’s excessive grinding of the left main landing gear’s aft trunnion pin during machining, which imparted heat damage to the base metal and led to the fatigue cracking that caused the pin to fracture during landing.
- DCA08IA0442008-02-26 · Airbus Industrie A320 · United Air Lines
the loss of braking action on the left main landing gear due to the cross connection of the wheel speed tachometer wires that was caused by inadequate maintenance performed on the airplane during the installation of the main landing gear.
What it recommended after them
- A-10-096TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require that mechanics performing required inspection item and other critical tasks receive on-the-job training or supervision when completing the maintenance task until the mechanic demonstrates prof… · DCA09IA017Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action
- A-10-097TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require that required inspection item (RII) inspectors receive supervision or on-the-job training on the proper inspection of RII items until the inspector demonstrates proficiency in inspection. · DCA09IA017Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action
This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).