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Cases › ENG20LA016 › The analyst

Airbus A319Spirit Airlines Inc

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

0
timed facts
8
precedents
26
passages to ask

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passages, not paraphrases
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Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.

One timeline

0 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report

No timed facts: this docket has no extracted recorder sequence and no transcript.

Recorder events without a clock time
  • 02/14/2020, SRN 57600-69900Flight 1 (NK806, KLAS to KATL) full flight recorded, inflight dual generator failure occurred; aircraft landed without further incident at KATL
  • 69048 SRNDuring the descent phase of Flight 1, the FDR stopped recording
  • ~69125 SRN (77 seconds after stop)The FDR resumed recording approximately 77 seconds later, determined by calculating the difference in GPS time recorded before and after the event
  • 02/14/2020Flight 2 (NK805, KATL to KLAS) - uneventful flight performed between the two legs of interest; no plots or tabular data provided
  • 02/15/2020, UTC 1438:00-1543:00Flight 3 (NK1818, KLAS to KSMF) full flight recorded, inflight dual generator failure occurred; aircraft landed without further incident at KSMF
  • 1542:06 UTCDuring the approach to KSMF, the FDR stopped recording
  • after 1542:06 UTCThe FDR did not resume recording before landing at KSMF
FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - SPECIALISTA��S FACTUAL REPORT · 7 events extracted by claude-sonnet-5
How the Board coded the sequence
  1. Approach-IFR initial approach: Electrical system malf/failure

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • ENG23LA0332023-08-03no fatalitiesmatch 103
    AIRBUS A320 · JETBLUE AIRWAYS CORP
    Jacksonville, FL
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Electrical power system
    Electrical system malf/failure
  • DCA08IA0332008-01-25no fatalitiesmatch 94
    Airbus A320 · United Airlines Inc
    Newark, NJ
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Electrical power system
    Electrical system malf/failure
  • DCA11FA0722011-04-02substantialmatch 73
    BOMBARDIER CL600 2B19 · US Airways Express
    Phoenix, AZ
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Electrical power system
  • WPR16FA1532016-07-294 fatalmatch 66
    PIPER PA-31T · Cal-Ore Life Flight
    McKinleyville, CA
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Electrical power system
  • DCA09IA0182008-12-11no fatalitiesmatch 65
    MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD88 · DELTA AIR LINES INC
    Greer, SC
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Electrical power system
  • DCA09FA0332009-02-28substantialmatch 64
    BOMBARDIER CRJ · Atlantic Southeast Airlines, Inc.
    Tallahassee, FL
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Electrical power system
  • ENG10IA0412010-07-18no fatalitiesmatch 62
    MCDONNELL DOUGLAS AIRCRAFT CO MD-88 · DELTA AIRLINES INC
    Atlanta, GA
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Electrical power system
  • ENG14IA0192014-07-11no fatalitiesmatch 56
    BOEING 767 332 · Delta Air Lines
    Los Angeles, CA
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Electrical power system
    Electrical system malf/failure

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Occurrences it coded
  • 6 of 8Fire/smoke (non-impact)
  • 3 of 8Electrical system malf/failure
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
  • Aircraft systems › Electrical power system
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
  • —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
  • —

A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.

In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • ENG23LA0332023-08-03 · AIRBUS A320 · JETBLUE AIRWAYS CORP
    The loss of both Integrated Drive Generators (IDG) due to worn fixed cylinder block bores, which caused the IDGs to be tripped offline and caused the airplane to enter an emergency electrical configuration.
  • DCA08IA0332008-01-25 · Airbus A320 · United Airlines Inc
    a fault in the airplane's AC 1 electrical bus that caused a number of other electrical busses on the aircraft to lose power.
  • DCA11FA0722011-04-02 · BOMBARDIER CL600 2B19 · US Airways Express
    inadequate clearance between the Integrated Drive Generator (IDG) power cables and hydraulic lines in the aft equipment bay that resulted in chaffing of the IDG power cables and hydraulic lines, arcing, and fire.
  • WPR16FA1532016-07-29 · PIPER PA-31T · Cal-Ore Life Flight
    An inflight fire in the floor area near the main bus tie circuit breaker panel that resulted from chafing between an electrical wire and a hydraulic line and/or airplane structure.
  • DCA09IA0182008-12-11 · MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD88 · DELTA AIR LINES INC
    The overheating and arcing of the DC Ground Service Relay and Block Diodes component for undetermined reasons.
What it recommended after them
  • A-08-053TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all operators of Airbus A320 family aircraft to modify these aircraft in accordance with Airbus Service Bulletin A320-24-1120 to provide the automatic reconfiguration of the AC essential bus p… · DCA08IA033Closed - Acceptable Action
  • A-08-054TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require Airbus to develop a modification for in-service A320 family aircraft such that, in the event of an AC 1 electrical bus failure, the standby attitude indicator is powered by an additional power… · DCA08IA033Closed - Acceptable Action
  • A-08-055TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all operators of A320 family aircraft to develop new procedures, if necessary, and to provide flight crews with guidance and simulator training regarding the symptoms and resolution procedures… · DCA08IA033Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action
  • A-08-056TO THE EUROPEAN AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY: Require all operators of Airbus A320 family aircraft to modify these aircraft in accordance with Airbus Service Bulletin A320-24-1120 to provide the automatic reconfiguration of the AC essential bus p… · DCA08IA033Closed - Acceptable Action
  • A-08-057TO THE EUROPEAN AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY: Require Airbus to develop a modification for in-service A320 family aircraft such that, in the event of an AC 1 electrical bus failure, the standby attitude indicator is powered by an additional power… · DCA08IA033Closed - Reconsidered
  • A-08-058TO THE EUROPEAN AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY: Require all operators of A320 aircraft to develop new procedures, if necessary, and to provide flight crews with guidance and simulator training regarding the symptoms and resolution procedures for th… · DCA08IA033Closed--No Longer Applicable
  • A-17-001TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Issue an emergency airworthiness directive (AD) that requires owners and operators of Piper PA-31T-series airplanes to take the actions recommended in Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin CE-17-… · WPR16FA153Closed - Acceptable Action

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).