FlarePath
Cases › ENG18IA003 › The analyst

AIRBUS A330-243Hawaiian Airlines

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

10
timed facts
8
precedents
16
passages to ask

Ask the docket

passages, not paraphrases
Try

Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.

One timeline

10 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report
  1. 20:42:00 PSTFDRPre-takeoffp.3
    Start of data covered in figures 1 and 2, about 10 minutes before takeoff
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  2. 20:58:00 PSTFDRApproachp.3
    Final approach begins at a pressure altitude of 2,940 ft (start of figure 7 data)
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  3. 20:58:20 PSTFDRApproachp.3
    Final approach at a pressure altitude of 2,652 ft (start of figures 5 and 6 data)
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  4. 20:59:14 PSTFDRApproach/Descentp.3
    Engine variations began while descending through a pressure altitude of 1,952 ft
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  5. 21:01:10 PSTFDRApproachp.3
    Pressure altitude of 692 ft reached (end of figure 7 data, start of figure 8 data)
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  6. 21:01:35 PSTFDRFinal Approachp.3
    Start of data covered in figures 3 and 4, about 14 seconds prior to touchdown
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  7. 21:01:49 PSTFDRLandingp.3
    Touchdown
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  8. 21:03:06 PSTFDRPost-landingp.3
    Engine 1 was shut down
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  9. 21:03:40 PSTFDRPost-landingp.3
    End of data covered in figures 8 and 9, 1 minute and 51 seconds after touchdown
    see the traces at this moment ↗
  10. 21:04:00 PSTFDRPost-landingp.3
    End of data covered in figures 1 and 2, about 2 minutes and 11 seconds after touchdown
    see the traces at this moment ↗
FLIGHT DATA RECORDER - SPECIALISTA��S FACTUAL REPORT · 10 events extracted by claude-sonnet-5
How the Board coded the sequence
  1. Approach: Flight control sys malf/fail→
  2. Landing-flare/touchdown: Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail→
  3. Landing-landing roll: Loss of engine power (partial)→
  4. Landing-landing roll: Fire/smoke (non-impact)

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • DCA09IA0142008-11-26no fatalitiesmatch 58
    BOEING 777 · Delta Air Lines
    Bozeman, MT
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control
    • ●Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Fluids
    Loss of engine power (partial)
  • ENG11IA0162011-02-09no fatalitiesmatch 51
    BOEING 757-2Q8 · DELTA AIR LINES INC
    Minneapolis, MN
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control
    Fire/smoke (non-impact)
  • ENG17IA0362017-09-06no fatalitiesmatch 51
    BOEING 757 232 · Delta Air Lines
    Las Vegas, NV
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control
    Fire/smoke (non-impact)Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail
  • ENG17IA0032016-10-26no fatalitiesmatch 51
    AIRBUS A330 223 · DELTA AIR LINES INC
    Seattle, WA
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control
    Fire/smoke (non-impact)Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail
  • ENG11IA0112010-12-25no fatalitiesmatch 50
    BOEING 737 · Southwest Airlines
    San Francisco, CA
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control
    Fire/smoke (non-impact)Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail
  • ENG16IA0272016-07-07no fatalitiesmatch 48
    BOEING 757 · DELTA AIR LINES INC
    Jamaica, NY
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control
    Fire/smoke (non-impact)Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail
  • ENG23LA0312023-06-28no fatalitiesmatch 47
    BOEING 737-9 · United Airlines
    Newark, NJ
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control
    Fire/smoke (non-impact)
  • DCA12IA0962012-06-17no fatalitiesmatch 47
    AIRBUS A320 · JETBLUE AIRWAYS CORPORATION
    Las Vegas, NV
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft handling/service › Maintenance/inspections

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Occurrences it coded
  • 6 of 8Fire/smoke (non-impact)
  • 4 of 8Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail
  • 2 of 8Engine shutdown
  • 2 of 8Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
  • Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
  • —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
  • —

A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.

In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • DCA09IA0142008-11-26 · BOEING 777 · Delta Air Lines
    An accumulation of ice in the fuel system, which formed from the water normally present in jet fuel during commonly encountered flight conditions, which accreted and released, restricting the fuel flow at the right engine fuel-oil heat exchanger inlet face. Contributing to the incident were certification requirements (with which the aircraft and engine fuel systems were in compliance), which did not account for the possibility of ice accumulating and subsequently releasing in the aircraft and engine fuel feed s…
  • ENG11IA0162011-02-09 · BOEING 757-2Q8 · DELTA AIR LINES INC
    the failure of the right engine's fuel control unit to operate correctly when the fuel metering valve became frozen in the full open position because of corrosion on the fuel metering valve slide and sleeve, which caused the engine to be overfueled during engine start and resulted in a tailpipe fire.
  • ENG17IA0362017-09-06 · BOEING 757 232 · Delta Air Lines
    A No. 1 (left) engine undercowl fire caused by a fuel nozzle installation error during engine overhaul at Delta TechOps. A fuel nozzle b-nut was cross threaded, which allowed fuel to leak on hot engine case surfaces and subsequently ignite.
  • ENG17IA0032016-10-26 · AIRBUS A330 223 · DELTA AIR LINES INC
    A No. 1 engine fire caused by a fuel manifold supply line high cycle fatigue crack which led to a fuel leak that subsequently ignited on hot engine case surfaces. The fatigue crack originated and progressed due to elevated fuel manifold assembly vibration levels. Engine vibration testing identified a combustor tone that excites a natural (resonant) frequency of the fuel manifolds at specific engine speeds on Pratt & Whitney PW4000-94 and -100 inch fan series engines that feature a TALON II combustor.
  • ENG11IA0112010-12-25 · BOEING 737 · Southwest Airlines
    The probable cause of the undercowl in-flight engine fire was the insufficient installation torque of the bolts that secure the fuel manifold cover to the fuel manifold. Engine vibrations and fuel pressure cycles caused the bolts to gradually loosen further until one bolt lost all its tightening torque and fell out. The internal fuel pressure then forced open the fuel manifold cover at the location of the missing bolt, causing a gap between the two mating surfaces which allowed fuel to push past the integral packi…

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).