FlarePath
Cases › ENG17IA027 › The analyst

BOEING 737 7H4SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO

What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.

3
timed facts
8
precedents
4
passages to ask

Ask the docket

passages, not paraphrases
Try

Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.

One timeline

3 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report
  1. 08:19:41 EDTFDRCruisep.4
    Engine 2 N2 decreased from 90.1% RPM to 49.0% RPM at pressure altitude of approximately 41,000 ft
  2. 08:19:49 EDTFDRCruisep.4
    Engine 2 N2 decreased to 0% RPM
  3. 09:12:37 EDTFDRLandingp.4
    The aircraft landed
Recorder events without a clock time
  • 0820 EDT (approx.)Right-hand (No. 2) engine failure while enroute from Tampa, FL to Rochester, NY
Flight Data Recorder - Specialist's Factual Report · 4 events extracted by claude-sonnet-5
How the Board coded the sequence
  1. Enroute: Uncontained engine failure→
  2. Enroute: Loss of engine power (total)→
  3. Enroute: Engine shutdown→
  4. Enroute: Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail

Precedents

8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded
  • ENG17IA0062016-11-29no fatalitiesmatch 78
    BOMBARDIER INC CL 600 2C10 · GoJet Airlines, LLC.
    Kansas, IL
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop)
    Engine shutdownPowerplant sys/comp malf/failUncontained engine failure
  • ENG18IA0362018-09-06no fatalitiesmatch 76
    Boeing 757 · Delta Air Lines
    Atlanta, GA
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop)
    Engine shutdownUncontained engine failure
  • ENG17IA0172017-03-19no fatalitiesmatch 76
    DOUGLAS DC 9 83 · Allegiant Air
    Dayton, OH
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop)
    Engine shutdownPowerplant sys/comp malf/fail
  • ANC08IA0922008-07-29no fatalitiesmatch 75
    Saab-Scania AB (Saab) SAAB 340B · PENINSULA AIRWAYS INC
    Anchorage, AK
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop)
    Loss of engine power (total)Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail
  • CEN20FA0352019-12-072 fatalmatch 75
    Bell 407 · Panther Helicopters Inc
    Gulf of Mexico, GM
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop)
    Loss of engine power (total)Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail
  • ENG11IA0432011-08-06no fatalitiesmatch 74
    MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DC-9-51 · Delta Air Lines
    Atlanta, GA
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop)
    Uncontained engine failure
  • ENG08IA0382008-08-06no fatalitiesmatch 72
    BOEING 757 · DELTA AIR LINES INC
    Las Vegas, NV
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop)
    Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail
  • ENG16IA0012015-10-02no fatalitiesmatch 72
    BOEING 747 · Delta Air Lines
    Russian airspace, JP
    • ●Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop)
    Engine shutdown

What the record says

a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable cause
Findings the Board cited in those cases
Occurrences it coded
  • 5 of 8Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail
  • 4 of 8Engine shutdown
  • 3 of 8Uncontained engine failure
  • 3 of 8Loss of engine power (partial)
  • 2 of 8Loss of engine power (total)
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
  • Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop)
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
  • —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
  • —

A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.

In the Board’s words — the closest cases
  • ENG17IA0062016-11-29 · BOMBARDIER INC CL 600 2C10 · GoJet Airlines, LLC.
    The probable cause of the uncontained No. 1 (left) engine failure was a separated high pressure turbine 2nd stage blade that failed due to a fatigue crack that originated below the blade platform from an area of corrosion.
  • ENG18IA0362018-09-06 · Boeing 757 · Delta Air Lines
    A right engine turbine uncontainment resulting from failure of the high pressure turbine (HPT) lenticular seal due to a fatigue crack originating from an overheated region at a knife edge tip. Contributing to the failure was Pratt & Whitney’s decision to introduce the temperature-resistant knife-edge coating as a new-part number lenticular seal on an attrition basis without the option to recoat existing lenticular seals, which delayed implementation of the more durable seal material into the fleet.
  • ENG17IA0172017-03-19 · DOUGLAS DC 9 83 · Allegiant Air
    The probable cause of the No. 2 (right) engine fire was an uncontained generator failure. Deformed rotating generator components and/or metal fragments radially released by the generator severed the constant speed drive-to-oil cooler return line located adjacent to the generator and caused oil to spray onto hot generator and engine case surfaces that subsequently ignited.
  • ANC08IA0922008-07-29 · Saab-Scania AB (Saab) SAAB 340B · PENINSULA AIRWAYS INC
    The failure of one of the stage 1 gas generator rotor blades due to high-cycle fatigue, resulting in a contained engine failure during the takeoff roll.
  • CEN20FA0352019-12-07 · Bell 407 · Panther Helicopters Inc
    A total loss of engine power due to the failure of the engine’s Nos. 3 and 4 bearings and the power turbine pinion gear, and subsequent loss of main rotor rpm, which resulted in a loss of control and impact with the water.
What it recommended after them
  • A-08-085TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require that Pratt & Whitney PW2037 engines be removed from service for inspection of the 2nd stage turbine hubs when they have accumulated significantly fewer hours and/or cycles than the incident en… · ENG08IA038Closed - Unacceptable Action
  • A-08-086TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require that Pratt & Whitney PW2037 2nd stage turbine hubs undergo recurring inspections when they have accumulated significantly fewer hours and/or cycles than the incident engine (10,880 hours and/o… · ENG08IA038Closed - Acceptable Action

This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).