Cases › ENG17IA005 › The analyst
EMBRAER ERJ170 200LRSKYWEST AIRLINES INC
What the docket says, assembled. No language model is involved, so nothing on this page can be invented — every line traces to a recorder, a report page or the Board's own record.
22
timed facts
8
precedents
10
passages to ask
Ask the docket
passages, not paraphrasesTry
Every answer is a passage of the docket with the page it came from, or the words “not in the docket”. Nothing is summarised or reasoned for you — read the source.
One timeline
22 timed factsthe recorder events from the FDR report, with the transcript's warnings, callouts, the words nearest each event and the final seconds — on one clock, as printed in each report- 18:16FDRDeparture/Climbp.3Flight departed and climbed to cruise altitude of 36,000 ftsee the traces at this moment ↗
- 19:06FDRDescent (first approach to MMTY)p.3Aircraft began to descendsee the traces at this moment ↗
- 19:30:08FDRApproachp.3Landing gear commanded down with landing gear lever, aircraft descending through 3,677 ft; left, right, and nose landing gear status transitioned from Up and Locked to In Transitsee the traces at this moment ↗
- 19:30:20 (approx, 12 sec after transition)FDRApproachp.3Left and right landing gear status became Down and Locked; nose gear status remained In Transitsee the traces at this moment ↗
- 19:30:29FDRApproachp.3Master Warning annunciated with associated Gear Lever Disagree message (7 seconds after main gear became Down and Locked)see the traces at this moment ↗
- ~19:31:00FDRMissed approachp.3Aircraft stopped its descent at about 3,650 ftsee the traces at this moment ↗
- 19:31:34FDRMissed approachp.3Gear handle moved to the up position; both main and nose gear transitioned to Up and Locked; Gear Lever Disagree message clearedsee the traces at this moment ↗
- ~19:36 (about 5 minutes after 19:31:34)FDRSecond gear extension attemptp.3Gear handle moved to down position again, with same result as first attempt (nose gear remained In Transit)see the traces at this moment ↗
- 19:40:48FDRClimb / diversion decisionp.3Gear handle moved back to up position; aircraft began to climbsee the traces at this moment ↗
- 20:02FDRClimb/Descentp.3Aircraft climbed to 33,000 ft then began a second descentsee the traces at this moment ↗
- 20:18:40FDRDescent toward KSATp.3Gear handle moved to down position with aircraft descending through 10,200 ft; all gear status became In Transit, followed by left and right gear becoming Down and Locked; nose gear status remained In Transitsee the traces at this moment ↗
- 20:19:12FDRDescent toward KSATp.3Gear retractedsee the traces at this moment ↗
- 20:19:34FDRDescent toward KSATp.3Gear commanded down again; left and right gear transitioned to Down and Locked, nose gear remained In Transitsee the traces at this moment ↗
- 20:29FDRLow passp.3Aircraft descended to 500 feet AGL for one minutesee the traces at this moment ↗
- 20:29-20:41 (approx, climb then circle for ~12 minutes)FDRHoldingp.3Aircraft climbed to 4,000 ft where it circled one timesee the traces at this moment ↗
- 20:49FDRFinal approachp.3Aircraft began its final descentsee the traces at this moment ↗
- prior to 20:53:28FDRFinal approachp.3Airspeed stable at 130-132 knots during approachsee the traces at this moment ↗
- 20:53:28FDRLandingp.3Aircraft touched down on main gear at KSAT runway 4 with airspeed 113 knots and ground speed 95 knotssee the traces at this moment ↗
- 20:53:28 to 20:53:38 (approx 10 sec)FDRLanding rolloutp.3Pitch decreased slowly to a value consistent with the nose gear resting on the groundsee the traces at this moment ↗
- 20:53:41FDRLanding rolloutp.4Nose gear began to retract at a ground speed of 52 knots with no change in the recorded gear handle positionsee the traces at this moment ↗
- ~20:53:51 (about 10 seconds later)FDRLanding rollout / stopp.4Aircraft slowed to a stop; final resting pitch of the aircraft was -5.98 degreessee the traces at this moment ↗
- 20:53:54FDRPost-landingp.4Engines were shut down and recording stoppedsee the traces at this moment ↗
Flight Data Recorder Specialist's Factual Report · 22 events extracted by claude-sonnet-5
How the Board coded the sequence
- Landing-landing roll: Landing gear collapse
Precedents
8 closest casesranked by what happened, in the Board's words, and by the findings and occurrences it coded- BOEING 737-824 · United AirlinesDenver, CO
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
Landing gear collapse - BOEING 737 · Southwest Airlines, Co.Chicago, IL
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
Landing gear collapse - BOEING 737-890 · Alaska AirlinesSanta Ana, CA
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
Landing gear collapse - MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DC 9 83(MD-83) · Caribbean Sun Airlines IncAlexandria, LA
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
Landing gear collapse - DOUGLAS DC8 · ASTAR AIR CARGO INCCincinnati (CVG), OH
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
- DeHavilland DHC-8-311 · Piedmont AirlinesPhiladelphia, PA
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
- BOMBARDIER INC CL 600 2C10 · GOJET AIRLINES LLCChicago, IL
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
- BEECH 1900D · Great Lakes AviationDenver, CO
- ●Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
Landing gear collapse
What the record says
a pattern, not a findingacross the 8 closest cases · 8 carry coded findings · 8 have a probable causeFindings the Board cited in those cases
- 8 of 8Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear systemcited here too
Occurrences it coded
- 5 of 8Landing gear collapse
- 4 of 8Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
- 2 of 8Aircraft structural failure
Set against the Board’s own findings for this case
Cited here, and common in the precedents
- Aircraft systems › Landing gear system
Cited here, not seen in the precedents
- —
Common in the precedents, not cited here
- —
A teaching device, not a verdict: what the record would have looked at, next to what the Board found.
In the Board’s words — the closest cases
- DCA20LA0472019-12-23 · BOEING 737-824 · United Airlines
Maintenance personnel’s excessive grinding of the left main landing gear’s aft trunnion pin during its initial overhaul, which caused heat damage to the base metal and led to the fatigue crack that caused the pin to fail during the accident flight. Contributing to the accident was the failure of maintenance personnel to detect the excessive grinding during the initial overhaul and the fatigue crack during the subsequent overhaul.
- ENG08IA0422008-10-01 · BOEING 737 · Southwest Airlines, Co.
The right nose landing gear axle's failure from intergranular and fatigue cracking due to an earlier bearing failure.
- DCA23FA4172023-08-21 · BOEING 737-890 · Alaska Airlines
Maintenance personnel’s excessive grinding of the left main landing gear’s aft trunnion pin during machining, which imparted heat damage to the base metal and led to the fatigue cracking that caused the pin to fracture during landing.
- DCA18FA1442018-04-20 · MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DC 9 83(MD-83) · Caribbean Sun Airlines Inc
the failure of the right main landing gear under normal loads due to fatigue cracking in an area subject to an FAA Airworthiness Directive that was not adequately inspected.
- ENG10IA0162010-01-07 · DOUGLAS DC8 · ASTAR AIR CARGO INC
Failure of the NLG cylinder occurred by intergranular rupture; coincidental to a chrome plating crack. The failure origin occurred along the inner surface of the cylinder and then propagated by stress corrosion cracking to the outer surface. A secondary crack with the same features as the primary crack was found diagonal to the primary crack. Both cracks initiated by intergranular cracking due to grinding burns caused by abusive grinding and propagated by stress corrosion cracking. Hydrogen embrittlement did not co…
What it recommended after them
- A-13-004TO THE HAWKER BEECHCRAFT CORPORATION: Determine the fatigue life (life limit) of the Beechcraft 1900D nose landing gear (NLG) end cap with the longitudinal grain direction both aligned and not aligned with the longitudinal axis of the NLG. · CEN11IA341Open - Acceptable Response
- A-13-005TO THE HAWKER BEECHCRAFT CORPORATION: Develop and implement a replacement program for all Beechcraft 1900D nose landing gear end caps based on the fatigue life determined in Safety Recommendation A-13-04. · CEN11IA341Open - Acceptable Response
- A-13-006TO THE HAWKER BEECHCRAFT CORPORATION: Revise the Beechcraft 1900D nose landing gear end cap repetitive inspection procedure and time interval to ensure that fatigue cracks are detected prior to failure and issue updated guidance to operator… · CEN11IA341Open - Acceptable Response
This is the pattern in the NTSB’s own record across similar accidents — which findings it cited, what it coded, what it recommended. It is drawn from the record, not written about this case, and it never assigns blame: investigations exist to prevent the next accident (ICAO Annex 13).